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iAbstract
This thesis aims at exploring the link between information sharing
and collective natural resources management (NRM). Reflexivity is often
referred to as a possible solution and one of the main ways to mobilize ac-
tors around collective objects. This reflexivity may be achieved through
the implementation and use of information sharing artifacts.
So as to qualify the relation linking information sharing and NRM, I
focused on the specific case of oyster farmers, investigating two case stud-
ies: the Thau Basin, France, and several estuaries in New South Wales,
Australia. Oyster farmers are particularly sensitive to water quality and
are currently severely harmed by a virulent virus. Locally, actors devel-
oped and used various types of information sharing artifacts. Artifacts
are destined to tackle threats that oysters farmers face.
Realizing this focal point of interest led to develop the concept of
threats using the traditional goods and resources typology as a base for
comparison. Threats are defined as the 〈A, C, I, D, E〉 model: a group of
actors A is concerned for some characteristics C of goods or resources
they use which is influenced by local infrastructure I, human decisions D
and environmental dynamics E. They are organized along two main
axes: internality, that determines how open or closed the threat is, and
excludability that focuses on how much actors may individually find ways
to tackle the threat.
Framing oyster farming situation using this concept allows for a char-
acterization of stakes for information sharing artifacts when they are des-
tined to help actors cope with different types of threats, as actors of the
cases do.
To explore these stakes and evaluate the role information sharing
artifacts may have in social-ecological systems (SES), specifically on oys-
ter farming, I adopted a descriptive approach and first delved into actual
artifacts, evaluating qualitatively their impact with the ENCORE frame-
work. Then, I developed an exploratory agent-based model, a tool that
permits a quantitative evaluation of various facets of SESs: environment,
beliefs, knowledge and practices of actors.
The various artifacts studied in the thesis show that their nature
encompasses a wide variety of in goals, contents or media, may lead to
improvements in reflexivity or to little to no changes. These improve-
ments, or differences, are strongly linked to the artifact creation process.
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0.1 Introduction
La gestion de ressources naturelles est un enjeu planétaire et pressant dû no-
tamment à la croissance de la population, à l’augmentation des besoins, ou à la
pression urbaine (Steffen et al., 2015). La gestion de ressources naturelles ne se
résume pas à un enjeu technique et à un savoir d’expert(s) mais relève plutôt
de la science post-normale à cause des fortes incertitudes et de l’importance
des enjeux (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 2003). Elle fait intervenir l’histoire, les
règles et institutions existantes, les acteurs d’un territoire dépendant de ces
ressources à des niveaux variés ainsi que les dynamiques environnementales.
L’étude de ce domaine inscrit dans la complexité appelle donc fortement à
l’interdisciplinarité (Bhaskar et al., 2010), une position que nous avons adop-
tée dans cette thèse où nous avons mis les disciplines au service de l’objet
étudié. Nous avons aussi procédé avec prudence quant à la généralisation de
résultats grâce à aller-retour constant entre cas particulier et cas général.
L’information et son partage sont postulés comme utiles à la réflexivité des
acteurs sur leurs pratiques et leur territoire (Young et al., 2006). Sur un certain
nombre de territoires, de tels outils ont été développés, de manière et avec des
buts variés. Dans cette thèse, nous nous sommes demandés quelle pouvait être
la conséquence de la mise en place de tels dispositifs, appelés artéfacts, tant
au niveau de l’environnement qu’au niveau des acteurs et de leurs pratiques.
Pour étudier cette question, nous avons spécifiquement étudié des cas
d’étude précis autour de l’ostréiculture. Nous avons sélectionné deux cas où
des acteurs d’un territoire se mobilisent pour créer un artéfact. Nous nous
sommes premièrement demandé pourquoi et comment les acteurs créent ces
outils et qui sont ceux qui s’impliquent dans cette création. L’étude de ces
cas, que nous présentons ci-dessous, nous a mené à comprendre que les acteurs
se mobilisent en grande partie pour collectivement faire face à des “menaces”.
Cette découverte nous a amené à formuler et étudier la problématique suivante
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:
Comment le partage de l’information entre des acteurs en interaction entre
eux et avec une ou des ressources naturelles peut-il les aider à faire face à des
menaces ?
0.2 Etat de l’art
Premièrement, nous décrivons la vision usuelle de la gestion collective de
ressources naturelles telle qu’étudiée théoriquement et empiriquement dans
la lignée de Ostrom. Nous proposons ensuite notre apport concernant la prob-
lématisation de la question de l’action collective pour la gestion de ressources
naturelles autour de la notion de menaces. Finalement, nous mettons en lu-
mière les enjeux de partage de l’information en regard des menaces.
0.2.1 Gestion de ressources naturelles et communs
Les travaux d’Elinor Ostrom et de nombreux autres chercheurs, focalisés sur
l’étude des institutions mises en place par des acteurs utilisant et gérant une
ressource dont ils ont besoin ont permis d’en terminer avec l’idée d’une néces-
saire tragédie des communs. Selon cette fable, contée dans Hardin (1968), un
commun laissé en autogestion est voué à disparaître car les acteurs les utilisant
vont chercher égoïstement (rationnellement) à maximiser le bénéfice qu’ils peu-
vent tirer de la ressource, menant à son épuisement. Les solutions proposées
sont une gestion publique ou une gestion privée.
Dans Governing the commons, Ostrom (1990) démontre empiriquement
que dans certaines conditions, des acteurs ont réussi à créer, maintenir et faire
évoluer des institutions qu’ils considèrent légitimes pour gérer de façon durable
et équitable des ressources qui doivent être partagées. Les biens sont classés
selon deux dimensions, l’exclusivité (peut-on empêcher quelqu’un de profiter
de la ressource ?) et la substractabilité (l’utilisation du bien par un acteur,
par prélèvement par exemple, limite-t-elle son utilisation par d’autres acteurs
ou a-t-elle un impact sur le bien ?). La réponse à ces questions permet de
distinguer quatre principaux types de bien : public, club, privé et commun.
Le commun est dans cette classification une ressource non exclusive et sub-
stractable. L’accès, l’usage et la gestion de ces biens et ressources sont classés
sous un angle de faisceaux de droits qui se superposent, donnant des droits var-
iés à différents acteurs et à différents moments (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992).
Une question fondamentale présente dans la thèse de Hardin et vérifiée
empiriquement dans de nombreux domaines est la problématique du dilemme
social, situation dans laquelle un individu a intérêt à suivre son intérêt per-
sonnel plutôt que de collaborer avec l’autre ou les autres. Une telle personne
est alors appelée un passager clandestin. Dans un travail collectif, il peut être
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Figure 1: Cadre des Systèmes Socio-Ecologiques (McGinnis and Ostrom, 2014)
tentant de laisser les autres faire (investir du temps ou de l’argent) pour prof-
iter du résultat. Or si chacun suit son intérêt personnel, le résultat global
ne pourra être atteint. Les communs peuvent se trouver dans cette situation.
Pour s’en sortir, plusieurs stratégies sont evisageables, comme la communica-
tion, l’établissement de contrats ou une vision de son intérêt à long terme (qui
se confond alors avec l’intérêt collectif).
L’étude des communs a permis l’établissement d’un cadre appelé le cadre
des systèmes socio-écologiques qui nous a guidé pour l’exploration des cas
d’étude de la thèse (Folke et al., 2005; McGinnis and Ostrom, 2014) (Fig-
ure 1). Ce cadre met en lien un système de ressources (par exemple une forêt)
que des acteurs (des forestiers, des chasseurs) utilisent pour extraire des unités
de ressources (des arbres, des animaux) en fonction d’un système de gouver-
nance (collectivités, parcs naturels, associations ...). Ces éléments forment des
situations d’action favorisant certains types d’interactions menant à des ré-
sultats, tant pour les acteurs que pour le système de ressources. Ce système
socio-écologique est vu comme un système complexe où les rétroactions ont
un rôle important : ces situations d’interaction rétroagissent sur les autres
éléments.
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Figure 2: Relations entre les élements constitutifs d’une menace 〈A, C, I, D, E〉.
0.2.2 Menaces
L’approche développée concernant la gestion de ressources collectives met
l’accent sur la ressource et les règles que les acteurs ont mis en place. Or,
l’étude des cas montre qu’une partie de l’action collective est déclenchée par
une perception commune de menaces qui pèsent sur certaines caractéristiques
importantes des ressources et bien utilisés. Cette action collective peut se
traduire par la mise en place de règles, de mesures ou d’artéfacts de partage
de l’information.
Une menace, par exemple la possibilité de pertes de récoltes à cause d’un
ravageur, est indépendante du régime de propriété du bien sous-jacent. Ces
menaces peuvent agir sur un ensemble de champs de même type ou sur des
ressources halieutiques partagées.
Nous avons défini les menaces dans le cadre de la gestion de ressources
naturelles à l’aide du 5-uple 〈A, C, I, D, E〉 (Figure 2). A est un groupe d’acteurs
qui s’inquiètent pour certaines caractéristiques C de biens ou de ressources
(appelés actifs) qu’ils possèdent ou utilisent. I contient les infrastructures au
sens de Anderies and Janssen (2013), i.e. , humaines (du canal aux règles) ou
naturelles. L’infrastructure est ici considérée dans un sens large comme un
ensemble de contraintes ou d’éléments qui pourraient avoir une influence sur
certaines caractéristiques des actifs C. Finalement, D et E sont les événements
comme les décisions humaines (D) et les dynamiques environnmentales (E) qui
peuvent affecter, directement ou indirectement à travers I, les actifs.
Cette définition permet de capturer les caractéristiques essentielles à la
description d’une menace. Elle est volontairement subjective et relative à un
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Table 1: Une typologie des menaces
Internalité
Faible Forte
Exclusion Difficile Publique CommuneAisée X Privée
ensemble d’acteurs, ce qui la distingue de la vision habituelle d’un risque qui
se veut une probabilité objective.
A ce stade, il manque un moyen pour les acteurs d’envisager des actions
pour lutter contre les menaces. Nous avons identifié deux axes menant à
une typologie permettant de repérer des stratégies d’actions pour les acteurs
une fois d’accord sur ses caractéristiques principales. Les deux axes que nous
avons retenus sont : l’internalité et l’exclusion. Une menace est interne si
la menace émane des acteurs de A eux-mêmes ou si elle ne concerne qu’eux.
Une menace est exclusive s’il est possible pour un acteur de s’extraire seul de
la menace. Cette classification nous a mené à définir trois types principaux
de menaces découverts grâce aux cas d’étude (Tableau 1). Premièrement, les
menaces communes (forte internalité et exclusion difficile), les plus classiques,
qui concernent la présence de passagers clandestins entre autres. Ce sont
celles qui sont la focale de la littérature sur la gestion collective de ressources
naturelles. Deuxièmement, les menaces privées (forte internalité et exclusion
aisée) pour lesquelles la lutte peut nécessiter un partage d’information en plus
d’un apprentissage des acteurs. Troisièmement, les menaces publiques (faible
internalité et exclusion difficile) sont des menaces qui ne peuvent être réglées de
l’intérieur par les seuls acteurs touchés, elles sont particulièrement importantes
dans des systèmes ouverts aux influences extérieures. Les cas d’étude que
nous avons menés ne nous ont pas permis d’identifier des menaces de faible
internalité et d’exclusion aisée. Cela n’empêche pas leur possible existence
dans d’autres situations.
0.2.3 Information et partage de l’information
C’est grâce à la perspective des menaces que nous avons étudié l’information
dans le cadre de gestion de ressources naturelles renouvelables. Cette notion
est difficile à cerner car l’information peut facilement être vue partout, au
travers d’éléments repérés dans l’environnement, d’apprentissages personnels,
d’échanges avec d’autres acteurs ou de connaissances accessibles via des arté-
facts. La définition de l’information diffère grandement en fonction de la focale
envisagée, de la discipline, de l’objectif.
Afin de pouvoir distinguer l’information de la non information, nous avons
retenu la définition suivante due à Bateson (1972): “l’information est une dif-
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férence qui fait la différence”. Cette définition permet une vision subjective
de l’information adaptée à la subjectivité de la notion de menace : ce qui fait
information pour un acteur ne fait pas forcément information pour un autre.
Nous pouvons observer plusieurs problématiques spécifiques à la gestion de
ressources naturelles concernant le partage de l’information via des artéfacts.
Premièrement, contrairement aux grands réseaux de partage d’information
comme Wikipedia, l’anonymat est limité et peut amener certains à se retenir
de partager leurs expériences. Deuxièmement, un comportement stratégique
de la part des acteurs peut se manifester. Ainsi si certains résultats sont
attendus, les observations inscrites peuvent être biaisées. Troisièmement, la
question du passager clandestin subsiste puisque certains acteurs peuvent se
reposer sur le travail de partage d’information d’autres acteurs sans participer
à l’effort collectif. Il s’agit là d’un dilemme du second-ordre dans les cas où
l’artéfact est destiné à lutter contre des dilemmes sociaux observés. Un dernier
problème résulte de l’auto-réalisation, telle une prophétie, liée au partage de
certaines informations : la nouvelle d’un possible épuisement d’une ressource
peut accéler son épuisement en faisant évoluer les schémas mentaux d’une
gestion d’une ressource renouvelable vers celui d’une ressource minière où le
premier arrivé est le premier servi, comme le montre l’exemple étudié par
Villena and Zecchetto (2010).
En plus des problèmes évoqués, il est nécessaire de garder en tête que le
partage de l’information peut se faire de multiples façons qui dépassent le cadre
des artéfacts qui sont le centre d’attention de notre travail. Ainsi les acteurs
partagent-ils l’information via leurs réseaux ou lors de rencontres en direct
entre autres. Ces réseaux sont d’une importance fondamentale et sont l’objet
de nombreuses études (Bodin and Prell, 2011).
La complexité de la définition et l’ubiquité de l’usage de l’information
nous a amené à défricher la question de l’information et de son partage pour
faire face à des menaces en suivant trois axes principaux : pourquoi partager
l’information ? quelle information partager ? comment la partager ?
Si la menace est publique, l’information permet de légitimer l’action de
certains acteurs ou de faire du lobbying. Dans le cas d’une menace commune,
elle peut permettre de gérer les conflits ou de limiter les passagers clandestins.
Si la menace est privée, l’information peut servir à comprendre les dynamiques
environnementales, ou à augmenter les connaissances. Les types d’information
à partager sont extrêmement variés, allant de mesures quantitatives environ-
nementales à des règles à porter à la connaissance de tous, en passant par
les décisions prises par les acteurs. Les moyens de partage de l’information
sont aussi multiples allant du simple échange interpersonnel, aux réunions de
groupe ou au partage institutionnel. La description d’un artéfact de partage
de l’information peut se faire en décrivant les éléments suivants : but, type,
lecture, écriture, granularité et caractère dynamique.
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0.3 Methodologie
Lors de la thèse, nous avons suivi deux directions majeures pour étudier la
question du partage de l’information. La première a consisté à explorer des
cas d’étude réels, la seconde à développer un modèle multi-agents.
L’étude de deux cas réels centrés sur l’ostréiculture, en France et en Aus-
tralie, nous a permis de nous imprégner de situations existantes tout en ré-
duisant les fortes limites liées à la focalisation sur un cas unique, comme monter
trop hâtivement en généralité, et la dispersion liée à l’étude de cas trop nom-
breux pour la durée d’une thèse. Pour le cas français, nous avons interviewé
17 ostréiculteurs (sur les 500 de la lagune), 1 membre de syndicat mixte et par-
ticipé à 1 conférence et 5 réunions avec des acteurs. Pour le cas australien, nous
avons interviewé 13 ostréiculteurs situés dans 9 estuaires différents (sur 320),
3 membres des pouvoirs publics et parcticipé à une rencontre entre acteurs.
Nous avions initialement choisi de nous concentrer sur un unique estuaire en
Australie, mais la plupart des ostréiculteurs de cet estuaire autrefois important
ont fait faillite à cause d’un virus particulièrement virulent dont nous parlerons
plus tard. Nous avons donc opté pour une étude de plusieurs estuaires aux
problématiques similaires.
Les entretiens réalisés, 34 au total, étaient semi-ouverts et guidés par les
éléments majeurs suivants : quelles sont les conditions locales et quelles sont
vos pratiques ; quelle est votre vision du rôle des ostréiculteurs dans la gestion
de l’environnement (au sens large) et quelle est votre implication ; quelle est
votre relation avec les autres ostréiculteurs et les artéfacts étudiés.
L’influence des artefacts de partage de l’information a été mesurée selon
deux méthodes, une qualitative et une quantitative. Nous avons utilisé le cadre
ENCORE (externe, normatif, cognitif, opérationnel, relationnel et équité)
(Ferrand, 2004) qui permet une description d’aspects qualitatifs sur 6 dimen-
sions pour différents acteurs ou groupes d’acteurs, dans notre cas, en com-
parant les situations avec et sans la présence d’artéfacts.
En complément de ces études de cas réels, nous avons développé un modèle
multi-agents. Un modèle multi-agent est un laboratoire expérimental in silico
permettant de construire et tester précisément différents scénarios (notamment
de partage d’information) afin de comparer leurs conséquences. Cet outil est
particulièrement utile pour étudier des systèmes complexes et les relations en-
tre niveaux micro (au niveau des agents) et macro (au niveau global) (Edmonds
and Meyer, 2013a). Il est souple dans la définition du fonctionnement interne
des entités ainsi que de leurs interactions et ne demande pas de résolution
mathématique. Plus précisément, nous avons développé un modèle en util-
isant le logiciel Cormas (Bousquet et al., 1998; Le Page et al., 2012) que nous
avons couplé au logiciel de statistiques R (R Core Team, 2015). Nous nous
sommes fortement appuyé sur les techniques classiques de conception informa-
tique orientée-objet (comme UML) et utilisé un protocole dédié aux modèles
multi-agents dans le cadre de la gestion de ressources naturelles, le protocole
xx RÉSUMÉ EN FRANÇAIS
Estuaire
Précipitations
Bassin 
versant
Réservoir
Mer
Aquifère Flux hydrologiques
Saisonniers
Episodiques
Continus
Figure 3: Flux hydrologiques majeurs d’un bassin versant côtier.
ODD+D (Overview, Design concepts and Details + Decisions) (Grimm et al.,
2006; Müller et al., 2013).
0.4 Etude de cas
Les cas d’étude sont centrés sur l’ostréiculture, une profession qui a été, à notre
connaissance, peu étudiée par la communauté des chercheurs sur la gestion
collective de ressources naturelles. Au commencement de l’enquête, nous nous
étions assuré que les cas d’étude choisis permettraient d’investiguer le partage
de l’information car les acteurs avaient développé ou étaient en train de mettre
en place des artéfacts.
0.4.1 Généralités et intérêt du cas de l’ostréiculture
La culture d’huîtres se fait au niveau d’estuaires, espaces ouverts et points de
sortie de bassins versants côtiers (Figure 3). Les tables sur lesquelles sont cul-
tivées les huîtres sont donc situées à l’aval de ces bassins. La qualité de l’eau
est fortement influencée par les activités dans l’estuaire et dans le reste du
bassin versant. Des pics de pollution microbiologique ont régulièrement lieu,
à la suite de fortes pluies ou de défaillances de stations d’épuration. Ces pics
obligent les autorités sanitaires à interdire temporairement la vente d’huîtres,
ce qui a un impact économique pour les ostréiculteurs et pour la région en
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Figure 4: L’information permet-elle de boucler la boucle ?
général. La qualité de l’eau est dans le cas présent assimilée à la quantité
d’E. coli dans l’eau, l’indicateur habituellement utilisé. Les estuaires sont des
lieux aux usages multiples avec des utilisateurs exercant divers droits d’usage
(accès, extraction) et ayant des besoins différents pour la qualité de l’eau. Les
ostréiculteurs sont les acteurs requerrant les conditions de qualité les plus ex-
igeantes. Une eau de qualité assez bonne pour garantir la production d’huître
consommables vivantes est assez bonne pour tous les autres usages. Les os-
tréiculteurs ont donc un fort intérêt à travailler dans un environnement le plus
préservé possible. Remarquons qu’une eau riche en microbiologie est une eau
favorable au développement des huîtres, organismes filtrants, bien qu’elle ne
soient pas consommables à ces moments précis.
La difficulté que les ostréiculteurs rencontrent est due au fait que la qualité
de l’eau est surtout liée aux comportements d’acteurs situés à l’amont du
bassin versant. Le flux physique d’eau arrivant dans l’estuaire (en négligeant
les échanges avec la mer) est donc situé en dehors de la zone d’action des
ostréiculteurs, ou tout du moins, n’est pas directement lié à leurs pratiques :
bien que similaire à l’agriculture par la fixité des installations, il n’est pas
possible à un ostréiculteur, ni même à un groupe d’ostréiculteurs, de changer
la qualité de l’eau devant sa ferme par des actions personnelles directes sur la
ressource alors qu’un agriculteur peut tenter d’utiliser des pesticides pour se
prémunir contre une attaque d’insectes.
Comment les ostriéculteurs pourraient-ils trouver le moyen d’exercer une
influence sur la qualité de cette eau située au centre de leur activité ? Y a-t-il
une possibilité pour eux de remonter ce flux physique d’eau et ainsi de fermer
la boucle du système dans lequel ils s’inscrivent ? Le partage de l’information
via des artéfacts est-il une solution possible et utile ? (Figure 4)
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0.4.2 Cas spécifiques et artéfacts focaux
Avant de répondre à ces questions, nous allons entrer dans le détail des cas
d’étude évoqués dans la section Méthodologie.
0.4.2.1 Etang de Thau, France - OmegaThau
L’étang (ou lagune) de Thau est situé dans le sud de la France, près de la
ville de Sète. La culture d’huîtres y est dévelopée depuis plus de 100 ans et
a pris son essort après 1945 (Giovannoni, 1995). La lagune est lieu d’usages
multiples (pêcheurs, ostréiculteurs, plaisanciers, bateaux de commerce), parfois
conflictuels. Plus de 500 entreprises ostréicoles, pour 2000 emplois permanents,
sont présentes sur la lagune. Le Syndicat Mixte du Bassin de Thau a déclaré
comme prioritaire la préservation des petits métiers (nom utilisé pour désigner
pêcheurs et ostréiculteurs) dans le Schéma d’Aménagement et de Gestion des
Eaux (SAGE) dont le Syndicat a coordonné la rédaction.
Dans le cadre de la mission du Syndicat Mixte, un outil de connaissances, de
suivi et de prédiction des flux microbiologiques a été développé : OmegaThau
(Figure 5, à gauche). Cet outil utilise un modèle basé sur des modèles hy-
drologiques, un réseau de capteurs et les prévisions météo pour réaliser ces
prévisions de flux. Les ostréiculteurs peuvent alors être prévenus au plus tôt
d’une possible interdiction de vente imminente afin qu’ils s’y préparent.
Les huîtres cultivées sur l’étang de Thau, la Pacific Oyster Crassostrea
Gigas (PO), proviennent principalement d’écloseries industrielles produisant
du naissain ainsi que de captages naturels directement réalisés dans l’étang.
Les écloseries produisent deux types d’huîtres : des diploides et des triploides,
huîtres provenant d’un croisement entre une huître quadriploide et une diploide.
Les huîtres triploides sont stériles et ne produisent pas de laitance. Elles ar-
rivent à maturité en 2 ans (au lieu de 3 pour les diploides) ce qui leur confère
un fort avantage économique. Depuis 2008, les huîtres du bassin sont touchées
par un herpès virus OsHV-1 qui élimine jusqu’à 90 % de la population en
quelques jours, au printemps, quand les eaux se réchauffent. Les entretiens
avec les ostréiculteurs ont montré que là résidait leur préoccupation principale
et non sur la question microbiologique, contrairement à ce que nous postulions
au départ.
0.4.2.2 New South Wales, Australie - Environmental management
systems
La culture des huîtres dans le New South Wales (NSW) emploie 1600 personnes
réparties dans 320 entreprises et 32 estuaires le long des 1300 km de côte. Un
estuaire peut compter entre 3 et 30 entreprises. Ces estuaires ont des conditions
locales différentes, notamment à cause de la présence ou non d’un fleuve ou de
grandes villes. Les exigences de qualité de l’eau sont similaires aux Françaises.
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Figure 5: Les principaux artéfacts étudiés. A gauche, le système d’observation
OmegaThau (France) ; à droite, un système de management environnemental
(Australie).
L’huître cultivée en majorité est une huître locale, la Sydney Rock Oyster
Saccostrea Glomerata (SRO), à laquelle s’ajoute la culture de PO triploides
stériles (cette huître en diploide est considérée comme invasive) dans certains
estuaires. La production globale a décliné, passant de 9400 tonnes en 1976
à 3500 en 2012 à cause de diverses épizooties. Le même virus que celui qui
sévit en France, l’herpès virus OsHV-1, a fait son apparition dans le NSW en
2012, réduisant à néant les efforts de nombreux ostréiculteurs.
Depuis 2010, grâce à quelques ostréiculteurs proactifs et à l’intervention
d’une association mi-publique mi-privée, Ocean Watch, l’industrie ostréicole
se dote petit à petit d’outils de partage d’information appelés Environmen-
tal Management System (EMS) (Figure 5, à droite). Ces artefacts sont des
livrets d’information disponibles sur internet et localement, écrits au niveau
des estuaires (en 2016, 50 % des estuaires étaient équipés). Ils contiennent des
informations sur le bassin versant et l’estuaire dans lequel les ostréiculteurs
agissent, une description des pratiques de ces acteurs ainsi que l’ensemble des
risques perçus par les ostréiculteurs, qu’ils soient internes (directement liés à
l’activité ostréicole) ou externes (ayant un impact sur cette même activité).
Les ostriéculteurs interviewés se sont montrés fiers de l’existence de cet outil
qui a mené à l’émergence d’organisations plus structurées qu’auparavant pour
cette industrie, comme Australia’s Oyster Coast ou Sapphire Coast Wilderness
Oysters.
0.4.2.3 Discussion sur les cas étudiés
Les deux cas d’étude concernent l’industrie ostréicole et sont comparables au
niveau des modes de production, d’autant que les niveaux de développement
des pays sont similaires. Il est donc raisonnable de comparer ces cas. Malgré de
nombreuses similarités, il existe deux différences importantes qu’il nous faut
noter et que nous avons pu identifier grâce à l’application systématique du
cadre des systèmes socio-écologiques aux cas.
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Figure 6: La menace microbiologique sur la qualité de l’eau.
La première est une question de taille : plus de 500 fermes cultivent des
huîtres sur le bassin de Thau alors que les estuaires australiens ne comptent
pas plus de 30 fermes chacun. Cela a des conséquences sur la capacité collec-
tive d’organisation et de la participation à la création d’artéfacts de partage
d’information. Ce n’est pas la même chose de réunir 30 ou 500 personnes pour
un projet commun.
La seconde est liée à la notion de communauté ("community"). Ce con-
cept anglo-saxon est fortement présent dans les entretiens réalisés auprès des
ostréiculteurs australiens qui se sentent redevables envers leur communauté
alors qu’il ne semble pas spécialement pris en considération par les ostréicul-
teurs français.
0.5 Résultats
L’étude de terrain nous a permis d’identifier les deux menaces principales
auxquelles les ostréiculteurs sont soumis dans les deux cas étudiés : la ques-
tion microbiologique et celle de l’herpès virus. Ces deux menaces sont de
natures fondamentalement différentes et justifient des stratégies d’approches,
ici étudiées via le partage de l’information, radicalement distinctes.
0.5.1 Une menace publique : la microbiologie
0.5.1.1 Formalisation de la menace
Comme évoqué plus haut, la menace microbiologique que l’on peut voir comme
une déterioration de la qualité de l’eau, est une menace économique pour les
ostréiculteurs ainsi qu’une menace d’image globale pour la région : des ferme-
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tures régulières donnent une mauvaise image de l’eau dans la région résultant
en d’importantes pertes au niveau du tourisme.
Cette menace est un exemple de menace publique pour les ostréiculteurs
puisqu’elle est de faible internalité (ce ne sont pas les ostréiculteurs qui sont
à l’origine des variations de la qualité de l’eau) et d’exclusion difficile (un
ostréiculteur ne peut pas changer la qualité de l’eau sur sa ferme).
Nous pouvons utiliser le cadre que nous avons présenté en Figure 2 pour
l’appliquer à la question de la qualité de l’eau et cerner les enjeux liés à cette
menace (Figure 6).
0.5.1.2 Stratégies de partage de l’information
Les stratégies utilisées pour agir contre cette menace par certains acteurs des
terrains étudiés sont différentes, tant sur le plan technologique que sur les in-
formations partagées et la manière de les partager. En Australie, l’artéfact est
un document (Environmental Management System, EMS), rédigé par des os-
tréiculteurs, soutenus par les collectivités locales et l’Etat ; en France, l’artéfact
est un système d’information (OmegaThau), développé principalement par les
collectivités locales.
L’utilisation du cadre ENCORE nous a permis de déterminer l’évolution de
la situation des systèmes socio-écologiques concernés suite à la mise en place de
ces artéfacts, au niveau de l’état de la ressource, de la relation que les acteurs
entretiennent avec la ressource et des relations des acteurs entre eux, qu’ils
appartiennent à la même catégorie ou non.
Dans le cas australien, les conséquences sur la ressource pourraient être
mesurables à long terme, mais, d’après les entretiens, les acteurs eux-mêmes
conviennent qu’il est difficile de mesurer un véritable impact direct de l’artéfact
sur l’état de la ressource. En effet, les éléments soulevés et les informations
recueillies ne peuvent mener qu’à des actions aux conséquences à long terme
et visent à une adéquation plus grande des pratiques de chacun vis-à-vis de
la ressource, sans effet immédiat. La première conséquence de la rédaction
des EMS réside dans l’évolution de la relation que les acteurs entretiennent
entre eux. Durant la rédaction elle-même, les ostréiculteurs ont d’abord glob-
alement renforcé la cohésion des acteurs au sein de l’industrie, même s’il ex-
iste un contre-exemple. Ils ont par ailleurs créé une relation directe avec les
collectivités locales qui ont vu leur vision de l’ostréiculture évoluer de celle
d’une tolérance d’utilisateurs d’une ressource publique (l’estuaire) vers celle
de soutien d’un ensemble de sentinelles de l’environnement qui ont tous en
tête l’importance de la préservation et de la surveillance de la ressource eau
des estuaires, voire des bassins versants. De plus, l’existence de ce document
contraint publiquement les ostréiculteurs à des actions concrètes et mesurables
garantissant des pratiques durables au sein de l’ostréiculture. S’engager ainsi
sur la place publique légitime le rôle des ostréiculteurs en tant que déclencheurs
de pratiques au sein d’une communauté d’acteurs vaste (Paget et al., 2016).
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Dans le cas français, l’artéfact a officiellement pour but de mieux compren-
dre et prévoir l’évolution de la ressource. Il a demandé 7 ans de développement
et un investissement public conséquent en temps et en argent. L’artéfact fi-
nal atteint son but annoncé : les connaissances sur les flux hydrologiques et
les prévisions sont améliorées. La ressource est donc mieux comprise par les
collectivités locales et les informations sont partagées avec les membres du
syndicat conchylicole. En revanche, son existence n’est que peu connue par
les ostréiculteurs que nous avons interviewé et son efficacité souvent remise
en question ("ça ne m’apporte rien de plus que la météo.") et encore moins
par d’autres acteurs du territoire. Les relations entre acteurs ou la cohésion
entre ostréiculteurs ne semble pas avoir évolué sur les dimensions du cadre EN-
CORE. Il faut néanmoins rappeler que le Syndicat Mixte du Bassin de Thau
a une forte tradition de concertation et de consultation des acteurs et popu-
lations locaux et a mis au centre de sa politique de développement territorial
les "petits métiers", i.e. ostréiculteurs et pécheurs (SAGE-Thau, 2015).
Rappelons que la définition que nous avons choisie pour l’information est
"une différence qui crée une différence". Cela nous amène à nous demander
pour qui cette différence existe et en quoi elle consiste. L’analyse de ces deux
cas d’étude montre que la différence que peut créer un artéfact peut être limitée
aux conséquences prévues, voire ne pas créer de différence, comme dans le cas
français où les acteurs n’obtiennent pas plus d’information qu’avec la météo,
ou aller plus loin et atteindre un ensemble d’acteurs dépassant les créateurs de
l’information.
0.5.2 Une menace privée : l’herpès virus OsHV-1
0.5.2.1 Formalisation de la menace
Cette menace est spécifique à l’activité ostréicole puisque le virus agit ex-
clusivement sur les huîtres. Il s’agit donc d’une menace fortement interne.
Certains ostréiculteurs semblent échapper au virus par leurs pratiques. Le
virus est donc une menace dont il est possible de s’exclure. Il peut donc être
considéré comme une menace privée. Cette conclusion est forte et sera utile
pour la modélisation que nous développeront plus bas.
De même que pour le virus, nous pouvons formaliser la menace en utilisant
le cadre 〈A, C, I, D, E〉 que nous avons développé (Figure 7).
0.5.2.2 Stratégies de partage de l’information
Cette menace est encore mal comprise par les acteurs et par les scientifiques
qui l’étudient (Pernet et al., 2014). De plus, le virus n’agit qu’une seule fois par
an. Pourtant, ce sujet est le premier sujet d’inquiétude évoqué par les acteurs
lors des entretiens menés. Par ailleurs, notre point de focale se situe au niveau
de la conséquence de la mise en place d’artéfacts de partage d’information.
Comment étudier ces conséquences, tout en maîtrisant les modalités de partage
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Figure 7: La menace virale sur la vie des huîtres.
d’information sur un sujet et une temporalité qui dépassent largement celui
d’une thèse ? Pour les raisons exposées à la section méthodologie, nous avons
fait le choix de créer un modèle puis une simulation multi-agents qui répond
aux exigences de la question que nous nous posons tout en permettant une
maîtrise et un suivi des différents paramètres.
La présentation du modèle suit le protocole ODD+D. La figure 8 montre le
fonctionnement simplifié du modèle multi-agent. Nous nous sommes demandé
quels pouvaient être les effets du partage d’information pour l’adaptation à
une menace privée (ici le virus). Des ostréiculteurs cultivent des huîtres qui se
font attaquer par un virus au fonctionnement inconnu, mais fixe dans le mod-
èle, que les acteurs cherchent à déterminer. Cette mortalité est fonction de la
race d’huître et de la quantité d’huître par table. Pour cela, ils observent la
mortalité sur leur ferme et partagent leurs résultats selon plusieurs scénarios :
pas de partage, partage via un réseau social et/ou un système centralisé de
partage de l’information. Les agents ostréiculteurs, conçus en s’inspirant de
l’architecture de type BDI (belief, desire, intention), sont de plusieurs types,
i.e. suivent plusieurs systèmes de décision, ce qui mène à une hétérogénéité des
agents, une des forces de la modélisation multi-agents. Les différents agents
sont de type "économicus" s’ils cherchent à maximiser leur profit (en fonc-
tion de leurs croyances), "conservative" s’ils changent de stratégie seulement
lorsqu’ils sont mécontents ou "conscious" s’ils choisissent de ne cultiver que
des huîtres diploides naturelles. Une fois l’information partagée, les agents la
recueillent et élaborent une stratégie qui sera appliquée l’année suivante.
Pour comparer les 1296 différents scénarios (en fonction des types et quan-
tités d’agents, des modalités de prise de décision, de l’épidémiologie du virus
et du partage d’information), nous avons défini des indicateurs. Nous avons
mesuré l’écart des croyances des agents sur le mode opératoire du virus tant
entre agents qu’avec sa vraie dynamique. Le modèle montre que la disper-
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Figure 8: La boucle principale du modèle.
sion des croyances des agents était systématiquement plus faible lorsqu’un
système centralisé de partage d’information était présent mais que celles-ci ne
convergeaient pas forcément vers la réalité de l’épidémiologie du virus. Nous
avons aussi mesuré les conséquences sur les pratiques des acteurs grâce à un
indicateur mesurant pour chaque scénario l’étape à partir de laquelle les agents
cessent de modifier leurs stratégie. Le modèle amène à conclure que la présence
d’un système de partage d’information, ainsi que d’un réseau social, mène à un
choix final de stratégie précoce. En revanche, les conséquences de ces scénarios
sur la production globale au cours de la période testée (20 ans) sont limitées.
Nous observons en fait que la production augmente avec l’hétérogénéité des
acteurs. Une population d’acteurs uniquement "economicus" produit sensible-
ment moins d’huîtres que lorsqu’elle est mélangée à des agents "conservative"
et "conscious" car le domaine d’exploration des pratiques possible s’élargit
avec la diversité d’acteurs. Ainsi, les "economicus" laissent de côté les huîtres
naturelles initialement vues comme moins intéressantes économiquement alors
qu’elles se révèlent plus résistantes face au virus.
0.6 Discussion
Dans cette thèse, nous explorons les possibles impacts de la mise en place de
systèmes de partage de l’information pour la gestion de ressources naturelles.
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Cette question et l’étude de cas réels nous a amené à développer le concept de
menaces, menaces autour desquelles les acteurs effectuent des actions collec-
tives, notamment le développement de systèmes de partage d’information.
0.6.1 Sur l’approche méthodologique
0.6.1.1 Etudes de terrain
Lorsque nous parlons de gestion de ressources naturelles, il est fondamental
de confronter les idées théoriques et la réalité. Dans cette thèse, nous avons
suivi ce principe qui a été à la base des recherches d’Elinor Ostrom et de la
philosophie générale de recherche que nous avons suivie (Janssen and Ostrom,
2006). L’étude de terrain, guidée par le cadre SES, nous a permis d’identifier
des éléments qui n’auraient pas pu être identifiés si nous étions restés dans le
laboratoire. En revanche, il faut se garder de généraliser hâtivement tous les
éléments que nous pouvons rencontrer sur le terrain, car certains peuvent se
révéler contextuels et d’importance mineure. Pour contrer cet effet négatif,
nous avons choisi d’étudier deux cas comparables mais suffisamment distincts
pour limiter ces risques. Après avoir passé du temps à étudier le premier cas
d’étude (l’étang de Thau), nous avons formulé des hypothèses dont certaines
ont pu être rejetées lors de l’étude du second cas qui nous a conforté dans cer-
taines directions et ouvert d’autres voies. L’étude de deux cas permet d’éviter
les écueils principaux, mais le temps à consacrer à chaque cas force à se re-
streindre à un nombre de cas limités. Nous devons alors choisir un nombre de
cas adapté au temps disponible, surtout sur le temps d’une thèse qui n’est pas
principalement consacrée aux cas en eux-mêmes.
0.6.1.2 Le cadre des systèmes socio-ecologiques (SES)
Ce cadre nous a guidé lors de l’exploration de ces systèmes complexes, per-
mettant de ne pas oublier d’élément fondamental. Nous l’avons utilisé pour
comparer les deux cas d’étude et identifier certaines variables qui pouvaient
expliquer des différences. Les systèmes socio-écologiques sont des systèmes
complexes où interagissent de nombreuses entités humaines ou non et aux
rétroactions multiples. Il est aisé de s’y perdre et nous recommandons de
suivre ce cadre pour l’enquête de terrain qui peut être longue et laborieuse.
Cependant, lorsque nous avons étudié le terrain, nous avons découvert
que nous ne pouvions y inscrire les éléments qui concernaient les menaces et
qui sont au cœur de l’action collective, en tout cas dans les cas d’étude sur
l’ostréiculture. Nous avons donc proposé un certain nombre de variables pour
compléter le cadre SES.
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0.6.1.3 Modélisation multi-agents
La modélisation multi-agent permet de conceptualiser la ou les questions que
nous nous posons en définissant clairement les processus et scénarios grâce à
un langage clair et précis, créant un véritable laboratoire virtuel. Sa phase de
construction est aussi importante que la phase d’exploration. La construction
permet de révéler des trous dans la connaissance qui peuvent nous être ap-
portés par des entretiens avec les acteurs ou la littérature. Quand ces connais-
sances n’existent pas, nous devons alors faire des hypothèses que nous pouvons
explicitement décrire, notamment lorsque le modélisateur adopte le protocole
ODD+D. Nous pouvons alors définir un ensemble de scénarios et d’indicateurs
permettant de comparer les sorties et de comprendre l’effet des scénarios. Le
développement du modèle et la structure de la modélisation multi-agent amè-
nent rapidement à une inflation de la taille du modèle, du nombre de scénarios
et de paramètres à suivre. Il devient alors quasiment impossible de compren-
dre ce qu’il s’y passe. La définition et le choix des scénarios doit se faire en
prenant en compte l’explosion rapide de la complexité des modèles.
0.6.2 Sur le concept de menaces
Les menaces sont une nouvelle façon d’aborder la question de la gestion de
ressources naturelles, habituellement organisée autour de “ressources” ou de
“biens”. Ces menaces peuvent mener à des actions collectives qui n’existeraient
pas sans cela, voire aboutir à la création de communautés intéressées à faire
face à cette menace : dans le cas de l’étang de Thau, en temps normal, les
ostréiculteurs font la guerre sur les prix, alors qu’en temps de crise, ils se re-
groupent et s’unissent. La perception d’une menace peut expliquer la création
et l’existence d’un groupe ou d’une institution et permet de mieux comprendre
les actions collectives engagées, ou les règles établies.
Plusieurs aspects de ce concept méritent d’être explorés plus avant. La
typologie a été développée en se focalisant sur les présentes études de cas.
L’approche pourrait être confirmée par l’étude de nouveaux cas. Le caractère
dynamique des menaces n’a pas été abordé. La mise en place de mesures par
un acteur ou un groupe d’acteurs a potentiellement des répercussions internes
comme externes au groupe. Il est nécessaire d’étudier le transfert qui est ainsi
opéré. L’évaluation des menaces n’a pas été abordée dans la thèse. Il serait
intéressant d’étudier la possibilité d’introduire une fonction d’évaluation des
menaces couplées aux solutions apportées, ce qui permettrait de les comparer.
0.6.3 Sur l’information pour la gestion de ressources
naturelles
Menaces Les études de cas et le modèle nous ont permis d’explorer les liens
entre les menaces et le partage de l’information dans le cadre de la gestion de
ressources naturelles et plus particulièrement de l’ostréiculture.
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Dans le cas d’une menace publique, les acteurs peuvent utiliser le partage
de l’information pour gagner de l’influence auprès d’autres acteurs. Ainsi, les
ostréiculteurs des bassins ayant développé des EMS ont-ils gagné une grande in-
fluence. Les Français ont gagné une information plus précise, mais l’information
n’émane pas d’eux et l’artéfact ne provient d’une volonté des ostréiculteurs.
Dans le cas d’une menace privée, le partage de l’information peut être lié
à un besoin d’apprentissage. Dans le modèle, nous avons testé la variable de
l’apprentissage de dynamiques environnementales ayant un impact important
sur les résultats des agents (des ostréiculteurs). Les résultats du modèle in-
diquent que la simple existence d’un système permettant un partage rapide
d’expériences n’implique pas une connaissance parfaite de la dynamique envi-
ronnementale ni des changements de pratiques permettant une profonde prise
en compte de la menace. Cet effet peut être lié en partie au nombre limité
d’options à disposition des agents.
Observations générales La participation à l’élaboration d’un système de
gestion partagé comme dans le cas australien montre que cela peut être un
excellent moyen de faire évoluer, voire converger, les modèles mentaux. La
partie de la création parait donc fondamentale, et l’implication des acteurs
parait modifier les conséquences de l’existence du système. L’utilisation peut se
réveler multiple car ces systèmes peuvent toucher plusieurs catégories disctintes
d’utilisateurs.
Malgré tout, la simple existence d’un artéfact ne garantit pas qu’il sera utile
ni utilisé. Ainsi les ostréiculteurs de la Hawkesbury River (Australie) avaient-
ils créé et utilisé un EMS qui ne les a pas protégé des effects d’un virus non
prévu. La méconnaissance de l’outil OmegaThau par les ostréiculteurs français
en est un autre exemple. Les résultats du modèle montrent que l’existence
d’un réseau ou d’outils de partage de l’information permettent une meilleure
appréhension des dynamiques environnementales par les acteurs mais que le
cumul de ces multiples possibilités de partage ne créent pas d’amélioration
forte des pratiques et des croyances.
0.7 Conclusion
Dans cette thèse, nous nous sommes demandé si et comment la mise en place
d’artéfacts d’information permettait de faire face à des menaces dans des cas de
gestion collective de ressources naturelles. Pour cela, nous avons étudié deux
cas d’étude centrés autour de l’ostréiculture, une profession d’acteurs agissant
dans des espaces ouverts, les estuaires, et qui dépendent d’une ressource, l’eau,
dont la qualité n’est pas la résultante de leurs actions.
L’étude de ces cas et des artéfacts mis en place nous a mené à identifier
la notion de menaces et à développer le cadre 〈A, C, I, D, E〉 qui permet de
circonscrire une menace subjective pour un groupe d’acteurs.
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La méthode que nous avons adoptée a consisté à aborder notre question
de plusieurs manières. Nous avons commencé par une approche qualitative,
mêlant une analyse de plusieurs terrains grâce au cadre SES qui nous a guidé
dans l’exploration et au cadre ENCORE qui nous a fourni des dimensions
d’évaluation pour comparer les cas, en présence ou non d’artéfacts. Ensuite,
nous avons développé un modèle multi-agent que nous avons simulé pour ob-
server et maîtriser de façon fine les conséquences possibles de scénarios de
partage d’information.
Les cas d’étude ont révélé que la réponse à la question initale n’est pas
univoque ni simple. Dans un cas, les effets de l’artéfact sont limités à une
meilleure connaissance de certains éléments comme les flux bactériologiques ;
dans l’autre, les effets vont nettement plus loin, allant jusqu’à la volonté de
créer des institutions propres à l’ostréiculture et à légitimer certains acteurs
comme utilisateurs et garants d’une ressource, ici, l’eau. Le processus de créa-
tion de l’artéfact doit être soigneusement étudié si son impact doit dépasser la
simple accumulation de connaissances.
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Natural resources management
Natural resources are under great stress due to climate change linked to an
increasing human population and activity. Planetary boundaries have been
assessed and crossed on several dimensions (Steffen et al., 2015). Deforestation
of tropical forests is happening at a sustained rate of 8 M hectares per year since
at least 1990 (Achard et al., 2014). Fish stock is being overharvested in the
Mediterranean (Vasilakopoulos et al., 2014) and efforts need to be sustained to
rebuild fisheries (Worm et al., 2009), which is feasible, as fishermen managed
to do in Northeastern Atlantic Ocean (Fernandes and Cook, 2013). Global
solutions have yet to be found, for instance in forums such as COP21, held in
Paris in 2015.
The tragedy of the commons predicts exhaustion of open-access resources
(Hardin, 1968), proposing private or public management as the only solutions.
An important body of work has shown that local populations of actors can craft
emergent management rules and principles for a sustainable management of
resources they deal with (e.g. Acheson, 1975; Ostrom, 1990; Lansing, 2009;
Cox et al., 2010). Protection of areas may be done more easily with local
actors participation, such as in National Parks in Norway (Risvoll et al., 2014);
Nepalese users of the Rupa Lake found a way to reverse the tragedy deemed
to hit the lake (Chaudhary et al., 2015).
Interdisciplinary studies on Natural Resources Management (NRM) are in-
creasingly advocated for (e.g. Bhaskar et al., 2010), emphasizing on the tight
connection between resources, users of resources and a set of rules framing how
users may exploit the resource (Binder et al., 2013). The importance of tak-
ing advantage of local users knowledge in management of their environment
is recognized and used (Rommetveit et al., 2010). In those context of high
uncertainty and importance of decisions, questions go beyond simple technical
or scientific knowledge and postnormal sciences need to be applied (Funtow-
icz and Ravetz, 2003; Bray and von Storch, 1999) encompassing potential
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conflicts (Adams et al., 2003) or diversity of mental models (Castillo Brieva,
2013). Reflexivity over local environment can be enhanced using participatory
methods involving local stakeholders, for instance through role-playing games
(Barreteau et al., 2007), agent-based modeling (Bousquet and Le Page, 2004),
or co-planning (Daniell, 2012).
1.2 Information and information sharing
We currently live in a world loaded with information. Information is ubiq-
uitous, used in an immense variety of contexts, from local and specific (local
public transportation timetable) to global and far-reaching (Wikipedia). Bat-
tles between transparency and confidentiality are advocated and supported by
different groups: from open-data and open-software movements to copyright
tenants who want to protect information costly to produce. We have entered
an information age (Castells, 2011), a knowledge democracy where “both dom-
inant and non-dominant actors have equal access and ability to put knowledge
forward in the process of solving societal problems” (Bunders et al., 2010,
p.125).
Information existence and availability led to improvements such as African
farmers getting to know market prices and being less prone to be tricked by
buyers (Aker, 2008). Collective action projects such as openStreetMaps in
Haiti1 - users around the world created an accurate map of Haiti’s roads in
a few days right after the 2010 earthquake for all, especially humanitarian
workers, to use - show a capacity of information to be produced and used
quickly, building upon technological means and engaged users.
Production of science, data as much as knowledge, is increasingly partic-
ipatory, thanks to the use of information technologies, for instance through
distributed computing2. This phenomenon is not new. Star and Griesemer
(1989) give the example of a form used in 1907-39 by a zoological garden
in the United States that was to be filled by different populations in order
to widen information gathering. Now, the availability of modern information
and communication technologies boosts these areas of knowledge production
almost anywhere and at any time.
With these different examples, we could hypothesize that the more infor-
mation we have, within physical limits of our cognitive possibilities, the more
we know about the surrounding world and the better and more sustainably we
can live in it.
What can be the impact of information availability and sharing for actors
that have to interact with a renewable natural resource? This question is vast
and deserves a qualified and contextualized answer. In this thesis, I explore
1http://wiki.openstreetmap.org/wiki/WikiProject_Haiti/Earthquake_map_
resources
2For instance, a project on protein folding: http://folding.stanford.edu/home/
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this subject at the level of local systems and investigate the idea according to
which more information leads to better resource management.
1.3 Purpose and problem of the thesis
This thesis is interdisciplinary and uses computer science, through modeling,
as a way to synthesize knowledge acquired using strengths of various fields
such as economics, geography, sociology, political sciences or decision aid. The
thesis is eventually meant to better formulate and understand issues related to
people actions and stakes in fundamentally uncertain systems linking humans
and their environment. In those systems, actors need to make decisions based
on norms, beliefs and knowledge. These decisions affect others around them.
In a seminal paper discussing globalization of social-ecological research,
Young et al. (2006) suggest that the revolution of information technologies,
along with the rise of mega-cities and the demand for hydrocarbons, is one of
the key trends that could impact the management of natural resources. This
impact may be measured in terms of vulnerability, resilience, or adaptation.
As evoked above, natural resources are under pressure and have to face
multiple issues such as exhaustion, misuse, competition or pollution. Actors
devised a vast variety of ways to deal with those pressures over a period of
centuries. A recent trend in NRM is to implement artifacts actors can share
information through. Can those artifacts help actors manage resources by
making decision that would be better for them and for the resource in general?
Formulated in those terms the question is not precise enough. NRM is
a vast field that covers resources of intrinsically different nature. A single
thesis is not enough to cover all these different types and Ostrom (2007a)
warns against panaceas (one-size-fits-all solutions). A contextual focus was
thus required (Edwards and Steins, 1999; Castillo et al., 2011). An important
amount of research has been conducted in cases of resources where actors are
homogeneous and tap a relatively bounded resource, typically common-pool
resources (Cox et al., 2010).
In this thesis, we decided to focus on intrinsically open environments where
various actors have different roles, impacts and goals interact. These situations
are particularly interesting when studying artifacts that may be considered at
the interface between heterogeneous actors and as tools for collection action.
Water in coastal catchment is such a resource: the environment is open and
actors have various goals, beliefs, practices and relation to the resource. In
such environments, an activity with high demands on water quality may be
conducted, like oyster farming. These actors are the most sensitive actors
regarding water quality in estuaries of coastal catchment. They act in funda-
mentally open environments due to the high impact of catchment actors and
inhabitants’ practices. The case of oyster farming, placed in the ecology of
coastal catchments seemed a perfect option for the intended study.
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This option was motivated by a second element: in the chosen cases, more
or less technology-laden information sharing artifacts have been developed as
tools to help manage the resources. These artifacts proved to be destined at
getting information to tackle threats (such as pollution, exhaustion or free-
riding) actors need to collectively face and at helping them make better and
more informed decisions.
This context led me to frame the main question of the thesis as follows:
How can information sharing help actors interacting together
and with natural resources to face threats?
To provide an answer to this complex question, I consider several subques-
tions:
• There are several types of threats. What are those threats and what
characterizes them?
• What are the stakes linking the different types of threats and information
sharing artifacts?
• Can information sharing artifacts help actors to improve their businesses?
• Can information sharing artifacts help actors manage resources they in-
teract with?
• Reversely, can information sharing artifacts be of no use or even harmful?
In the thesis, I use a descriptive approach through the direct study of
cases and an agent-based model. This approach does not allow for general
demonstrations of normative theorems starting with “for all ...” that can only
be obtained using a reasoning based on a normative or an axiomatic approach.
The method allows for a refutation of such generalities by finding counter
examples of such theorems, i.e. conclusions starting with “there exists ...”.
Case studies allow a detailed exploration of specific and contextualized artifacts
and their effects may be observed directly or through interviews. Agent-based
modeling opens the way to fine and mastered exploring of a situation inspired
from the case studies and focused on information sharing artifacts.
1.4 Structure of the thesis
In order to explore the listed questions, I start by presenting conceptual el-
ements in Part I. In Chapter 2, I begin by introducing the usual vision on
collective NRM that draws upon an identification of good and resource types
to frame challenges for actors possibly as social dilemmas. I also describe
a framework used to depict coupled human and natural systems called the
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Social-Ecological System (SES) framework (Folke et al., 2005; Ostrom, 2009).
Then, in Chapter 3, I develop the concept of threats for which I propose a
characterization, as well as a typology. This concept emerged from the study
of information sharing artifacts that actors of the case studies developed. I ad-
vocate for the explicit introduction of threats in the SES framework since they
are part of a diagnosis of a situation the framework intends to understand, es-
pecially when considered from a decision-making perspective. Finally, I delve
into the question of information sharing in the context of SESs. I explain the
specific challenges information artifacts set up at local levels face and explore
the stakes information sharing poses to tackle threats actors face in Chapter 4.
After exposing these elements, I present the methodology that I adopted
to investigate the main questions of the thesis in Part II. I predominantly
used two approaches. The first one (Chapter 5) is a case study investigation
that consisted of interviews, meetings, participatory observation and study
of actual artifacts. The second one (Chapter 6) is agent-based modeling, a
method increasingly used to study social complexity (Edmonds and Meyer,
2013b).
As explained in the previous section, a contextual focus is important in the
study of NRM. I present those cases in Part III. Before considering the actual
cases, I begin by discussing in Chapter 7 the ecology of oyster farming in gen-
eral: the environment in which growers act, the biology and ecology of oysters,
as well as a general presentation of practices. I also discuss consequences of
change in scale for the analysis of SESs. In Chapter 8, I delve into the two
actual cases that I studied in New South Wales (NSW), Australia and Thau
Lagoon, France. I present in detail the local environments actors evolve in, and
information sharing artifacts that they developed, using the SES framework
as a guideline. Finally, in Chapter 9, I frame the resources and threats oyster
farmers deal with using the conceptual elements developed in Part I.
Using the previous parts, I present results regarding information sharing
roles for actors in two different threat cases in Part IV. In Chapter 10, I draw
upon the cases and artifacts that actors developed to tackle general water
quality issues and in Chapter 11, I propose and analyze an agent-based model
developed on a pressing issue for oyster farmers, a virulent virus that heavily
harms oysters.
I finish the thesis with a discussion (Chapter 12) and a conclusion (Chap-
ter 13).
1.5 A tale in the thesis
Before entering into the body of the thesis, I tell an illustrative story intended
as an archetypal situation that shows how actors, the environment, rules and
institutions are interwoven in a complex manner.
I describe a simplified version of such an environment which articulates the
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main issues that actors face and the resource(s) they are in relation with. The
description focuses on a type of users of a resource. The overall goal of this
section is to present a situation that I will use as a running virtual example
and refer to throughout Part I to illustrate more clearly the presented ideas,
as Hardin (1968) did in his seminal paper. This situation is inspired by real
cases. The global context is presented here as a whole and will be developed
further when necessary in the following chapters.
A village located on a sunny coastline. An important community of fish-
ermen lives and work in the village. For a long time already, fishermen have
been using their boats, fishing nearby and are famous for being able to find
a specific very appreciated fish that is sold up to the capital of the country.
They store their boat in a harbor, located in a naturally protected bay.
Fishermen are organized in a fishery where they devise rules, train new-
comers, even though most fishermen are there because fishing is a family affair.
The fishery is in charge of maintaining the harbor docks, of deciding over quo-
tas and allocating fishing areas, which is mostly done using a random draw.
Conflicts have been under control for a long time but the local situation is
changing.
Thanks to their privileged location, the village, nearby beaches and the
surrounding region are highly attractive to tourists. Population doubles during
summer, which creates an important flow of money for the village as well as
a few issues such as water treatment. Leisure boating and fishing is a popular
activity, so is jet-skiing or windsurfing. This demand creates conflicts with
local fishermen, who have more difficulties in practicing their activity, even
though tourists enable them to sell much more fish than during the rest of
the year. On the shore, they are in competition with tourism infrastructure
developers that push for the building of marinas, hotels and privitization of
beaches. There is also a demand for tourism boats storage in the harbor.
The increasing demand for fish entices fishermen to fish a little more, cre-
ating an important pressure on the fish stock, and in parallel, a drop in fish
prices. This situation is aggravated by tourists who fish without properly
knowing fishing rules and areas, or even release black water directly in the
water instead of using the water pumps in the harbor to save some money,
resulting in deterioration of water quality.
The local government is in charge of general development (and control of
development) in areas such as water and urbanization, but it is known to be
quite weak and corrupt: urbanization project can be facilitated with a little
bribe and water treatment could be handled better with proper investment.
Sewage treatment plants are not very efficient and water is released in pipes
directly in the sea not too far from the coastline. The word has it that a few
tourists were poisoned by a dubious fish. The investigation did not go too far,
but internally concerns were risen about possible contamination of the local
ecosystem.
Fishermen also face two other issues. The first one is linked to the presence
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of foreign industrial boats that use heavy machinery and deplete local stocks.
The second is linked to a recent observation that the very appreciated local
fish is an indirect victim of water eutrophication: new algae are replacing
traditional vegetation in which this fish species spawns its offspring.
In the following chapter, we will follow Bob, a fisherman, whose life is
actually quite complex.

Part I
State of the Art
9

Chapter 2
Resources, Dilemmas and
Social-Ecological Systems
Renewable natural resources that produce goods extractable by people are
subject to pressures. They are harvested by multiple and possibly uncoor-
dinated actors following various goals and having different interests. How to
guarantee a sustainable use of the resource while favoring equity is one of the
key questions in Natural Resources Management (NRM)? Public or private
management are possible ways to manage natural goods or resources (Hardin,
1968). Studies of real coupled human and natural systems have revealed that
other methods exist, such as common management. Ostrom (1990) has shown
that in some situations local actors found ways to collectively create institu-
tions that allow them to maintain a sustainable use of a resource over centuries.
With the intention of clarifying the different types of management linked to
key properties of resources, Ostrom et al. (1994) propose a typology of goods
and resources actors may use, and Schlager and Ostrom (1992) specify bundles
of rights users have access to. I built part of the analysis of this thesis on these
notions presented in this chapter.
I focus on systems where actors are striving to grow oysters in estuaries.
These actors are confronted with management of various natural resources
they need for their activity. Thus, I first present the typology of goods and
resources, as well as actors’ property rights mentioned above that I will use to
frame and analyze the case studies. Then, I expose a conceptualization of the
key issues actors extracting goods produced by resources face: social dilemmas.
Subsequently, I recall necessary principles of institution design for successful
common resource management as well as the asymmetric commons situation
that will be useful to analyze the case studies. Finally, I present a framework
that enables a diagnosis of systems where humans interact with a collective
resource and that I will use throughout the thesis: the Social-Ecological System
(SES) framework (Folke et al., 2005).
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2.1 Resources and users
2.1.1 Goods and resources
In the narrative of the tragedy of the commons, Hardin (1968) tells the story
of herders leading their herd to a pasture. They all face a choice: increasing
the size of their herd or keeping it the same size. Since they are “rational”
(i.e. short term profit maximizing) agents, they all choose to increase their
herd size, resulting in pasture exhaustion and in the long run, bankruptcy
of the herders. Two solutions are then given for the pasture management:
privatization (all herders manage their own piece of land), or nationalization
(an all-mighty ruler decides over pasture management, taking into account the
resource interests). This story is a narrative of a simple system. An input
leads to easily predictable outcomes.
Discovering that many natural resources have been managed in a sustain-
able way for centuries or even millenia by people without using either private
or public solutions, NRM scholars, like Elinor Ostrom, have shown that several
other ways existed for managing a good or a resource. For a given good, it is
important to pay attention to two main properties that define its nature: sub-
stractability and exclusivity (Ostrom et al., 1994). “The first attribute is that
the benefits consumed by one individual subtract from the benefits available
to others. The second attribute is that it is very costly to exclude individ-
uals from using the flow of benefits either through physical barriers or legal
instruments. Both attributes vary across a range” (Hess and Ostrom, 2003,
p.119).
Four broad types of goods can thus be defined: public, club, private, and a
Common-pool resource (CPR) (Table 2.1). Of course, there are other variables
and some goods can be in certain categories under some conditions and in
another under other conditions. For instance, even though a public road is
a public good, since there is low exclusivity and substractability, the latter
property can turn to high substractability at peak hours, making the good
more akin to a CPR, or a club-good if a toll is set up.
Except for private goods, other goods are shared among several people and
are usually managed according to institutions, which can be more or less for-
mal. “Institutions are human-constructed constraints or opportunities within
which individual choices take place and which shape the consequences of their
choices” (McGinnis, 2011, p.170). They can range from mere norms to sets of
people with legal powers.
Let us take a look back at our original example1. Bob the fisherman has
to deal with numerous goods and resources of different types. Bob owns his
boat and nets that he uses to fish. He docks his boat along the piers reserved
1In the rest of the text, I emphasize the example of Bob the fishermen to make it easier
for the reader to distinguish between theoretical elements and the example. See Section 1.5,
p.5, for the whole story.
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Table 2.1: Typology of goods and resources (Ostrom et al., 1994).
Substractability
Low High
Exclusivity Low Public good Common-pool resourceHigh Club good Private good
for fishermen. These docks are an example of club goods: Bob has to pay
a fee to use the docks of the harbor whose use is restricted to fishing boats.
These fees are added to State subsidies and allow the harbor authorities to
maintain the docks and the rest of the harbor in a well-functioning state. The
fish resource out of which Bob earns a living is a typical CPR. After unloading
his boat, Bob drives to the market, a boundary institution where fishermen and
buyers interact, using his private truck on public roads. The different goods
and resources Bob interacts with are all necessary for his activity. They are
managed by different institutions. He has to take care of his private belongings.
The boat, nets and other technologies, which are private goods and used by Bob
to fish are regulated by the local fishing institution. This institution devises
rules to ensure sustainability of local fish stock by defining rules for technologies
used as well as fishing periods and locations. It also deals with occasional
conflicts that arise among fishermen. This institution has a strong legitimacy
since it has existed for a long time and is composed of fishermen themselves.
For his activity as a fisherman, Bob has to interact with many different types
of goods, which are under varied property regimes (Section 2.1.2).
This whole situation, featuring a combination of different types of goods
and resources, is actually a description of a resource system, part of a global
system called a social-ecological system, a framework that will be introduced
in Section 2.3. Besides interacting with goods of all types, Bob interacts with
other people who play different roles and have different property rights to the
resources.
2.1.2 Users and property rights
There are different types of users defined according to how they are allowed
to interact with the resource. These types were mostly defined on the study
of CPRs and are valid mostly when there is substractability. According to
R. John (cited in Schlager and Ostrom, 1992), a property right is an enforceable
authority to undertake particular actions in a specific domain. These property
rights open different privileges. In the context of NRM, five bundles of rights
are defined: access (right to enter an area and enjoy non substractive benefits),
extract (right to obtain resource units), management (right to regulate internal
use patterns and transform the resource), exclusion (right to determine who
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Table 2.2: Types of users and associated property rights. These levels exist for
a complex resource such as a CPR from which one can extract units (Adapted
from Schlager and Ostrom, 1992; Hess and Ostrom, 2003).
Access Extract Manage Exclude Alienate Example
Owner 7 7 7 7 7 ?
Proprietor 7 7 7 7 Fishermen board
Claimant 7 7 7 Fishermen assem-
bly
Authorized
user
7 7 Fisherman
Authorized
entrant
7 Recreational boater
will have access rights and withdraw or transfer rights), and alienation (right
to sell or lease management and exclusion rights). Table 2.2 illustrates these
rights with examples.
As a licensed fisherman, Bob has access and extraction rights. Everyone
has access rights and tourists can ask for an authorization to fish (temporally
limited extraction rights) to authorities who have exclusion rights. Tradition-
ally, management of the resource is left to the fishermen and their institution
with the help of public authorities who enforce rules valid at a larger level. Ex-
clusion is left to a subset of fishermen and takes place in the institution. They
are elected every year and deal with conflicts among fishermen and try to help
fishermen interact with other types of actors.
Interactions among users are multiple and take various shapes. One of the
main difficulties in renewable resources management lies in the existence of
conflicts between users, usually linked to a discrepancy between short-term
individual interest and long-term collective interest. These difficulties can be
represented as social dilemmas.
2.2 Social dilemmas
In this section, I present social dilemmas, a theoretical situation that enables
to capture the core of NRM issues: the discrepancy between short term indi-
vidual interest and long term collective interest. After presenting an archetypal
situation of social dilemma between two, then N , actors, I describe the nec-
essary principles for CPR management found by Ostrom (1990) that allow
actors to collectively escape social dilemmas. Finally, I present the question
of asymmetry in resources management that actors in the case studies of this
thesis face.
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Table 2.3: Prisoner’s dilemma payoff matrix: T > R > P > S. Column (row)
player gets first (second) payoff.
Strategy Cooperation Defection
Cooperation R,R S, T
Defection T, S P, P
2.2.1 Social dilemmas and what to do about them
Social dilemmas are situations in which “two or more participants must each
choose between following their own immediate interests, or the common inter-
ests of all participants. For each participant, choosing the ’selfish’ option is
immediately advantageous, whatever the other participants do, but if enough
participants take this option, all end up worse off than if enough had made
the ’altruistic’ or ’cooperative’ choice” (Gotts et al., 2003, p.3). Elster (1989)
argues that in these situations lie the tension between what Adam Smith called
the homo economicus, who listens solely to his own private interests, and what
Emile Durkeim called the homo socialius, who acts purely as a member of a
social group following collective norms, a tension that lies within each of us.
The most famous dilemma is probably the prisoner’s dilemma (Flood, 1958;
Poundstone, 2011). In a prisoner’s dilemma, two isolated players are charged
with some accusation. They are given a choice (strategies) by the police: to
cooperate or to defect. Table 2.3 shows the payoff matrix of this situation.
There are four possible payoffs that depend on players’ choices. When both
cooperate, they get the reward (R). When both defect, they get the punish-
ment (P ). When one cooperates and the other defects, the cooperator gets
the sucker’s payoff (S) and the defector the temptation one (T ). The diffi-
culty of the situation lies in the fact that, when simply presented under this
form, defection is a winning strategy for rational players, leading to a collective
outcome that is worse than when both cooperate.
The basic result is that even for two people, rational behavior (the domi-
nant strategy) is at odds with collective, and thus personal interest. Presented
under this form, this game seems as depressing and inextricable as the tragedy
of the commons. However, by looking at actual human behavior and studying
resource management, one can have a sense that this situation is not doomed.
Several ways out can be imagined. First, communication and agreement can
make both prisoners realize that cooperation leads to a better social outcome.
Second, it is possible to set up institutions to change the payoff matrix, for
instance by making defection punished (financially or socially) and thus less
attractive. Another solution that has been devised to escape the dilemma is
through the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) con-
ducted a famous experiment that determined that the best strategy in a series
of prisoner’s dilemma situations is called tit-for-tat: starting with coopera-
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tion and doing what the other player did at the previous round. This type of
strategy can be called conditional cooperation where player cooperate as long
as they are sure that the other player will. This strategy has been observed
in case studies (Rustagi et al., 2010) and in experiments (Fischbacher et al.,
2001; Kocher et al., 2008) with two or more players. This behavior is coherent
with what is known in evolutionary biology under the name reciprocal altru-
ism, observed inter and intra species, from bacteria to humans (Trivers, 2006).
This property is seen as one of the keystone of the theory of evolution which
entices cooperation with non kins and as the one that allowed homo sapiens
to successfully colonize the planet (Marean, 2015).
The tragedy of the commons described in Section 2.1.1 is another example
of social dilemma with many players facing a dilemma between the long run
common interest (preserving the pasture), and the short term individual inter-
est (increasing herd size). Two main behaviors are defined here: cooperation
and free-riding. A free-rider is someone who benefits from a low excludable
resource without financing it. Examples of free-riding could be: not paying
taxes, using an irrigation system without participating in renovation works,
defecting in the prisoner’s dilemma.
There are ways to minimize the negative impact of temptation to free-ride.
Firstly, people live in communities within which they share social bonds of
different types. If a defection can be easily spotted and the defector easily
identified, then it is not very likely that the actor will choose to defect. This
is the reason why a lot of rules are defined in such terms that it is easy to see
whether the person has broken the rule: “Seeing somebody in the wrong spot
at the wrong time with the wrong gear will be a clear violation of institutional
arrangements” (Janssen, 2013, p.1). Secondly, norms come with education and
culture and are an important factor (Elster, 1989). While it may be tempting
to leave litter in a park, an internal norm could tell the person that it is
something wrong to do and free-riding would actually be a matter of moral
choice (Ostrom, 2014). Norms “are sustained by the feelings of embarrassment,
anxiety, guilt and shame that a person suffers at the prospect of violating them”
(Elster, 1989, p.100). Thirdly, it has been observed that people are prone to
engage costly monitoring, enforcement and punishment to prevent free-riding,
thereby ensuring conditional cooperation (Janssen et al., 2010, 2012; Rustagi
et al., 2010). Being aware of several unpunished rule infringement could lead
people to believe that they are “suckers” (the position the player is in when he
chooses to cooperate while the other defects) and thus entice them to break
the rule as well.
Our fictional character Bob faces social dilemmas. Regarding his fishing
activity, he faces a commons dilemma since he could be inclined towards fishing
with more efficient techniques or catching smaller fish than allowed, to generate
more income. This situation applies to all fishermen of the village. This is why,
as in the example of the Maine lobster fishery where fishermen mark certain
types of lobsters (Acheson, 1975, 2003), the fishing institution has established
2.2. SOCIAL DILEMMAS 17
Table 2.4: CPR design principles (Adapted from Cox et al., 2010, Table 3).
Design principle Definition
Clearly defined bound-
aries - actors
Individuals or households who have rights to withdraw re-
source units from the CPR must be clearly defined
Clearly defined bound-
aries - resource
The boundaries of the CPR must be well defined
Congruence between ap-
propriation and provision
rules and local conditions
Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology,
and/or quantity of resource units are related to local con-
ditions
Congruence between ap-
propriation and provision
rules and local conditions
Benefits obtained by users from a CPR, as determined by
appropriation rules, are proportional to the amount of in-
puts reuired in the form of labor, material, or money, as
determined by provision rules
Collective-choice arrange-
ments
Most individuals affected by the operational rules can par-
ticipate in modifying the operational rules
Monitoring - presence Monitors are present and actively audit CPR conditions
and appropriator behavior
Monitoring - accountabil-
ity
Monitors are accountable to or are the appropriators
Graduated sanctions Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be
assessed graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness
and context of the offense) by other appropriators, officials
accountable to these appropriators, or both
Conflict-resolution mecha-
nisms
Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-
cost local arenas to resolve conflicts among appropriators
or between appropriators and officials
Minimal recognition of
rights to organize
The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions
are not challenged by external governmental authorities
Nested enterprises Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict
resolution, and governance activities are organized in mul-
tiple layers of nested enterprises
minimum size rules and thus properties on nets legal to use. Buyers at the
market are also compelled to check whether the fish being sold meets this size
condition. Since the community is not that big, repetitive lack of compliance
to this accepted rule, or norm, could lead to social issues for the fisherman
implied. Since errors can occur, if this non compliance happens, the fisherman
is not ostracized: a gradual sanctioning system is applied.
2.2.2 Common-pool resources management design principles
As a focal type of resource in NRM, CPRs have been under close look and
studied in-depth. The halieutic resource that Bob and the community of fish-
ermen extract fish from is a CPR since it is possible to extract units (it is
substractable) and it is difficult to exclude someone from extracting fish (it is
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non excludable). Other classical examples of resources that can be considered
CPRs are collective irrigation networks, common forests, or common land.
These resources are typical resources that fall under the realm of the
tragedy of the commons. Initially proposed solutions consider public or pri-
vate regulations as the only management options (Hardin, 1968). However, it
has been proved that under certain conditions, local actors managed to devise
adapted ways to manage a resource that is necessary to all and used by all in
a sustainable way. Ostrom (1990), in her seminal book Governing the com-
mons, has proposed 8 design principles that have proved robust over time after
scholars studies numerous case studies (Table 2.4). 20 years after publication
of the book, Cox et al. (2010) review 91 case studies and confirm the strength
of the principles.
These principles put an important amount of trust on local users of re-
sources postulating that they are those who most regularly interact with it and
have a collective interest in maintaining it in the long run. Thus, those actors
have a strong interest in setting up institutions that guarantee a sustainable use
of the resource they manage. These institutions may create conditions so that
personal short term and collective long term interests are aligned, subsequently
favoring cooperation and sustainability. an important reward behind modify-
ing the structure of the CPR extraction and participation payoffs. Actors may
successfully build structures where the personal and collective interests are
aligned if they follow the design principles.
2.2.3 Asymmetric commons
Let us say Bob faces problems coming from the upper catchment. As a fish-
erman, he is very concerned with water quality, a public good, especially in
summer when population doubles. City eﬄuents are supposed to be treated in
sewage treatment plants, but these plants are old and hardly stand the flow. In
this situation, we can identify upstream actors (city dwellers and tourists) as
a loose category of users and downstream actors (fishermen). In this section,
I focus on this type of upstream - downstream situations.
Upstream - downstream situations are such that there is a physical flow,
like water, running from upstream actors to downstream ones. Downstream
actors are locked and have to undergo upstream users choices. Solutions based
only on individual and selfish choices of upstream actors are likely to affect
negatively downstream ones. An interesting question is to investigate ways to
close the loop by creating a feedback, as illustrated in Figure 2.1. Such feedback
can consist in money (as in Jack, 2009), other type of physical drawback (such
as pests in Lansing, 1991), shared values and norms, or information. This
last type of feedback will be of particular interest in this thesis. The studies
that I found involve homogeneous actors, linked by the same CPR, such as
farmers pumping into a running river. This situation can be generalized in
more global situations with heterogeneous actors, acting in the same place,
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Upstream Downstream
Physical ﬂow
(water)
Other ﬂows
(money, information,
other physical ﬂows)
Figure 2.1: Upstream Downstream flows
around different kinds of goods. The case study in this document involve such
a situation (Chapter 10).
2.3 The SES framework
After Hardin’s article, the study of the commons was particularly focused on
CPR management, in a manner that provided a way out of the private/public
dichotomy (Ostrom, 1990) as described in Section 2.2.2. The questions that
this field raises are fundamental and can be applied to different situations.
Scholars studied interactions between actors and a renewable resource that
produces units that can be substracted (Table 2.1). How do users can prevent
exhaustion of the resource they all need? How can they prevent free-riding?
How do they implement solid institutions? What are the links they keep with
the local resource? In what way is institutions building path-dependent? How
can failure be explained?
A step further into NRM made researchers take a step back and look more
globally at systems where social and ecological systems interact and for ways
to link the two (Berkes and Folke, 1998). This research resulted in the design
(Folke et al., 2005; Ostrom, 2007a) and improvement (Ostrom, 2009; McGinnis
and Ostrom, 2014) of a broad framework called the Social-Ecological System
(SES) framework, illustrated in Figure 2.2 in its current version. Ostrom
(2007a) illustrates the framework with Hardin’s model. It shows that Hardin’s
metaphor was actually a very specific case in the class of all SESs. In this
model, Hardin’s conclusions may be true, but this is not a sufficient reason
for undue generalization. Once again, human organizations and interactions
with the environment are resisting simple explanations and one-size-fits-all
outcomes.
Figure 2.2 is a summary of relationships between broad entities in interac-
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Figure 2.2: The SES framework (McGinnis and Ostrom, 2014)
tion. Each entity can be described using several variables. McGinnis and Os-
trom (2014) provide a list of second-tier variables recalled in Table B.1, p.260.
A SES is centered around a resource system (RS) (e.g. fish stock, forest, pas-
ture, irrigation system) that produces resource units (RU) (fish, trees, food for
cattle, water). The full description of these two entities contains specifications
about the size of the system and biological knowledge. SESs involve some
actors (A) (Bob and other fishermen, local dwellers, public authorities) and
a governance system (GS) where the different institutions actors have to deal
with and/or have established are described. Actors can have different types of
property rights, from simple use to alienation. Thus, they can share different
relations with the RS. Some of these broad entities interact directly with each
other: RU are a part of RS, and GS define and set rules for A. They are all in-
teracting in another type of entity called the action situation (Ostrom, 2007b).
An action situation is a situation where “individuals (acting on their own or as
agents of organizations) observe information, select actions, engage in patterns
of interaction, and realize outcomes from their interaction.” (McGinnis, 2011,
p.173). RS, RU, A, and GS are influencing the action situation, and the action
situations influence back to these entities. Action situations are divided in two
main parts: interactions and outcomes. In the interaction part of the action
situation, there are variables such as processes, conflicts, or common activities
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(investment, lobbying, networking ...). Information sharing is one of them.
These interactions result in producing outcomes on social (mainly for A) and
ecological (for RS and RU) dimensions. These outcomes are the base of the
feedbacks.
In NRM, a system description is not complete without paying attention to
what is outside of the system. Two main dimensions are defined. The first
one describes the general social, economic and political settings (S) the SES is
included in. These dimensions encompass the global situation, located above
the SES that is studied. The second dimension focuses on related ecosystems
(ECO) that are linked to the focal SES, through flows in and out the SES, or
pollutions (externalities).
This framework has been applied in the literature to a variety of topics re-
garding common management of resources. Authors use it at different scales,
from a single case study to worldwide comparisons. Risvoll et al. (2014) use
it to investigate consequences of pastoralists’ participation in national parks
management in Norway. Nagendra and Ostrom (2014) apply the SES frame-
work to understand and analyze differences on the evolution of collaboration
for the management of several lakes of different sizes and ecological condi-
tions in Bangalore, India. Gutiérrez et al. (2011) employ the framework to
compare 130 co-managed fisheries all over the world and, by identifying key
variables, they demonstrated that leadership, social capital and incentives pro-
mote successful fisheries. The SES framework provides an opportunity for a
clear and precise description of a complex situation where actors with different
property-rights over various types of goods are intertwined in a single system.
One can think Bob and his fellow fishermen as the set of actors. But the
framework could describe a situation where A goes beyond fishermen, includ-
ing tourists or city inhabitants. The basic RS is the fish stock, but one can
define RS as the whole watershed, which would change ECO variables, mul-
tiply possible indicators for outcomes, and make interactions more complex
(Chapter 7). It is a matter of choice, and of question one wishes to address:
the SES framework is adapted to clarify the analyst’s choices and to allow
comparisons (of scales or cases) on a vast set of variables. I use this framework
with this idea in mind in the rest of the thesis. In the upstream downstream
situation, there could be nested SESs, where upstream and downstream are
two SESs, included in a bigger one that encompasses the two systems. Fur-
thermore, the depth in which those interested in studying a SES needs to be
carefully calibrated. There are numerous proposed variables, and some authors
propose even more variables, according to their focal point. For instance, Vogt
et al. (2015) propose to unpack the “E” in the SES. They provide much more
information about the ecological aspects of a SES that they believe too scarce
in the way the SES framework has been formulated (because of its social sci-
ences background). I make full use of these suggestions when describing in a
generic way the RS and RU of the case studies (Chapter 7).
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2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I presented a first conceptualization of NRM situations. A
proper characterization of goods and resources properties provided a way out
of the private/public dichotomy for renewable resources management by intro-
ducing common management of resources (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1994).
Studies of actual situations led to unveil an important complexity and variety
in ways actors manage the resources they need and use. Actors defined various
rights from simple access to right to sell the resource and devised institutions
that allowed for sustainable use of resources.
Institutions, regulations and norms exist in the context of NRM because
of a fundamental tension that occurs between short term rational interest and
long term collective interest, a situation that is called a social dilemma. The
prisoner’s dilemma or tragedy of the commons are theoretical instances of
social dilemma. Fortunately, Ostrom (1990) suggests ways to manage these
situations in the context of common-pool resources by guaranteeing that the
8 design principles recalled in Table 2.4 are verified.
Actors managing collective resources act in social-ecological systems. I
presented this framework that will lie at the background of the thesis and
structured the exploration of the cases.
Bob is worried. He is convinced that water quality is getting poorer. It
is very likely that this situation comes from poor handling of water eﬄuents
coming from the city. He believes that fish population is decreasing since he
catches less fish than before, even though he is not sure how much or if this is
cyclical or due to climate change. He does not know for sure, but suspects that
the flow of tourists fishing for leisure is detrimental to the fish stock since they
probably do not respect the rule that fixes a minimum size of caught fish (there
is almost no monitoring from authorities).
I call threats the different problems Bob faces. The goods and resources
typology as well as the SES framework presented in this chapter do not make
an obvious place for these threats. Even though the typology enables an iden-
tification of resources characteristics, an effective typology of threats faced by
groups of actors and how their characteristics may influence and help collective
decision-making or information-seeking is lacking.
How are these threats (exhaustion of fish stock, pollution of water, climate
change) of different nature? How one should deal with all these different
threats? What is the influence of information-sharing on actors and their
environment? These questions will be the topic of the rest of the thesis, starting
with the following chapter that defines precisely this notion and creates a
typology of threats in the context of NRM.
Chapter 3
Threats for Goods
The questions raised at the end of the previous chapter are important issues to
explore in order to understand evolution of resources management, as we will
see in this chapter and in Part III. Actors of SESs have to collectively make
decisions, devise rules, create institutions to sustainably manage resources that
are necessary for all. The difficulty underlying NRM is linked to the existence
of collective threats, that all have to face and deal with, and that actors have to
solve or understand together. To my knowledge, there is no precise description
of threats. What are the nature of threats faced by actors? How can we create
a typology of threats? How is this typology helpful to identify ways to tackle
these threats?
In this chapter, I formalize the concept of threat that I will refer to through-
out the thesis. I make the case that these threats of various nature and typs
are at the core of understanding relations between users of a resource. They
are also key to the implementation of information sharing artifacts, as I will
show in Chapter 4.
First, I define the concept, then I differentiate threats from similar con-
cepts such as risk, uncertainty, or hazard, and illustrate threats with examples
taken from the literature. After, I describe two key properties that will enable
identification of different types of threats: internality and excludability. Then,
I show that goods of all types can be part of threats of all types. Finally, I
make the case for the addition of this concept to the SES framework, showing
that a case diagnosis cannot oversee these key elements.
3.1 Why a threat?
In addition to the numerous types of goods and associated property rights that
Bob has to deal with everyday, he has to take into account threats that these
goods face to make his day-to-day or long term decisions. He could loose his
boat in a tsunami, or simply due to poor maintenance, fish stock could be
depleted because of pollution or overharvesting.
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Difficulties in NRM are linked to multiple elements. Hardin (1968) pointed
out free-riding, overharvesting and eventually exhaustion, all threats for open-
access resources and actors who use them. These threats to the resource force
actors that want to manage resources they use to devise ways to avoid loosing
access or the possibility of exploiting the resource. However, threats that
resources used collectively by actors face are not defined.
A large body of literature emphasizes particular threats associated with
CPRs without using such a conceptualization. In Section 2.2.2, I have exposed
CPR necessary design principles as ways out of these threats that actors of
CPRs face (Cox et al., 2010). However, some threats are not directly, or
uniquely, linked to the decisions and infrastructure of actors of systems with
clearly identifiable actors and boundaries.
A precise definition, characterization and typology of threats can help to
gain a deeper view of actions available to actors and relate these to different
types of goods that actors use for their activities. This will be the topic of this
chapter. First, I define threats. Then, I focus on similar concepts such as risk,
uncertainty, or hazard and show how they differ from threats. To conclude,
I use literature to present examples of threats and solutions that actors have
devised.
3.1.1 A definition of threats
Formal definition Threats are absent from the Dunster (2011)’s dictionary
of NRM and according to the Oxford English Dictionary, threats have several
definitions. The definitions that best fit the NRM context are: “A person or
thing likely to cause damage or danger” and “the possibility of trouble, danger,
or ruin” (OED, 2015).
I propose to define threats in the context of a SES as a 5-tuple 〈A, C, I, D, E〉
made of three main parts. Firstly, A is a group of actors (that may be self-
constituted) which are concerned about some characteristics C of some goods
or resources (subsequently called asset) that they possess, or use. Secondly, I
contains a set of infrastructures in the sense of Anderies and Janssen (2013),
that is inclusive of human, both soft (e.g. rules) or hard (e.g. canals) and
natural (e.g. forest) or human-made (e.g. forest cuts) types. Infrastructure is
here used in a broad sense that can be understood as constraints or at least
elements that could influence characteristics of assets C. Last, D and E contain
events, both human decisions (in D) or environmental dynamics (in E), that
may affect directly or indirectly, through I, the asset. Figure 3.1 proposes a
vision to unify and Table 3.1 summarizes the elements of the 5-tuple.
Let me illustrate this definition with a classic CPR threat: exhaustion.
Bob and his fellow fishermen constitute the group of actors A that use the
(common) fish resource, which abundance, C, can face the threat of exhaustion.
Infrastructure I is made of a rule on the size of nets and legal fishing areas
(soft) or of the storage capacity in the local market (hard). Human decisions D
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Characteristics of 
goods or resources
Human 
decisions
Environmental 
dynamics
Infrastructure
Actors concerned with
aﬀectimpact
(indirect) impact
(direct)
Figure 3.1: Relations between elements constituting threats.
Table 3.1: Elements characterizing a threat.
Id Component Definition Examples
A Actors A group of people, the
target, that are or could
be affected by the threat
through goods
All dwellers, fishermen,
managers of a natural
park
C Asset characteris-
tics
Characteristics of goods
or resources that can be
touched by the threat
Fish stock, biodiversity
I Infrastructure Natural, human-made or
human elements that im-
pact C
Forest, forest cuts,
dams, hunting season
D Human decisions Actions of people that im-
pact C or I
Fish extraction, litter
E Environmental
dynamics
Actions of nature that im-
pact C or I
Floods, tornados, inva-
sive species
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can include quantities of fish taken or periods to go fishing and environmental
dynamics E invasion by a noxious species.
Precisions on A Actors of A form a group that can be self-constituted, or
delimited by an analyst, and that does not necessarily include all whom could
be affected by the threat or all whom could have an impact on it. Actions in
D include decisions that are made by people who do not necessarily belong to
A.
Consider a watershed containing two villages located along a river. In
both villages, farmers pump water out to irrigate their fields. Water is often
scarce and thus farmers from the upstream village tend to pump as much
as they can to favor their crops. If we consider water scarcity as a threat,
downstream actors can be a self-constituted target A trying to defend their
access to water (C). In this case, I pumping facilities and irrigation systems. E
includes rain and water flows from the river and D includes pumping decisions
from upstream and downstream actors. Boundaries are difficult to delineate.
One could include climate change in E, or the village water system in I.
In a second example, let us suppose that a factory and some farmers pump
out of the same aquifer that usually fills up every year. Farmers have noticed
that water is getting difficult to obtain since the factory has been established:
the factory possesses deeper drills and uses significant quantities of water.
All actors (farmers and factory) are interested in water and could be part
of the target since they would all be affected by an increase in water scarcity.
Farmers could also be the target themselves, trying to limit the factory’s water
consumption. The choice of the set of actors is open, and several options can
be advocated for.
3.1.2 Risk, uncertainty et al.
Risk, uncertainty, hazard, vulnerability are terms that have already been used
in NRM with a meaning close to threats. In order to understand the concept of
threat and its usefulness, I need to explore those concepts to clearly state how
they differ. I first provide definitions of these concepts in NRM context and
then relate them to threats. Three main axes are to be considered: describing,
evaluating consequences, and solving issues (threats).
The description phase contains hazards and hazard rating. Threats used
as a definition belong to this category. The dictionary of NRM (Dunster,
2011) defines hazard as “any action or substance that has a potential to create
an adverse effect without reference to the probability of the potential actually
occurring” and “the condition of stands, trees, and the prevailing environmental
conditions, which are conducive to the creation of the hazard”. According to
the first definition, an alien invasion, a nuclear power plant explosion or the
apocalypse are hazards, as is a tsunami (Bryant, 2014). With this definition,
events with less extreme consequences than the previously cited ones such as
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a storm, or rain at the wrong time are considered hazards. The second part
of the definition is interesting since it considers that elements which lead to
the increase in the probability of a negative event potential are also called
hazards. These elements can be natural (drought increasing probability of
fires (Meyn et al., 2010)), or human-induced (changes in population density
and continuity patches affecting probability of fires (Archibald et al., 2012)).
The identification of a hazard is often paired with hazard rating (Hernán (2010)
even points out hazards of hazard rating) which is “a system of identifying and
ranking individual stands in terms of the vulnerability to becoming conducive
for the creation of the hazard condition” (Dunster, 2011).
Hazards are specific types of threats. They are threats that focus on envi-
ronmental dynamics E and infrastructure I. There may be an underlying group
of actors A that could be targeted by the threat and the hazard is linked to
some asset characteristics C. Human decisions D are connected to the produc-
tion of elements leading to the increase of hazard consequences, but do not
include more general issues regarding NRM such as exhaustion or over-harvest
linked to social dilemmas.
On the evaluation side, there is the notion of risk which is connected to
hazards. In their white paper on risk governance, the Institute Risk Gov-
ernance Council defines risks as “uncertain consequences of an event or an
activity with respect to something that humans value” (Renn, 2005, p.19).
Many other definitions exist and Aven et al. (2011) provide an overview of
these. This definition is close to the definition given in decision theory. Taking
advantage of this direction, I add the concept of uncertainty : “in decisions
under risk, the decision maker knows the probability of the possible outcomes,
whereas in decisions under ignorance the probabilities are either unknown or
non-existent. Uncertainty is either used as a synonym for ignorance, or as a
broader term referring to both risk and ignorance” (Peterson, 2009, pp.5-6).
In NRM, it is said that risk analysis includes ways to objectively define prob-
abilities, while uncertainties need probabilities to be subjectively constructed
(Dunster, 2011).
Vulnerability is a concept part of the evaluation phase. According to the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, vulnerability is “the degree to
which a system is susceptible to or unable to cope with adverse effects of
climate change, including climate variability and extremes. Vulnerability is a
function of the character, magnitude, and rate of climate variation to which a
system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its adaptive capacity” (McCarthy et al.,
2001, p.995). Changes can be hazards, even though changes need not be
negative, and evaluation of vulnerability to these hazards are a way to infer on
capacity of people to cope with these changes. These concepts are linked to
tackling or absorbing threats rather than identifying and defining them clearly.
Finally, describing and evaluating consequences lead to devising ways to
limit or solve threats. For instance, hazard reduction gathers ways to limit
hazards consequences.
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The notion of threat is part of the description phase since it neither con-
tains evaluation methods nor asks for solutions. Threats as described here are
considered a diagnosis.
3.1.3 Design principles seen as answers to threats
NRM can be framed as an instance of social dilemma. Initial attempts to
understand it using game theoretical principles Hardin (1968) resulted in a
dead-end. The research of Ostrom and colleagues has revealed 8 necessary de-
sign principles to sustainable CPR management (Table 2.4). These principles
can be seen as answers to threats. If one looks at these principles thinking
“suppose that this principle is not respected then ...”, a threat appears (mainly
mismanagement of the resource resulting in unsustainable use, i.e. exhaustion
in the long run, or pollution).
For instance, one of the principles is that monitors who actively audit
biophysical conditions and user behavior are at least partially accountable to
the users and/or are the users themselves (Anderies and Janssen, 2013). If
such monitoring is not respected, then threats such as corruption and decay
(exhaustion or pollution) of the resource emerge. Clearly defined boundaries
are a principle according to which the boundaries of the resource system and
the individuals or households with rights to harvest resource units are clearly
defined (Anderies and Janssen, 2013). If boundaries are not well defined,
then threats such as decay and misuse can arise, such as what is currently
happening in some fisheries in Africa (Standing, 2008). Table 3.2 lists all of
these principles and relates them to threats that could occur if they are not
respected.
Thus, it is possible to see all design principles through the lens of threats.
A clear identification of threats may help to understand rule-making and con-
straints that actors impose to their use of resources.
3.1.4 Some examples and solutions
In this section, I give a few well documented examples that exist in the CPR
literature emphasizing the notion of threat. I give two examples of how actors
managed to cope with threats of overuse and exhaustion in CPR contexts.
Then, I give an example of threats to public water. Table 3.3 contains a
framing of those examples using the threats semantic.
Rice farming in Bali, Indonesia Lansing (2009) describes the case of Ba-
linese farmers making regular offerings to water temple gods to trigger the rice
seeding period (Figure 3.2). For centuries, farmers had adopted a cultivation
pattern with two annual rice crops. During the so-called green revolution of
the 1960s (see Griffin et al. (1974) or Evenson and Gollin (2003) for critical
assessments), a program was launched backed by foreign (Dutch) engineers
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Table 3.2: Ostrom’s CPR design principles (Table 2.4) under the lense of
threats. The table is intended to be read as: “if design principle x is not guar-
anteed, then a threat linked to elements of I or D could impact characteristics
of assets C, which would be a concern for a group of actors A.
Design principle I D
Clearly defined boundaries -
actors
Entry (extraction)
external actors,
free-riding
Clearly defined boundaries -
resource
Congruence between appro-
priation and provision rules
and local conditions - restric-
tions
Size of nets Overharvesting, un-
sustainable harvest-
ing
Congruence between appro-
priation and provision rules
and local conditions - benefits
Underinvestment in
labor
Collective-choice arrange-
ments
Unappropriated
rules and buildings
Non respect of rule
Monitoring - presence Free-riding
Monitoring - accountability Corruption
Graduated sanctions Too drastic sanctions
or no sanction
Non respect of rule,
unwillingness to par-
ticipate
Conflict-resolution mecha-
nisms
No cooperation
Minimal recognition of rights
to organize
Absence of local or-
ganization
Non legitimacy of or-
ganizers
Nested enterprises Bad scaling of infras-
tructure at inappro-
priate levels
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Table 3.3: Examples taken from the literature described using threats defined
as 〈A, C, I, D, E〉.
Example Threat A C I D E
Rice, Bali Pest Farmers Rice harvest Fields,
irrigation
scheme
Cropping
period
Pest
Lobsters,
Maine
Exhaustion Fishers Lobsters
abundance
Lobster bi-
ology
Catch Reproduction
rates
Lakes, Ban-
galore
Pollution City
dwellers
Water qual-
ity
Water
treatment
facilities
Involvement
of actors
& govern-
ment
Water flow
and imposed by the Ministry of Agriculture: farmers had to grow a specific
type of fast growing rice that enabled up to three crops per year, with the
help of chemical inputs. While this strategy allowed an increase in production
in following years, pests adapted and wreaked havoc on crops, since rice was
available in random patches all year long. New rice types were created and
pests adapted over again. A red queen’s race was engaged.
Lansing identified that water temple ritual roles went much further than
simple religious functions. They allowed farmers to both manage, in a very
efficient manner, water distribution while limiting the impact of pests on their
rice fields. Since there was a synchronization in crops that had to be done
after collective visits to the water temple, there were periods of very low food
availability for pests, controlling their population.
In this case, the threat is the loss of crops due to pests, the actors group
is all farmers and the characteristics of the goods are rice harvest quantities.
Environmental dynamics contains knowledge of pest and rice growing rates.
Infrastructure could be rice fields, and up to a certain point, there is a need
for including irrigation systems. Decisions contain cropping dates. As shown
by Lansing, a way to deal with this threat was to create and follow a rather
mystical procedure which was soon reinstated.
Lobster farming in Maine, USA Another classical example of appropri-
ators dealing with the threat of exhaustion or overharvesting is the example
of Maine lobster fisheries (Acheson, 1975, 2003). Fishermen devised the rule
of marking the tails of lobsters bearing eggs with a V-notch (Figure 3.2). It
is forbidden to keep and sell such a trapped lobster. All fishermen and buyers
know the rule. It is also forbidden to keep and sell lobsters below a certain
size.
This case shows how to deal with the threat of low reproduction rates
and differentiation of resource units by creating a rule to easily spot offenders
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Figure 3.2: A traditional water temple procession in Bali and a V-notched
female losbter in Maine (Pictures are from Wikipedia, respectively Ken Eck-
ert and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) under a
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 license).
so that cheating is limited. The actors are the fishermen and the resource
(the good) characteristic that is under threat is the lobster stock. There is
no specific infrastructure and the environmental dynamics is mostly linked to
reproduction patterns (i.e. lobster biology). Decisions are linked to the type
of lobster to catch.
Water quality in urban lakes, Bangalore, India Due to increasing ur-
ban pressure, lakes in Bangalore are more and more polluted (Nagendra and
Ostrom, 2014). This pollution is a threat to all inhabitants, and even more to
those directly dependent on water quality (the characteristic of water under
threat). In the study, the authors show that collective action can be successful
for the management of what they call an urban lake commons, a commons that
fits the definition of a public good. In some cases, those involved in the man-
agement succeed to improve water quality and fail in other cases. Whatever
the result, these lakes face the same threat where the environmental dynam-
ics are linked to limited water flows. The infrastructure is the (poor) water
treatment management and decisions are the involvement of citizens and their
capacity to create ties with the local government.
3.1.5 Conclusion on threat definition
In this section, I made the point that threats are an essential part of the study
of NRM. They lie at the core of the need for such a management, as shown with
the example of the well-studied CPRs. To define a threat, one has to look for
five main elements: a set of actors A in relation with assets characteristics C
that could be affected by the threat, the infrastructure I and the environmental
dynamics E, as well as actors decisions D that could have an effect on C. While
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threats are connected to other concepts, such as hazards, risks, uncertainty, or
vulnerability, threats capture as many aspects as possible: natural elements,
human infrastructure and decision making. These elements can be the base for
information seeking, or sharing (Chapter 4). This definition of threats allows
a complex view that can include actors’ individual rationality (decision) in
relation with their environment, be it man-made or natural.
This definition has the potential to be used to describe collective situations,
as in this dissertation, that could go wrong or to assess clearly a fact that can
be mitigated through rules, or norms, or knowledge.
Characterizing a threat is not enough. A natural question that comes
after is: what to do? The definition does not suffice to answer that question
since it can include too many different types of threats that call for specific
treatments. There is a need for further clarification. In upstream downstream
situations, in a natural park and in a collection of fields irrigated with the same
reservoir, threats are different in essence. In the following section, I propose a
typology that will enable identifying different types of threats and strategies to
tackle them. Some of the strategies include information seeking and sharing,
as illustrated by the cases investigated in this thesis (Chapters 9 to 11).
3.2 Typology of threats
Identifying threats is a useful lens through which we can understand the
decision-making processes, be it at the individual level, such as changing prac-
tices, or at the collective one, such as crafting rules. To demonstrate how
effective this concept is, I introduce key characteristics that threats can verify,
leaning towards a typology that I propose subsequently. Determining these
properties is suitable to better understand the type of answer users imple-
ment, i.e. their strategy, to tackle and/or limit the negative effects of threats.
I investigate two key properties: internality and excludability.
3.2.1 Properties
For now, the concept of threats has been defined and characterized. It en-
ables a precise identification of underlying elements prompting the necessity
of devising rules or institutions. CPRs and related issues have been identified,
bounded, explored and separated from other types of resources thanks to Os-
trom’s goods typology (Section 2.1.1). The concept of threats needs a proper
typology to enable an accurate diagnosis and adapted tackling strategies. In
order to characterize threats, I provide two properties below that will enable
the identification of different types of threats: internality, a characteristic of
the threat and excludability, a characteristic of ways to tackle the threat.
3.2. TYPOLOGY OF THREATS 33
3.2.1.1 Internal threats
The first property that I consider is a characteristic that I call internality. It
is related to questions such as: are D decisions of actors of A? Are people
outside of A concerned with the threat? Do actors that do not belong to A at
the origin of the threat?
A threat is totally internal if infrastructure I belong to actors of A, if the
decisions D are made by actors of A and if only those actors are concerned with
the environmental dynamics E. This property depends on the choice of A. In
most cases, there are several ways to draw the boundaries of A. The totally
internal case is the basic case studied in the literature on the commons, where
issues are common and linked to actors only. On the opposite extreme, if the
threat is linked to infrastructure that does not belong to the actors (a failing
water treatment plant), to decisions of actors outside of A or to environmental
dynamics that affect actors who do not belong to A, then the threat is non
internal. Thus, there are three dimensions in the internality concept. The
more the infrastructure or the decisions are outside the reach of actors of A,
the more environmental dynamics touch other actors, the less internal the
threat is.
Totally internal threats have the most demanding conditions and represent
the traditional tragedy of the commons for instance, when isolated from links
to the rest of the economy (exhaustion of a water resource has consequences
to users that do not seem initially related to the resource). A non internal
threat, as experienced by Bob and his fellow fishermen, could be foreign boats
looting the fish stock. An internal threat would be insider overharvesting. The
upstream downstream scenario could be seen as an example of non internal
threat for downstream actors in the sense that consequences are limited to the
target and the origin of the threat is from upstream.
A possible solution to internalize threats is to change the system bound-
aries, thus making non internal threats internal and traditional theory appli-
cable. However, some systems including the ones studied in this thesis are
structurally open. One could internalize all issues by creating a system that
would include all inhabitants of the planet (even though we would still depend
on the Sun or climate), but the explicative power of this vision would probably
be rather limited. In a less extreme manner, one could decide to extend the
physical boundaries of the system, or to include more actors, but it does not
provide an actual tangible way to tackle threats.
Some threats are intrinsically non internal, especially when relative to a
set of actors. If the fish stock that Bob subtracts units from is overharvested
because of the intrusion of foreign boats, then the threat is non internal and
should be considered non internal. For downstream actors, the upstream actors
cannot simply be considered internal actors to solve a threat. Downstream
actors have to find a way to change the system boundary so that upstream
actors feel engaged to help solve the threat. Internalization of threats is a
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strategy that requires work.
The qualification of “internal” certainly reminds the reader of the property
of externality which is widely used in economics. An externality is a cost or
benefit that affects a party who did not choose to incur that cost or benefit
Buchanan and Stubblebine (1962). Air pollution due to car use is a negative
externality to society, a pizzeria that sells more pizzas thanks to a bar located
next door benefits from a positive externality. This concept is seen from the
point of view of an actor or a group of actors creating something that others
will have to deal with. In our case, we are in the position of a target that has
to face a threat. Thus, it seems natural to define the concept of internality.
Actors of A can anticipate and communicate the externalities they produce as
a strategy to reach non-internal threats (Chapter 10). A second property is
necessary to complete the threat typology: excludability.
3.2.1.2 Excludable threats
The second element that the target needs to identify is the excludable charac-
teristic, a property connected to solutions to tackle the threat. This property
is interesting in the case of a target representing a group of actors, otherwise
it is a case of non-collaborative game theory. The excludable property deals
with questions such as: how collective solutions need to be? Can actors find
and implement solutions by themselves?
The difficulty in social dilemmas lies in the impossibility for individuals
to solve the dilemma by themselves. In the tragedy of the commons, a single
individual who decides to play by the rules and limit his own herd size does
not change the fate of the common. He is simply a “sucker” since all the others
take advantage of what is left of the common pasture.
Solutions to threats can be collective, but they can also come from in-
dividual behavior, or somewhere in-between. A threat is said to be totally
excludable if a single individual of the target can tackle the threat by an indi-
vidual action. It is non excludable if the solution involves a collective answer
to the threat. If a threat is totally excludable, then each one can mitigate the
threat by personally adopting a proper strategy, when possible. If the threat
is non excludable, then individual actions have little effect on the threat.
In most cases, there is no single way to tackle threats, some solutions can be
individual, others collective. Suppose Bob wants to limit overharvesting. He
can decide by himself to use nets with holes big enough to let small fishes pass.
If he is alone to make this decision while other fishermen decide to continue
to overfish, it will not be enough. This threat is thus non excludable. Since
it is quite difficult to privatize moving wild fish, sustainable solutions need to
be devised collectively. As other fishermen, Bob uses a collective refrigerated
room to store his fish. The refrigerated room is organized as a club good, a
solution to the threat of losing one’s catch. Private solutions could have been
imagined as well by using individual refrigerated rooms. But the collective
3.2. TYPOLOGY OF THREATS 35
Table 3.4: A typology of threats
Internality
Low High
Excludability Low Public CommonHigh X Private
solution was found to be cheaper.
Solutions devised by actors to face threats can range over the excludability
dimension. In some cases, for instance in usual CPR issues, solutions are
intrinsically non excludable. Actually, excludable threats may be considered
irrelevant at first sight. However, from information sharing perspectives, this
type of threat is particularly relevant since it points out issues such as limited
experience or knowledge, or ill-known environmental dynamics. The mere
existence of the threat may be unknown.
In the end, and as I will demonstrate in the rest of the thesis, the internal
and excludable properties allow to apprehend the type of threat faced by actors
using some good or resource.
3.2.2 Typology
Four types of threats can be defined by combining the internal and excludable
properties. The names are inspired by goods types since the categories fit
well, which makes remembering them easier. These threats are summed up in
Table 3.4.
I qualify a low excludable and low internal threat as public. This kind of
threat includes threats such as floods or foreign fishing boats.
I call a low excludable and highly internal threat as a common one. These
threats include social dilemmas and associated free-riding or overuse and in-
ternal pollutions.
Finally, a highly excludable and highly internal threat is private. Such
threats are more related to the lack of personal or collective knowledge. These
threats will be particularly interesting to deal with when we focus on these
issues from the perspective of information sharing.
A highly excludable and internal threat is here left as a hole that could be
filled with an appropriate case. In this thesis, the cases did not demonstrate
this type of threat, therefore I did not investigate it any further.
In the rest of the thesis I will investigate information sharing stakes for
users facing those different kinds of threats, except for the last one.
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3.2.3 Goods and threats
Goods are separate from threats. Table 3.5 shows examples of goods that face
different kind of threats. Various characteristics of goods of all types may be
touched by threats of all sorts. Initial studies in the commons literature are
oriented towards a group of actors that share a common good facing common
threats such as overuse, depletion or pollution. The typology of threats intro-
duced here enables to identify and think of threats that are less obvious, or
that do not belong to the commons category.
Bob owns a boat. His fellow fishermen do as well. Boats are both sub-
stractable and excludable. Thus, they are private goods. All types of threats
can happen to individual boats or to a set of boats. Hurricanes, a non-internal
(since it touches other people than the fishermen) and difficult to exclude (the
investment is probably high) threat, thus a public threat, can happen and destroy
the shore and the boats. Boats can also incur issues due to poor maintenance
(a private threat).
Goods and threat types are independent. There are types that can be
thought of as associated (CPR and common threat), but all different com-
binations exist. Adding the threat dimension to goods or resources used or
possessed by actors allows to widen the view that one associates with the said
good or resource, since the threats, issues, or concerns that can arise are of
different types. As will be shown in the rest of the thesis, identifying the threat
type enables to turn to specific strategies. For instance, public threats require
the involvement of actors that are not in the threat, common threats need in-
ternal cooperation, and private threats are mostly linked to lack of knowledge
and thus favor information sharing (Section 4.5).
3.3 Adding threats to the SES framework
In this section, I advocate for a clearer mention of the threats that actors face
in the SES framework. I first show that there is no specific mention of threats
in this framework and motivate the addition of threats, then compare the
robustness framework dedicated to identifying vulnerabilities (Anderies et al.,
2004). I explain why threats provide another vision than this framework.
Finally, I propose some variables to be explicitly added to the SES.
3.3.1 No threats in the SES framework
Vogt et al. (2015) propose to add variables to describe the ecological side of
a SES. According to them, this part is not developed enough. As explained
in Section 3.1.2, threats are part of a diagnosis. Threats force actors to make
decisions to limit potential effects of its realization and is therefore a funda-
mental part of (collective) decision-making. I claim that threats need to be
added to the SES framework.
3.3.
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Table 3.5: Threat examples for each type of good (Table 2.1). Oyster farming examples are reformulation of threats found in
the case studies (Part III).
† OF stands for oyster farmers.
Asset Threat Example
type Asset Threat A C I D E
P
u
b
l
i
c Public Water Microbiological
bloom
OF† Water qual-
ity
Sewage treatment
plants, rules on indi-
vidual water treatment
Improvements
in water treat-
ment
Water flows
Common Image Undermining
reputation
OF Image Depuration basins,
harvest class
Sell not purified
oysters
Microbiological
blooms
Private Water Faulty toilets OF Water qual-
ity
Connection to sewer-
age network
Investing in con-
nection
Water flows
C
o
m
m
o
n Public Fish stock Foreign fish-
ing boats
Fisher Fish abun-
dance
Unclear boundaries,
industrial-size boats
Extraction
Common Fish stock Exhaustion Fisher Fish abun-
dance
Fishing technologies Fish caught Reproduction
rates
Private Fish stock Access to fish Fisher Fish location Fishing periods Choose fishing
area
Fish move
C
l
u
b
Public Lease area Access to
lease area
OF Tables, Ac-
cess rules
Trespassing by non au-
thorized users
Exclusive access
Common Docks Docks degra-
dation
OF Docks condi-
tion
Docks Collective work,
docks mainte-
nance
Extreme
weather
Private ? ? ? ? ?
P
r
i
v
a
t
e Public Oysters Harmful al-
gal blooms
OF Oysters
health
Catchment area Upstream farm-
ers fertilizers in-
put
Water flows
Common Oysters Herpes virus OF Oysters
health
Unclear role of
practices
Virus dynamics
Private Oysters Sea bream OF Oysters
health
Tables, nets Ally with fisher-
men
Sea bream dy-
namics
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Filling in all the required information of the SES framework is already a
long and arduous task for an analyst. The addition of threats makes the task
even larger. A SES is a partial vision of a system, with an entry chosen by the
analyst who selects a subset of actors, a specific resource system and a set of
rules, some indicators, and specific interactions. By choosing those, the analyst
has to set aside other types of interactions which may have consequences on
the SES (in real life, actors may interact on many different action arenas
and processes considered external may have important effects on the SES),
projecting very complex and often hard to predict situations on a framework
composed of a set of variables, loosing information at the same time in the
hopes of providing the quintessential elements.
When assuming that a system is complex, one has to reject the reduc-
tionist idea according to which understanding subsystems perfectly enables a
finer understanding of the superior level (Sapolsky and Balt, 1996). When
describing social or ecological processes, one could look ever closer, probably
without being able to derive useful knowledge at the SES level. Even though
interesting and related, it may be irrelevant to go very deep into the study of
how tree leaves grow when trying to understand how people manage a common
forest. Once again, it is a question of choice. These choices are necessary, and
analysts should keep this in mind, especially when presenting results. Despite
this limit, which is intrinsic to the study of complex systems, where the whole
is not the linear sum of its parts, I believe that adding threats is fundamental.
In “a diagnosis approach for going beyond panaceas”, Ostrom (2007a) in-
troduces the SES framework. The paper title gives the general idea behind the
framework. However, in the SES, there is no apparent mention of free-riding,
natural risks, internal pollution patterns, overuse, or other types of threats
that actors of the studied SES have to face. As advocated in this chapter,
threats are elements that need to be considered while making a diagnosis of
a situation. Even more, they can be considered at the origin of rules or in-
frastructure as discussed in Section 3.1.3. There are not simply closer studies
of subsystems. The immediate step after making a diagnosis of a situation
is to think about consequences and thus make decisions. Threats are part of
decisions that need to be made by actors and cannot be left out of a diagnosis.
Of course, at the origin of the field are common threats that lie at the very
core of NRM. Hardin’s paper and subsequent research by other scholars of the
field exist because of the existence of threats, otherwise, there would be little to
talk about. Threats are present in the SES framework but not explicitly. For
instance, the need for (I9-I101) monitoring and evaluative activities is due to
possible threats to the RS or RU. Conflict (I4), a threat explicitly mentioned,
may arise. The only other threat that has a variable devoted to it is “Pollution
patterns” (ECO2), in the category “Related ecosystems”.
Given their position at the core of the field, I claim that threats should be
1The codes are those of the SES framework (Table B.1, p.260).
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added explicitly to the SES framework which is supposed to enable a diagnosis
of a situation, where some actors interact with a renewable natural resource.
Before proposing a practical addition of these threats to the framework, we
need to explore a related framework: the robustness framework.
3.3.2 Threats in the robustness framework
The robustness framework (Anderies et al., 2004, p.1) is a framework that is
intended to “identify potential vulnerabilities of SESs to disturbances”. The au-
thors identify four main nodes: resource users (the actors of the SES), resource
(that encompasses RS and RU), public infrastructure and public infrastructure
providers. These nodes are linked through some dynamics. All nodes and links
can fail, internally or externally, due for instance to actors’ internal conflicts
(decisions) or to environmental dynamics.
Anderies (2006) uses the robustness framework to describe systemic changes
for a lost civilization, the Hohokam of the Phoenix Basin. By unfolding boxes
such as resources and public infrastructure, civilizational choices are analyzed,
balancing efficiency and vulnerability: an increase in irrigation efficiency came
with an increased vulnerability to drought, possibly leading to the fall of the
Hohokam civilization.
In the context of a SES, the robustness framework opens ways for actors to
think about potential “vulnerabilities” that can be identified to threats and de-
scribed using the threat formalism. Recognizing these vulnerabilities enables
actors to diagnosis their own weakness(es). However, this framework comes
with two limitations. Firstly, threats are merely identified. The framework
does not propose ways to describe in a thorough manner those vulnerabilities
while threats come with an appropriate formalism. Secondly, it does not pro-
vide effective strategies to tackle threats contrary to the typology considered
in this chapter.
3.3.3 Adding threats
I propose to add new variables to the SES framework that would focus on
threats and force analysts to think of and describe precisely elements related
to this threat, or even point out lack of knowledge (Chapter 4).
I list in Table 3.6 new variables to be added to the SES framework, some-
times replacing existing variables using a more encompassing one. For instance,
I suggest to replace (ECO2) “Pollution patterns” by (ECO2) “Public threats”,
with pollution patterns as a third-tier variable. All types of goods are not
considered in the SES. In the same spirit, I do not list directly the different
types of threats in the framework. I have shaped threats to suit the precise
descriptions of SESs that are provided in the framework.
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Table 3.6: New variables to be added to the SES. Variables codes that already
exist in the framework, emphasized in italic, are intended to replace those that
are defined in the original SES framework.
Code Variable
RS10 Threats to resource system
RS10a - Threats due to unclarity of system boundaries (ecolog-
ical openness, contiguity with other systems)
RS10b - Threats linked to facilities (ecological consequences,
free-riding)
RS10c - Threats to resource system (fires, droughts)
RU8 Threats to resource units
RU8a - Biological threats (virus, pest)
RU8b - Human-related threats (theft, overharvesting)
I4 Threats to collaboration (conflicts, free-riding possibilities)
ECO2 Public threats
ECO2a - Pollution patterns
ECO2b - Facilities
3.4 Conclusion
Threats are an essential factor to understand decision-making and information-
seeking in the context of NRM. The existence of SESs is linked to the existence
of a renewable resource that actors want to exploit, and the existence of insti-
tutions is linked to the existence of threats. Threats prompt and force interac-
tions between users of a resource. I proposed a definition of threat, relative to
characteristics of assets C shared by actors A, that may be affected by existing
infrastructure I or human decisions D or environmental dynamics E. I also
proposed to characterize threats using two main properties: internality and
excludability. A threat is internal when the threat depends on decisions of the
designed actors and originates from their infrastructure. A threat is excludable
when it is possible for a single actor to choose a strategy that would prevent the
threat from touching the actor. These two properties enable to identify three
types of threats: public threats (non-internal and non-excludable), common
threats (internal and non-excludable) and private (internal and excludable).
Finally, I have advocated for the addition of threats as part of diagnoses of
SESs with the intention of helping individual or collective decision-making and
information-seeking.
Threats have been addressed through numerous means, that include all
forms of institutions, rules, infrastructures - sometimes missing the goal, some-
times ensuring long term sustainability of the resource. In this thesis, I inves-
tigate particularly the implementation of a specific type of infrastructure that
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may impact threats: information sharing artifacts. I will explore this element
in the following chapter.

Chapter 4
Information Sharing for Natural
Resources Management
Si j’aurais su, j’aurais pas venu.
La guerre des boutons
Louis Pergaud, 1912
Information has already been studied as a global good (Hess and Ostrom,
2003). Specific issues arise when information is shared in local settings. I
explore this subject in this context by answering the following questions: What
kind of information can be shared? How is it shared and what for?
Actors facing a threat may develop information sharing artifacts as a pos-
sible infrastructure to cope with it. This explains the focal point of this thesis.
These artifacts are a possible solution to deal with threats, part of a broader
set of information sharing solutions, which are a means among many others
to cope with threats. I propose a characterization of these artifacts that allow
for comparison with other types of artifacts in different situations. Then, I
state the stakes for information sharing for each type of threat that has been
defined in the previous chapter (Section 3.2). Finally, I interpret some results
that have already been investigated in the literature on information sharing to
manage common resources.
4.1 More information on information
Up to now, I used the word information without precisely defining the meaning
of the concept in this context. In this section, I dive into fundamentally diverse
views of information by studying the process of information creation, trans-
mission and reception. I show that depending on why one studies information,
one may use various definitions and perspectives on this multidimensional ob-
ject. Then, I give and motivate the definition that I will use in the context
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Representation
Communication
Phenomena
Creation of 
information
Reception:
interpretation
Social / Personal 
knowledge /beliefs 
(sustainable 
development ...)
Figure 4.1: Different steps for information. These steps are potential steps
that do not necessarily occur.
of the thesis: “information is a difference that creates a difference” (Bateson,
1972). Finally, I give an interpretation of information as a good made non-
substractable by modern information and communication technologies subject
to issues such as openness and accessibility.
4.1.1 Information in various contexts
Information is fundamentally ubiquitous in its nature. Figure 4.1 captures
those different moments where information has a different role or poses various
problems. Several steps have to be distinguished.
Creation First, information has to be created. Information is a represen-
tation of perceived phenomena into some kind of language that depends on
social and personal knowledge and beliefs, e.g. numbers if it can be measured,
words or concepts. Creation of information may be a difficult step. For in-
stance, this thesis is the result of this process. It emerged by interpreting a
large set of such phenomena added to a set of social and personal knowledge
and beliefs. In the thesis, I will suppose that this information is translated in
a language that can be transmitted. In an ecological approach of information,
some authors, such as Gibson (1978), consider that the phenomenon itself con-
tains signs that do not need to be translated it into a language. This type of
directly interpretable signs are particularly important for actors dealing with
an uncertain environment, which is the case in SESs.
Bob knows that the presence of a specific type of clouds in the sky indicates
the imminence of a storm. In this case, there is no need to translate the
information into a language. However, he can formalize the information as “a
storm is coming”, and then communicate it with others.
Storage Once the information is created or collected, it is stored somewhere:
in someone’s mind as a mental or internal representation, or in a more tangible
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artifact as an external representation (text, recording, formula...). Internal and
external representations are actually in interaction, enriching each other, in a
dialogue, especially for those who create the external representation (Kirsh,
2010). This thesis is the result of such a dialogue. Kirsh (2010) discusses how
external representations, typically through some artifact, can help thinking.
Among the advantages of these representations are their potency to “change
the cost structure of an inferential landscape” or “serve as a shareable object of
thought”. These elements are discussed in the rest of the thesis starting with
Section 4.2 that tackles challenges for artifacts.
Communication One of the characteristics of a representation of informa-
tion is that it can be transmitted. The question of proper transmission covers
two distinct elements: quality of signal and interpretation by the receptor.
The first element can be seen under a technical lense. Shannon and Weaver
(1959) created a theory of information where they studied how information
could be sent from an emitter to a receptor without altering the signal. The
emitter needs to be sure that the message is perfectly transmitted. The scope
of this thesis goes beyond the mere question of proper transmission.
The other side of transmission quality is the question of interpretation,
i.e. of meaning. This element is equivalent to a communication situation. Sup-
pose two people are conversing, the first person gives an information that she
formulated in her own words. This information is a projection of phenomena,
filtered by this person through knowledge and beliefs and expressed in words
that have specific meanings for her. The other person receives this information
and has to find a way to reverse the projection using her own understanding
of the words used. In an oral conversation, there may be misunderstandings.
Written information is subject to the same types of difficulties especially since
the author is usually not present to detail the meaning of the stored informa-
tion. Since information can be exchanged, Figure 4.1 features a white arrow
from the receptor back to the creator.
Information may then have an impact on the creator and the receptor, and
may feed back into the phenomena itself, as represented in Figure 4.1 using
the dotted arrows.
A difference that makes a difference The simple process represented in
Figure 4.1 shows that information can be thought of at diverse stages, un-
der distinct shapes. This variety should not be surprising since information is
everywhere and poses an immense range of questions. Information has been
studied under different perspectives in various fields. Table 4.1 gives some ac-
ceptations of information in a selection of disciplines and gives an idea about
how loose this concept is. Information is a key element that affects the minds
of individuals and can be interpreted in different ways depending on the per-
son’s knowledge and beliefs (psychology). Information impacts relations that
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Table 4.1: Definitions of information (Adapted from Maurel, 2012, p.251).
Field Vision of information
Ordinary sense Abstract mass-noun used to denote any amount of data,
code or text that is stored, sent, received or manipulated
in any medium (Adriaans, 2013)
Information
science
Elements written on some kind of artifact to transmit
knowledge (for instance, on paper or on a computer file)
Information
theory
Reproducing at one point either exactly or approximately
a message selected at another point (Shannon cited in
Mackay, 2003, p.3)
Knowledge
management
“Descriptions, answers to questions that begin with such
words as who, what, [where,] when and how many. Infor-
mation systems generate, store, retrieve and process data.
Information is inferred from data.” (Rowley, 2007, p.166)
Computer sci-
ence
Piece of knowledge regarding a phenomenon that has a
specific meaning in a given context. In the context of
data treatment, information is a piece of data that has
been interpreted (or reinterpreted). The framework that
determines this interpretation is made of all the knowl-
edge and experiences of the one who is interpreting the
information
Psychology Set of elementary data aiming at creating knowledge. Ac-
cording to Shannon’s information theory, the message
must bring something new to the receptor to dub these
data as information
Sociology Set of forms, conditions and effects of massive, regular,
continuous, repeated (and even permanent) diffusion for
an ad hoc audience of pieces of information, of intellectual
expression, of mental pressure and social therapy (among
many definitions)
Journalism Any event or fact broadcast by a press agency, a newspa-
per, a radio or television
exist between individuals (sociology, journalism, economics) or within organi-
zations (knowledge management). It needs to be stored efficiently on artifacts
(libraries, computer science) and be transmitted in a lossless manner (infor-
mation theory).
“The lack of preciseness and the universal usefulness of the term ‘informa-
tion’ go hand in hand” (Adriaans, 2013). This sentence is the first of the article
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on the concept of information in Stanford Plato dictionary of philosophy. As
exposed in this section, information has been studied and formalized in a wide
variety of contexts. The definitions given in those context relate to specific
angles to approach this concept. With this in mind, in this dissertation, I
do not intend to provide a definitive answer on what is the right definition of
information. I will more modestly adopt a definition that fits with the needs
of this thesis.
In the case studies actors deal with a vast range of information types and
of transmission methods. Thus, I decided to opt for a definition of information
that is as inclusive as possible. The goal here is not to restrict the study on very
specific types of information that could be shared, but rather to understand
the needs and goals of information creation and communication in the context
of NRM. Thus, in this thesis, I use the definition of information given by
Bateson (cited in Maurel, 2012, p.252): “information is a difference that creates
a difference”. This definition is broad enough to encompass all different types
of information actors may be willing to share. It gives a sense of goal to
producing and sharing information. This definition also gives the opportunity
to disqualify something that is disguised as information if it does not create a
difference.
This difference is a topic that has a huge impact on our society thanks to
the increasing use of information technologies. Thinking of information as a
good may help in understanding some of these issues.
4.1.2 Information as a good
Information can be considered a good (Hess and Ostrom, 2003). Information
is not substractable. One’s own use of information does not make it less usable
for others. It is (often) costly to produce and now, with the wide spread of
information technologies, it has a marginal cost of almost zero to transfer.
Being non-substractable, information can be either a public good or a club
good. Only the question of exclusion remains.
At this point, I need to define concepts that are widely used in knowl-
edge management: data, information, knowledge and widsom (DIKW). The
following definition of information is not the one that I use in the thesis (see
previous section). I give here the classical definitions Ackoff (1989) gave (cited
in Rowley, 2007, p.166), that are sufficient here. The interested reader can
explore (Rowley, 2007) for a discussion on these definitions:
Data “Symbols that represent properties of objects, events and their environ-
ment. They are the products of observation. But are of no use until they
are in a useable (i.e. relevant) form. The difference between data and
information is functional, not structural.”
Information “Descriptions, answers to questions that begin with such words
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as who, what, [where,] when and how many. Information systems gener-
ate, store, retrieve and process data. Information is inferred from data.”
Knowledge “What makes possible the transformation of information into in-
structions. Knowledge can be obtained either by transmission from an-
other who has it, by instruction, or by extracting it from experience.”
Wisdom “Ability to increase effectiveness. Wisdom adds value, which re-
quires the mental function that we call judgment. The ethical and aes-
thetic values that this implies are inherent to the actor and are unique
and personal.”
Information technologies and technical issues are limited, for now, to data
and information (in the sense of the definition). These two levels are those
which are non-substractable and easy to transfer. Knowledge and wisdom
let appear much more individual-oriented elements, quite difficult to grasp
and translate into transferable information. Because of this observation, if
we allow ourselves to consider knowledge and wisdom as goods, they can be
considered as private goods since they are substractable and exclusive.
As a good, information has already been studied as a global public good
(Hess and Ostrom, 2003). Information is often designed as a “commons” (in
expressions such as Creative Commons) but it is a public good according to the
goods typology (Section 2.1.1). Hess and Ostrom distinguish three key parts
about information seen as a public good: the idea (knowledge, information,
data), the artifact (book, computer file) and the facility (library, Internet).
Figure 4.2 shows examples for each of the three parts. The authors insist on
the paradigm change triggered by the movement of distributed information,
mostly through the existence of networks such as the Internet. Beyond ideas,
artifacts and facilities change rapidly with the emergence and spread of digital
artifacts such as videos and enriched scientific articles, and facilities such as
mobile phones or social networks.
In the case of the thesis, I am studying the implementation of information
sharing artifacts as an infrastructure (I) to cope with threats. The context of
the thesis is therefore the local one. Applying the concept of information as a
public good to local settings is not a direct process. Several issues specific to
information in local settings emerge. These issues are tackled in the following
section.
4.2 Challenges of information sharing for NRM at
local levels
In local contexts, information sharing raises specific issues and literature shows
debated effects of information. Limited anonymity, strategic behavior, second
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Figure 4.2: Forms of information Hess and Ostrom (2003)
order dilemma (free-riding on information) are issues that need different treat-
ment than with more global information sharing systems. A linked question
is to investigate the assumption according to which more information leads to
cope more easily with threats actors face. In addition to new infrastructure
building, information is already shared through other means, for instance social
networks, which may limit the artifact impact. When evaluating the impact
of information sharing system, a researcher needs to take into consideration
the existence of other means for information to spread.
4.2.1 Intrinsic challenges for artifacts
Artifacts are specific types of external representations that have numerous ad-
vantages over internal representations, in terms of complexity or shared per-
sistent referents, allowing to “think the previously unthinkable” (Kirsh, 2010)
or converge towards a shared views on issues (Adams et al., 2003). With all
these benefits, artifacts seem useful, if not necessary, tools for sustainable en-
vironmental management. I will not tackle this question in this section (see
Part IV) but point out specific caveats developers of local information sharing
artifacts need to pay attention to.
Limited anonymity In small-scale resource systems, anonymity is limited.
Using an economic experimentation, Villena and Zecchetto (2010) have shown
that subject-specific information can worsen the tragedy of the commons.
Other experimental economics studies have shown that more information can
on the contrary increase conditional cooperation by making known to all that
norms, rules or laws are respected by others (Chaudhuri and Paichayontvi-
jit, 2006; Janssen, 2013; Janssen and Ostrom, 2014). Thus, information has
not per se a positive or negative effect, does not imply converging towards
collective cooperation or defection. Context and granularity are important to
understand the effects of information as much as they matter to understand
field experiments results (Castillo et al., 2011).
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Strategic behavior Secondly, disclosure of private information could entice
strategic behavior both in writing inaccurate information or to get information
about other’s strategies. Using an econometric model based on a case study on
commercial fishing in the Bering Sea, Haynie et al. (2009) have shown that in-
formation about bycatch avoidance led to conditional cooperation except when
conditions tighten in which case, the information led to situation deterioration.
Another side of information disclosure is trust in information. Because of the
possibility of strategic behavior, when information comes from other actors,
trust, between actors, and in information must be built and maintained, which
can be a complex task (Henry and Dietz, 2011).
Free-riding Thirdly, free-riding can emerge from the existence of these sys-
tems since some actors can use information that have been written in an
information sharing system without providing any information (Evans and
Weninger, 2013). This type of free-riding can be considered a second-order
dilemma since it occurs on an artifact which is supposed to provide a solution
to free-riding regarding a resource. In global systems such as Wikipedia, we
can wonder whether it is a real problem as long as the active community is
big enough. In local systems, systematic participation of some and not others
may deter those who share from keeping information sharing active, especially
in the context of CPR since these actors could feel like they are suckers. In the
context of public goods used by all actors, proactive ones may remain active
(Chapter 8).
Information and sustainable management Fourthly in the context of
NRM, it is implicitly considered that the more the resource is monitored, the
better it is known and thus managed. Some studies suggest that simple mon-
itoring elements (such as green to signal that users can pump or red to signal
they cannot) allow sustainable use of a resource, water under contamination
threat in this case (Li et al., 2014). Bell et al. (2015), in a investigation
on equity in Pakistan’s irrigation system, show that information about water
availability allowed a more limited use of water resources but did not lead
to better water distribution. However, some studies argue that uncertainty
around the state of the resource allow more sustainable management of the
said resource. Haynie et al. (2009) illustrates this idea with a case of precip-
itated exhaustion due to precise information about a possible exhaustion to
be. It is an example of self-fulfilling prophecy: the resource turned from a re-
newable one to a non-renewable one in actors minds. Thus, there is no direct
link between precise information and sustainable and equitable management.
Conclusion These four challenges (limited anonymity, strategic behavior,
free-riding and monitoring) are focused on possible limitations intrinsic to in-
formation sharing through artifacts. These limitations should not make us
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oblivious that their impact may be hampered by the existence of other means
to share information. Social networks are one of them. As much as under-
standing changes due to anthropic activities in the global climate requires a
fine understanding of natural phenomena leading to change (Crowley, 2000),
an understanding of other information sharing levers is necessary to analyze
possible impacts of information sharing artifacts.
4.2.2 Without forgetting networks
Information and knowledge exchange (not necessarily linked to the environ-
mental dynamics) are the basis for most interactions between users. They can
be shared orally, without the help of any artifact. Spreading of information
through networks, without artifacts has to be taken into account when trying
to understand the impact of information sharing artifacts in a SES. It has been
shown that (real) “social networks can be more important than the existence of
formal institutions for effective enforcement and compliance with environmen-
tal regulations” (Bodin and Crona, 2009, p.366). An important part of the rich
literature on social and economic networks focuses on effects of information
transfer. Jackson et al. (2008) provide an overview of the field.
Investigating diffusion of information in real networks is lengthy and under-
standing consequences on decision-making can be difficult. It is necessary to
know certain topological properties of the network to be able to understand and
predict information diffusion (Bodin and Crona, 2009). In a thesis on social
networks applied to marine protected areas management, Alexander (2015) in-
vestigated social relations between fishermen in Jamaica. To obtain a network
that represents an actual real network, he had to determine different types of
relationships between actors, then create questionnaires, organize focus groups
and conduct semi-structured interviews with the goal of understanding these
relations. In the end, the author obtained several social networks for these
communities, allowing to derive understanding about how these networks cre-
ate conditions for marine protected areas management. This process is very
lengthy. In this thesis, I put a specific emphasis on the study of information
sharing artifacts, but it neither implies that they are more important than
social networks nor less important. More details are presented in the following
section regarding information in the context of NRM.
4.3 Why, what and how?
Suppose fishermen are weary about a threat. Bob and the community of fisher-
men (actors of A) have decided to build a new infrastructure in I: an informa-
tion sharing artifact. Bob has been appointed responsible for this project which
could make the threat evolve and be tackled more efficiently. Before creating
any type of information sharing artifacts, Bob needs to define a goal for creat-
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Table 4.2: Goals for information sharing using a threat perspective. Eventu-
ally, all these goals are useful for decision-making.
Threat Goal for IS Example study
Public
Legitimate action Berkes and Jolly (2001)
Common understanding of issues Adams et al. (2003)
Lobby EMSTilligerry (2014)
Common
Dealing with conflicts Rustagi et al. (2010)
Conditional cooperation Janssen (2013)
Resource monitoring Allen and Kilvington (2005)
Avoid exhaustion, pollution Nagendra and Ostrom (2014)
Private
Understand RS dynamics Evans and Weninger (2013)
Increase knowledge Dalcanale et al. (2011)
Change beliefs Castillo Brieva (2013)
Predict Dalcanale et al. (2011)
ing such an artifact, then decide over the contents and information required to
tackle this goal. Finally, he has to choose a facility to share this information.
I will use this perspective to present different facets of information sharing
in a NRM context: why share information, what type of information can be
shared and how and with whom to share this information?
4.3.1 Why share information in the context of natural
resources management?
Information sharing can occur for a wide variety of purposes. I address some of
them in this section. Since I adopted the idea that information is a difference
that makes a difference, I claim that information sharing is eventually decision-
making oriented. Numerous goals for information sharing can be found. The
goals listed in this section are goals that I found in the literature. I present
these goals as subgoals for tackling threats (Table 4.2).
In public threats, decisions in D may contain practices and actions of actors
outside of A. Information sharing artifacts can be used to influence those
actions in a manner that would suit actors of A better. The shared information
may lead to a common understanding of issues (Adams et al., 2003), be used
to lobby (EMSTilligerry, 2014) or to legitimate action (Paget et al., 2016):
internal representations may evolve and practices of D could change.
To tackle private threats, actors of A may share information to collect en-
vironmental information, elements of E; or actors decisions in D. The goal is
to understand the dynamics of the resource system and units, hence increas-
ing knowledge, enabling prediction, easing decision-making and institution-
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crafting (new infrastructures) to ensure long-term sustainability of the re-
source. This information may already have been acquired by a group of actors
and this information can be transmitted to newcomers so that they can learn
the trade properly.
Finally, actors may share information to deal with common threats. Com-
mon threats are the result of social dilemma situations which are linked to
decisions D of actors. This information can be shared to prevent others from
adopting a behavior that would harm the resource. This type of informa-
tion sharing could ensure conditional cooperation (or reciprocal altruism) by
making sure that none is infringing a rule without sanction. To ensure this
behavior, monitoring and sanctioning are useful goals of information sharing.
4.3.2 Information? What kind of information?
I consider information for NRM in general: all types of information that actors
can exchange related to the management of their professional activity and a
resource they share. Environmental information take different forms, and is
observed as such in case studies. Information can take the form of perishable
pieces of data (weather forecast) or take the for of durable texts (a law).
Table 4.3 lists information types that can be shared by users of a SES. This
list has been created using the literature on information sharing for NRM.
In the study in literature commons, I only give the most relevant paper that
I found for concision. The topic of information sharing for NRM is widely
studied, even though not systematically. This table shows that a vast diversity
of subjects are embedded within the concept of information.
Apart from the type of information, several levels of aggregation can be
thought of. Suppose the shared information consists of values xa, a ∈ A,
where A is a set of actors. Here is a list of possible strategies to disseminate
information: a global aggregated indicator, i.e. a value y = f({xa}a∈A), for
instance the average of given values; a distribution of values {xa}a∈A ; the
values associated with the actors who provided the information {(a, xa)}a∈A.
Thus, knowing the type of information is not enough to describe information
sharing. The way it is presented is to be taken into account as well. Depend-
ing on how information is presented, decisions that can be made using the
information and participation in the system can vary widely (Section 4.6).
4.3.3 How to share information?
How is information shared? Information needs to be emitted and received.
Information can be stored in an artifact located in a facility or be evanescent,
disappearing except in the minds of those who told it and those who were
present at that time.
Three main categories of emitters and receivers can be defined: a person
(1), a group of people (n) and an institution (I). We can thus define nine
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Table 4.3: Types of information shared for NRM.
Information type Examples Example study
Environmental data Water temperature,
rainfall
Allen and Kilvington
(2005)
Resource units marking V-notched lobster Acheson (2003)
Decisions Quantity of water used Anderies et al. (2011)
Outcomes, payoffs Quantity of fish caught Haynie et al. (2009)
Knowledge How to grow carrots Cutts et al. (2011)
Beliefs Sharing information in-
creases mutual under-
standing
Adams et al. (2003)
Technology, innovations New cultivation tech-
nique
Pyka et al. (2007)
Issues between users Conflict over land-use
Hazards Virus, pollutions Cutts et al. (2011)
Rules Sign at entrance
(Mis)behavior Cow exposed in village Ostrom (1990)
types of relations between emitters and receivers, all combinations of these
three categories which are illustrated in Table 4.4. These combination call for
different means to share information.
The most informal way to share information is trough speaking. Exchange
of information in such a way can range from formal, as during meetings, to
most informal, from tutor to apprentice, or during an evening in a pub. This
type of information sharing can be studied using social networks studies when
ones wants to understand the impacts of this type of information diffusion
(Bodin et al., 2006). Some authors even wondered if “what you know is who
you know”, studying this question using social networks (Crona and Bodin,
2006).
4.3.4 Conclusion on why, what and how
In this section, I have shown that information is ubiquitous, serves a wide va-
riety of purposes, from predicting the resource dynamics, to influencing rule-
crafting and favoring conditional cooperation. Information is spread through
channels that are of different nature such as social networks, schools or infor-
mation sharing artifacts.
By insisting on the vast diversity of the information realm, simply within
the field of NRM, I wish to show to the reader the intrinsic difficulty of studying
the subject of information and information sharing as a whole. Consequences of
information sharing are debated, effects can be subtle and little changes in how
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Table 4.4: Means to transfer information from column to row type of actor.
’1’ represents a single person, ’n’ a group of people and ’I’ an institution.
Receiver 1 n I
Emitter
1 Interpersonal com-
munication, personal
email
Collective email Court of law
n Informal meeting Meetings, information
sharing systems
Class action
I Court of law, official
letter
School, signs, court of
law, leaflets, informa-
tion sharing system
Court of law,
negociation
information is shared (such as different granularities) may lead to important
differences. Being so vast a subject, one needs to make assumptions and beware
of drawing definitive conclusions, keeping in mind the idea that there is no
panacea. Even studies that claim to explore information sharing for NRM are
actually focusing on specific types of situations which are studied in narrow
contexts such as in experimental economics or case studies, or multi-agent
simulation. One has to remain modest and prudent in one’s intent to derive
iron, immutable rules from these studies even though a cumulation of evidence
may help in finding generalities, such as in Ostrom (1990).
Despite these limitations, it is possible to study specific information shar-
ing elements and understand how they may influence a system. I delve into
the subject of information sharing through the angle of information sharing
artifacts as a means to address threats (Chapter 3), without setting aside
important information sharing means such as diffusion through real networks.
4.4 Local information sharing artifacts
4.4.1 Description
Considering the wide latitude of possible information sharing artifacts, a clear
specification of the main elements of the artifacts, as much as in content as
in goal, is needed. Elements cited in the previous sections of this chapter
demonstrate that properties of information sharing artifacts, access rules and
types of information (ideas) put in the system matter and can change how the
system will be used.
A list of items that should be taken care of follows. In this list, I use the
word information in a manner that encompasses data and information in the
DIKW pyramid. All combinations of items can exist and could be tested. I
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will show some combinations that seem more likely to give results than others
for specific types of threats in Section 4.5. In this thesis, I investigate a few of
them. Section 4.6 contains a brief review of studies found in the literature.
Goal What is (are) the goal(s) for setting up the information sharing artifact?
What questions should the artifact answer to?
Type What type of information does the artifact contain?
Write Who can enter information? Does anyone even enter information?
This element ranges from automatic input from sensors to users entering
figures or collectively writing texts.
Read Who can read information? It can be limited to users providing infor-
mation, to all users, to some kinds of categories of population (users of
several profession and / or public servants), or be open to all.
Granularity What grain of information should reader have access to? Should
they be able to have access to each and every piece of data entered
by everyone, or should they access only aggregated information, single
values or distributions? Differentiated access rights may be considered.
Dynamic Is information updated constantly (weather forecast), or does it
gather stable information valid for longer (legislations, techniques)? How
important is it for information to be recent and up-to-date?
Those items are important to take into consideration when designing or
studying an information sharing artifact. These elements can be combined as
part of the information being accessible to some users, while other parts are
accessible to another category of users. Goals can be combined and multiple:
having up-to-date information about some flows could help warn users of an
incoming threat, limiting its short term effects and help learn its origin and
mitigate its effects in the future.
4.4.2 Evaluation
Let us suppose that some actors A are facing a threat. The threat may orig-
inate from or concern other types of actors. How to evaluate consequences of
the implementation of information sharing artifacts (a new piece of infrastruc-
ture) for actors of and out of A? What difference and for whom do the artifact
make? According to actors’ or analysts’ goals, evaluating differences could be
done using qualitative or quantitative methods.
ENCORE is an observation and evaluation framework for participatory
management processes (Ferrand, 2004; Daniell, 2012). It is a useful framework
to list possible evolutions linked to a process involving a number of different
actors. It is an acronym of the following terms: External – Improvements in C.
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Normative – Norms, values and preferences of actors. Cognitive – Represen-
tations and beliefs of actors. Operational – Decisions D of actors. Relational –
Social relationships between users. Equity – Perception of social justice. The
definitions have been adapted from Daniell (2012) to fit the situation studied
in this thesis. This framework can be used by actors or planners of A to pre-
dict or identify differences the artifact could lead to. The ENCORE framework
provides qualitative dimensions. These dimensions can be deemed sufficient
for actors, especially when the information sharing artifact is destined to create
hard to measure effects.
If one would like to evaluate the differences created by implementing an
artifact in a more quantitative manner, one can create an agent-based model,
a model of a situation where agents interact in an environment (I provide a
thorough description of the method in Chapter 6). One can then set up indi-
cators to measure characteristics of the environment and actors and compare
situations with and without the artifact.
4.5 Information sharing stakes for threats
In this section, I investigate the relation between threats and stakes raised for
users in terms of information sharing.
4.5.1 Public threat
If the threat is public, users need to reach external actors or external factors
and thus to broaden the view and action capacity. Building information shar-
ing systems can then help act beyond the usual scope. In this sense, users need
to build very open boundary objects, so that information can be understood
and shared with publics from different background, especially when the tar-
geted audience is the general public. Information sharing can help users of the
resource communicate threats, including characteristics C of assets, that ac-
tors’ (not necessarily in A) decisions D pose to their usage, legitimate actors of
A’s role and increase awareness, fostering some specific actions and changes in
D. A strategy to make the threat internal could be to try to change the system
scale. By redefining the scale, users could make an external threat internal,
especially when involving other types of actors. Information sharing artifacts
may be used to change threat type by making the internality dimension evolve.
Given these elements, an information sharing artifact dedicated for tack-
ling the threat at its source should have the following requirements: writing
does not have precise requirement, but reading should be open-to-all, the gran-
ularity level should probably be high with no need for details, and it does not
need to be highly dynamic.
In this case, I adopt a long term view, a way for actors to limit the effects
of potential threats. It is also possible to consider an incoming threat that has
to be dealt with. The information system should be able to warn users of the
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imminence of the realization of a threat. Then, information should be much
more dynamic and up-to-date.
4.5.2 Private threat
If the threat is private, information sharing can help in spreading knowledge.
Users do not all have the same experience, age nor network. They do not
necessarily have the same skills and do not all have the same known-how or
even the simple awareness of threats facing them. Their decisions D may be
unadapted, for them and/or for the resource. Gathering information in in-
formation systems can have the impact of speeding up learning, sharpening
strategies, or making thinking clearer around investments. “Experience is the
main source of information” (Apesteguia, 2006, p.56). This kind of information
and knowledge sharing faces issues of free-riding, where some actors use infor-
mation without bothering to help creating the artifact and strategic behavior,
such as users retaining information about a technology, or even patenting an
invention. In SESs, actors are at the same time competitors and collaborators.
Threats can be linked to (collective) lack of knowledge about environmental
dynamics E, as well as determinants of the evolution of C. Dynamics could be
better understood if users shared their own decisions D and outcomes when
scientific investigations are non existent, too scarce or non adapted. In this
kind of case, actors could be forced to participate by creating a club artifact,
excluding users from results if they do not provide information. It seems that
since actors know each other, or at least a subset of them, it would be difficult
to prevent information from leaking out of the system.
This type of threat is internal, thus writing and reading should probably
be limited to users of the resource. Accessibility to external actors would be
of little interest. Goals could be multiple: from spreading knowledge (in this
case the threat concept would be a bit far fetched), to gaining information
about ill-known threats linked to some practices for instance. In this case,
general and anonymous knowledge is sufficient, including rules and regulation
communication, practices or relation between actions and outcomes.
4.5.3 Common threat
Common threats are those traditionally considered in studies on CPRs. Com-
mon threats are close to social dilemmas (Section 2.2). Actors have personal
interests at odds with the general, which is their own in the long run. Tackling
public threats is a coordination issue, where personal and collective interests
of actors are aligned (although perhaps not their dedication to participate in
collective action). To address common threats, users must fight their own in-
stincts towards reaping short-term benefits. The main goal of an information
sharing system should then be: favoring conditional cooperation. Information
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could reveal practices in D and show respect of collective agreements by others,
increasing chances of cooperation.
In these situations, second-order dilemmas emerge. Free-riding can occur
when actors publicly show an intention to adopt a practice and secretly adopts
another one, more in favor of his interest. The mere existence of information
systems is actually not sufficient to solve these collective dilemmas. As much
as a game theoretic analysis cannot help solving tragedies of the commons
and escape nasty Nash equilibria, an information sharing system subject to
the same kind of dilemma cannot offer a solution in itself. Without being
specific, information about practices is not enough. For instance, seeing a
distribution of anonymised data about practices can reveal non cooperative
behavior, but can it favor cooperation? Does knowing the existence of free-
riders favor cooperation? It seems doubtful and confirmed in Janssen (2013).
We must turn to the study of building trust, and how an information system
can favor building trust, in others and in the information. It can be the case
that the very process of creating the information sharing artifact itself increases
conditional cooperation by getting people to know each other and collaborate
on a common project.
This kind of threat is the most studied in the literature, because of its link
to collective dilemmas, a kind of dilemma scholars are eager to explore.
Thus, the three types of threats are associated with radically different
stakes: reaching outer actors, increasing experience, or ensuring alignment
between personal and collective interest.
4.6 IS for NRM in the literature
An important body of research on impact of information in the context of
NRM exists. This research draws on several methodologies such as case stud-
ies, experimental economics or Agent-Based Modeling (ABM). Studies use
descriptive (e.g. Paget et al., 2016) or normative approaches (e.g. Villena
and Zecchetto, 2010), or a combination of both (e.g. Haynie et al., 2009). I
selected a set of relevant studies and place them in the space of goods, threats
and information. I subsequently give results in Table 4.5.
A majority of studies are focused on CPR management mixed with a com-
mon threat. This combination is one of the main topics of the study of com-
mons. This focal interest is logical considering that in these cases, researchers
are looking at a problem that is mostly closed, which solution consists in find-
ing ways, such as information sharing, to change a payoff by creating adapted
institutions.
Types of information may concern a single aspect of threats such as actors
(irrigators) in Bell et al. (2015) who get information on water flows (from E);
or a combination of elements such as in Villena and Zecchetto (2010) where
actors (theoretical players) share information about personal efforts (D) and
60
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
4.
IN
FO
R
M
A
T
IO
N
SH
A
R
IN
G
FO
R
N
R
M
Table 4.5: Studies of information sharing in the context of NRM
Resource Threat Component Information Methodology Results Source
Irrigation
(CPR)
Common:
Inequality
in water
distribution
E Flow infor-
mation
Case study,
Experimental
game
“Flow information allowed players to take
more effective action to target overuse, and
overall activities that might bring social dis-
approval were reduced with information.” But
no improvement in equity
Bell et al. (2015)
Water
(Public)
Public: wa-
ter quality
A, C, I, D General in-
formation,
threats
Case study Farmers managed to gain role as stewards over
the resource they need
Paget et al.
(2016)
Theoretical
CPR
Common:
Overuse /
exhaustion
D Subject-
specific
efforts
Experimental
game
Great variations depending on settings but in-
formation is a core factor
Janssen (2013)
Wild fish
(CPR)
Private:
Spend too
much to
know loca-
tion
E Share loca-
tions
Game the-
ory, Bayesian
learning
“The benefits from information sharing are
largest when congestion penalties are large,
when information transmission among fisher-
men is costless, and when information about
the true location of productive fishing sites
does not quickly decay.”
Evans and
Weninger (2013)
Theoretical
CPR
Common:
Overuse /
exhaustion
C, D Subject-
specific
efforts and
payoffs
Game theory,
Econometrics
This kind of information worsens the tragedy
of the commons
Villena and Zec-
chetto (2010)
Wild fish
(CPR)
Common:
Bycatch
D Bycatch Case study,
Econometrics
“Conditionally cooperative behavior is preva-
lent but deteriorates as bycatch constraints
tighten”
Haynie et al.
(2009)
Theoretical
CPR
Common:
Overuse /
exhaustion
C Pay-off
structure
or not
Experiment,
Game theory
Aggregate behavior is not significantly differ-
ent pay-off structure is available or not
Apesteguia
(2006)
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get information about characteristics of the resource (C) in a payoff matrix.
Knowing the type of information on threats that actors share is once again
not enough to conclude with certainty on the difference (if there is one) created
for actors. In three studies where actors share information on their practices
(D), conclusions are different: Haynie et al. (2009) show that conditional coop-
eration increases until resources are too depleted; Villena and Zecchetto (2010)
demonstrate that information on subject-specific payoff worsens the tragedy
of the commons; and Janssen (2013) conclude that results vary according to
settings.
4.7 Conclusion
Information is a versatile, multi-purpose, and difficult to define good. In this
chapter, I have first evoked general stakes about information in modern days,
which changed dramatically with the emergence of new artifacts (information
technology). Then, focusing on NRM, I have shown that there are specific
challenges for information sharing at local levels, in this context where users
are competitors and cooperators at the same time: limited anonymity, strategic
behavior, free-riding and monitoring.
Even though information may be shared through social network and ex-
isting institutions, when they need to face a threat, actors A may build an
artifact as a new infrastructure in I. Artifacts may be used to face threats
of all types by collecting or sharing information of diverse types, for instance
environmental dynamics E , decisions D or outcomes. To create such an arti-
fact, specifications on the goal, type, granularity and dynamics of information,
access in writing and reading need to be defined clearly. These stipulations
vary according to the type of threat actors face and the targeted audience of
the artifact.
Studies on information in NRM are not converging towards general state-
ments such as “information leads to better resource management”. They rather
show a diversity of consequences, from situations where information leads to
better outcomes for actors and resources to others where the general situation
deteriorates.

State of the Art - Conclusions
The three chapters of the State of the Art section are designed to articulate
three main topics that are necessary to investigate while studying information
in the domain of Natural Resources Management (NRM): goods and resources;
threats; and information (sharing).
I have shown in Chapter 2 the importance of a fine distinction between
different types of goods and resources to understand with precision issues and
stakes that are relevant so as to manage the said good or resource. Two
main properties have been defined to characterize a good type: substractabil-
ity and excludability. These properties opened the door for the description
of four main types of goods: private, club, public and CPRs. CPRs are sub-
ject to the tragedy of the commons, an instance of social dilemma, at least
theoretically and in some cases around the world. Focusing on conditions for
sustainable management for CPRs, researchers have extended their investiga-
tion to coupled human and natural systems and designed and improved the
Social-Ecological System (SES) framework (Figure 2.2 and Table B.1).
The SES framework gives a thorough description of a system where some
actors interact with a renewable resource (a resource system) from which they
can substract resource units. Actors and public authorities are organized in
a governance system. These elements are in interaction and result in some
outcomes that feedback on those entities.
In Chapter 3, I described an element that is lacking from the SES frame-
work, while lying at the core of NRM: threats. Threats are related, but do not
coincide with close concepts such as hazard, risk or vulnerability. I propose
to define a threat as a 5-tuple 〈A, C, I, D, E〉, actors A using assets (goods or
resources), some characteristics C of which can be damaged by infrastructure I
as well as by environmental dynamics E, actors decisions D that can either af-
fect directly C or indirectly through I (Table 3.1). These elements allow for a
description of threats, but are not sufficient to define and identify strategies
to cope with them in a general way.
With this goal in mind, I defined two properties, internality and excludabil-
ity, that enable the identification of three main types of threats: public (low
internality and excludability), private (high internality and excludability) and
common (high internality and low excludability) threats. Common threats to
CPRs are the underlying threats that are usually studied in the theory of the
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commons: exhaustion, free-riding. All combinations of threats and goods are
possible (Table 3.5). I use this fact to advocate for the use of the threats
typology to frame NRM questions in addition to the goods and resource usual
framing. I adopt this vision for the rest of the thesis. Public threats require
strategies that can reach beyond the group of actors themselves. These are
threats that cannot be made internal by a simple change of system size: these
threats are defined in systems that are open, or difficult to close. Private
threats are usually linked with lack of personal or collective knowledge and are
especially interesting to study in combination with information sharing.
I propose some modifications to the SES framework (Table 3.6) that explic-
itly take into account the threats that have been defined. Threats need to be
put in the forefront since they lie at the center of interactions and difficulties
linked with NRM .
Information sharing (Chapter 4) is a central element for NRM. Informa-
tion is everywhere and takes a vast range of subjects and shapes, it varies
in granularity or accuracy (Tablee 4.3), its existing and sharing has multiple
consequences and is shared for numerous reasons (Table 4.2), through a wide
variety of channels (Table 4.4). This ubiquity needs to be kept in mind while
studying information sharing for NRM: one should not forget the complexity
of information sharing, and of the systems in which this information is shared.
Contradicting conclusions between studies reflect this ubiquity.
While there are multiple channels for information to flow through, an in-
teresting point to focus on is a reification around more or less dynamic infor-
mation sharing artifacts (external representations) that are deemed solutions
to manage the resource better and are used increasingly. A study of artifact
impacts needs to take into account other information diffusion media, in par-
ticular real social networks. Those artifacts need to be carefully described.
Describing an information sharing artifact requires going through its goal(s),
defining who can write and read information and in what granularity, as well
as characterizing dynamic aspects (obsolescence) of the information. Informa-
tion sharing stakes for the three types of threats are quite different. In the
case of a public threat, information on C or D can be used as a feedback that
allows a common understanding of issues and consequences of practices, as
well as communication with actors who may have no particular direct interest
for the resource. In this case, for the target, personal and collective interests
are aligned. The case of private threats is interesting to study by coupling
with information sharing. Private threats are related to lack of knowledge, in-
formation sharing may fill that gap by enabling actors to share knowledge on
infrastructure I, on decisions D they make and/or related outcomes, or collect
information about environmental dynamics E. Common threats exist in situ-
ations of social dilemmas. They are the initial threats that have been studied
along the development of the field of research on commons and information on
environmental dynamics E and human decisions D may help favor conditional
cooperation and respect for institutions.
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Figure 4.3: Interactions around threats. Blue solid lines represent use or pos-
session, red dotted lines, threats and green dashed lines, information sharing
possibilities. Information artifacts are not represented, but they can be placed
in the path of each green dashed line.
Figure 4.3 articulates the different elements that appear throughout Part I.
Blue (filled) actors are a set of actors A that are linked to assets, either as
a collection of private goods (such as a collection of private boats) or a more
global resource (such as a resource system). The blue (plain) lines show this
connection with divided goods (1) or collective assets (2). Threats happen
and may impact characteristics C of assets. They are represented with red
dotted arrows, coming from an actor to their private good (1 - private threat),
due to lack of experience for instance or to a global resource (2 - common
threat), adopting free-riding behavior. Public threats appear in arrows 3 to 5,
with threats originating from other actors, from a combination of actors and
infrastructure, or from some environmental dynamics, that may be combined
with other elements. Information (green arrows) can be shared and used in
several ways. Firstly, among actors of the group, with the intention of gaining
knowledge, or solve conflicts. Secondly, the group of actors may send infor-
mation to external actors, or the other way around, to limit the impact of
public threats. Thirdly, sensors can be designed to measure, understand and
limit the negative impact of environmental hazards. Fourthly, information can
be shared from a member of the group to the group, or from the group to a
member of the group, mostly to deal with internal threats.
I use these theoretical elements applied to case studies on oyster farming, in
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the Thau Basin, France and in several estuaries of New South Wales (NSW),
Australia, focusing on public threats (water quality) and the strategies, in
terms of information or not, deployed by the actors to cope with them. An
agent-based model follows, based of the understanding of ill-understood envi-
ronmental dynamics (a virus modus operandi), to study the consequences of
information sharing for a private threat. I first describe the methodology that
I followed in Part II, then I present and compare the case studies in Part III,
discuss the results in Part IV, and conclude in Part V.
Part II
Methodology
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Introduction to the
Methodology
Depending on the goal of the researcher, a toolbox of methodologies exist.
Janssen and Ostrom (2006) classify those methods according to two main
dimensions (Figure 4.4): (a) is the study contextual or general? (b) does the
study include few or many subjects?
According to their classification, case studies are contextual and may in-
clude many subjects. Role-playing games are contextual and include few sub-
jects around the table. These games usually involve local actors who play
their roles or roles played by others in their own context such as a member
of a local monitoring agency playing a farmer. Games may be played around
a table using a specifically designed board game or using a computer-based
model where actors enter their decisions. A more generalized version of these
role-playing games feature laboratory experiments where researchers usually
investigate a question by designing an experiment played by students in an
abstract situation, for instance Janssen (2013) follows situations where 2 or 5
students endowed with different types of information. A last method to study
generalized situations involving many subjects is the study of stylized facts,
through statistical methods, or using modeling such as Haynie et al. (2009)
who use econometric modeling and game theory derived from a case study
analysis.
Among those methods, I had to choose. The question of the thesis is:
how can actors of Social-Ecological Systems (SESs) face threats by sharing
information? The “no panacea” warning prompted me to choose to explore
a descriptive and contextual approach in specific coupled human and natural
systems where actors have implemented actual artifacts. For the context,
oyster farming seemed (and proved to be) an interesting option since oyster
growers depend heavily on a resource, water in estuaries, on which they have
little or no direct control. They act in intrinsically open systems and are
subjects of threats of all types. Information sharing is therefore a possible way
for them to gain influence over this resource.
Relying on a single case study would have been a drastic limiting factor to
findings generalization and put the identification of conclusions at risk (Poteete
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Figure 4.4: Methodologies available for research in NRM (Janssen and Ostrom,
2006).
et al., 2010). Thus, I made the choice of investigating two different settings in
which growers farm oysters: one estuary in France and several in New South
Wales (NSW), Australia. Chapter 5 provides more information on the specific
case studies that I chose to explore as well as the detailed methodology.
The study of information sharing artifacts consequences on threats impacts
is difficult to grasp within the time frame of a thesis. Information and infor-
mation sharing are subtle to measure, participation is difficult to observe, and
changes may arise in the long-run in non-reproducible settings. Therefore, I
could not solely rely on case studies. I had to find a more direct way to explore
the information sharing question that allows for exploration of controlled sce-
narios. The use of an agent-based model is advised in such conditions (Bonté,
2011). The case study investigation revealed a problem farmers had little ca-
pacity to deal with, a virus attacking the oysters. I studied the question of
how useful an information sharing artifact may be by designing an agent-based
model on this question. Would more information lead to better results for the
resource and for the actors? Agent-based models are introduced in Chapter 6.
Chapter 5
Methodology for Case Studies
To investigate the questions of this thesis, I dwelt upon two case studies on
oyster farming: one in the Thau Lagoon, France and one in NSW, Australia.
I explored the case studies by interviewing actors, participating in meeting,
creating a survey and reading official and gray literature. First, I motivate the
choice of these specific cases of oyster farming. Then, I detail the methods
that I followed to gather information about the cases.
5.1 Case choice
In this section, I explain why I chose to investigate the specific cases of the
Thau Lagoon, France and several estuaries in NSW, Australia. In both cases,
information sharing systems had been or were in the process of being imple-
mented, by actors or by public authorities, regarding directly oyster farming
or more generally water management.
Despite challenges linked to the investigation of several cases (Poteete et al.,
2010, Chapter 3) and the limited time frame of a thesis, I decided to investi-
gate two distinct cases, based on the same kinds of farming practice, oyster
farming. This choice enables comparison and is a step towards generalization.
Relationships and insights learned from a single case could prove too much
intertwined with a local reality. As put by the authors, context matters to
explain results of experiments (Castillo et al., 2011). As a corollary, studying
several cases may prevent one from being too context specific. Comparing
with a second case helps limiting these constructs and sometimes even allows
the identification of key elements that would explain why something is true in
one case and false in another.
The first case is located in the Thau lagoon, in the South of France, and
the second one is located in NSW, Australia, involving the exploration of sev-
eral estuaries. These two precise cases were first identified and chosen thanks
to an already existing network of researchers acquainted with both the cases
and local actors, simplifying entry and investigation, important elements in
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the time frame of a thesis. In France, there is a long history of collabora-
tion between IRSTEA and local authorities of the Thau Lagoon. Specifically,
Dr. Pierre Maurel, one of my tutor, worked and keeps working on the Thau
Lagoon with local actors (Maurel, 2012). In NSW, Dr. Katherine Daniell, for-
mer PhD student at IRSTEA and LAMSADE, researcher at the Australian
National University Center for European Studies (ANUCES), has extensively
studied the Hawkesbury river (Daniell et al., 2010; Daniell, 2012). Her net-
work in the local community quickly opened many doors, speeding up the field
study process.
The existing network is simply a first motivation that provides useful entry
points. Adding to this, these cases were relevant in the context of informa-
tion sharing. In the Thau Lagoon, local authorities have been developing the
OMEGA Thau project since 2007. This project aims at building an infor-
mation system to monitor closely water quality and water flows in the whole
Thau catchment. Oyster farmers have been involved in the project from the
beginning. In NSW, oyster farmers developed estuary-wide environmental
management systems that they use to gain clout in their local contexts. The
question of the use of information and information sharing in those cases is
thus relevant. These artifacts are described in detail in Chapter 8.
5.2 Interviews and participatory observation
This section contains the protocols that I followed for the field investigation.
I describe it using a chronological approach. Statistics are summed up in
Table 5.1. The field work has first consisted in getting acquainted with the
Thau Lagoon situation, and more generally with oyster farming. Then, I
researched the NSW situation. Finally, I got back to the Thau Lagoon to use
the knowledge acquired in the Australian context to broaden comparison.
5.2.1 Thau Lagoon
Chronologically, this case was researched first. I first got acquainted with it
by studying gray literature, official statistics and general global presentations
of the area provided by the very active local council.
Important sociological work exists, especially centered around fishing with
large parts on oyster farming in the Thau lagoon (Giovannoni, 1995; Sécolier,
2009). These books are useful to immerse oneself into local traditions and
relations between groups of actors. Statistical socio-economic studies are nu-
merous, both on the Thau catchment, oyster farmers and oyster production.
In the beginning, the field work consisted in participating in three meetings
held by the local council (Section 8.2.2). These meetings took place to pre-
pare visits to oyster farmers, and to make the council acquainted with the
subject, while exchanging on local information and sharing stakes. From the
first meeting onwards, I was in regular contact with this local council. Then,
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Table 5.1: Statistics for field studies investigation.
Case study Thau NSW
Estuaries visited 1 9
Growers interviewed 17 13
Growers 500 320
Workshops attended 1 1
Meetings attended 5 0
Non-growers interviewed 1 3
I interviewed 17 oyster farmers (out of 500) using semi-structured interviews.
The interviews were semi-structured in order to allow interviewees to express
as much elements as possible, without setting too many constraints. Generally,
I tried to organize the interview using the following outline:
• Describe your practices, oyster farming in general and local conditions.
• Explain your involvement and your vision of oyster farmers’ role in water
management.
• Describe your relations with other oyster farmers with a special focus on
informtion sharing and the OMEGA Thau project.
In the beginning, I chose to emphasize the microbiological threat which is
the focus of the information sharing system developed by the Syndicat Mixte
du Bassin de Thau (SMBT) (Section 8.2.3.1) and soon broadened the question
to other types of threats. These main themes were backed by questions that
would be asked or not, depending on how available the interviewee was, and
on his/her previous answers. The questions order depended on what direction
the interviewee wanted to follow during the discussion. The shortest interview
lasted for 10 minutes, most of them lasted for 45 min to 1 hour. Two oyster
farmers gave more than 3 hours of their time to this process.
Some people that I interviewed were recommended by interviewees. I con-
ducted most of the interviews by choosing an area, walking along the shores
where the sheds are located and asking whether someone would answer my
questions (Figure 5.1 gives the spatial distribution of interviewed farmers).
This random procedure ensures as much heterogeneity among interviewees as
possible. Most sheds were empty when I walked by and I have been turned
away by some farmers, while others were more welcoming and have accepted to
be interviewed. Most interviews were conducted in the morning, while oyster
farmers are on their sheds, sorting and cleaning oysters. The sheds are gen-
erally empty during afternoons and farmers go out on the water in the early
morning. Thus, the window of opportunity is quite limited.
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Figure 5.1: The Thau lagoon sheds. In black, the total number of oyster
farmers, in red, the number interviewed (Adapted from SMBT, 2009).
Among these 17 growers interviewed, most owned small, family-size farms,
with 5 or less tables. Two of them were part of bigger businesses, with up
to 30 workers and 46 tables. At least 3 of them ran a restaurant in paral-
lel. Some were newcomers, with less than a year of experience, others were
old timers with more than 30 years in the business. One oyster farmer was
a member of an association dedicated to promoting traditional methods of
oyster farming: Ostréiculteur traditionnel1. One of them was an ex-researcher
at Institut Français de Recherche pour l’Exploitation de la Mer (Ifremer), the
French Institute for Marine Studies, who wanted to work in a more hands-on
environment. An oyster farmer was of special importance during the investiga-
tion. I met him several times for interviews. He is involved in many different
arenas (notably water management ones), and organizes the commission on
environment at the local oyster farming institution, Comité Régional de la
Conchyliculture de Méditerranée (CRCM) (Section 8.2.2).
Further to these interviews with growers, I interviewed the director of
CRCM to understand better relationship of the lobby with grassroots farmers,
other local professional or political institutions and as well his views on infor-
mation sharing and information sharing artifacts. I also attended a meeting
of the commission on environment, held at CRCM, involving 7 oyster farm-
ers and 1 oyster farmer / fisherman. This meeting helped to understand the
position of local growers as actors of the local SES and how they manage to
obtain information and act.
The result of these investigations led to a view of how local oyster farmers
1http://www.ostreiculteurtraditionnel.fr/index.html
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could use information sharing, and especially information sharing artifacts,
to help manage their resource, at the collective and at the personal levels
(Part IV). In the end, microbiological issues seem to be of less concern to
growers than a virulent virus wreaking havoc on crops since 2008. At that
point of the investigation, it was unclear how information sharing artifacts
could lead to improvements in resource management. The second step of the
process was then to investigate a second field.
5.2.2 New South Wales, Australia
This part of the investigation was led on a shorter period of time, during a three
months stay in Australia from October to December 2014. The initial project
was to focus on a single basin: the Hawkesbury River basin. However, when
I went to the Hawkesbury, only 3 oyster farmers remained out of the 12 that
were growing oysters in 2012. They were struck twice by virulent viruses
attacks that wiped them out. The most recent attacks started in 2013. It was
obviously impossible, or at most uninteresting, to compare two information
sharing situations, with 500 farmers on one side and 3 on the other.
Still, one element came out of these interviews with local farmers: after
having been struck by the first virus which lowered the local oyster grower
population from 25 to 4 (it rose up again to 12 in 2012 and dropped to 3 after-
wards), the remaining growers gathered and started implementing an Environ-
mental Management System (EMS) at the estuary level. These growers were
proud of their EMS, saying it was the basis for a great relation they mantain
with the local council, another very proactive council.
These elements seemed a good entry point to study information sharing
as interviews led to understand that EMSs were developed in more than half
(17 out of 32) estuaries of NSW.
The number of oyster farmers in NSW estuaries is much less than in the
Thau lagoon, with 1 to 30 oyster farmers per estuary. For this reason, I decided
to interview a small number of oyster farmer in several estuaries rather than
interviewing all oyster farmers in only one or two in order to create a better
picture of the case study.
Apart from the 2 growers interviewed in the Hawkesbury River (out of
3 licensed farmers), I interviewed 1 (out of 10) grower in the Shoalhaven River,
then I interviewed 3 (out of 7) growers in Wagonga Inlet, 1 (out of 10) in
Wapengo Lagoon, 1 (out of 1) in Nelson Lagoon, 3 (out of 6) in Merimbula
Lake, 1 (out of 24) in Pambula Lake, 1 (out of 8) in Wonboyn River. This
makes 13 interviews. Licensed farmers are farmers who are authorized to grow
oysters, they do not necessarily effectively farm oysters. Figure 5.2 shows the
location of the estuaries that I visited. Sydney is located on the Georges River.
In all these estuaries, EMSs were implemented, except Nelson Lagoon in which
it was in the process of being implemented. Aside from the Hawkesbury, all
these estuaries are located in the South Coast (i.e. South of Sydney), where
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further studies were carried out as detailed above. I later learned that the
situation was less problematic in the South Coast that in the North Coast. At
that point, it was already too late, and due to time constraints, I could not
lead a proper investigation in the North Coast. Despite this limiting factor,
the South Coast situation was rich enough and worth investigating, as the rest
of the thesis will demonstrate. Refer to Table 5.1 to get summarized figures
regarding the investigation.
Some of the growers interviewed are proactive growers, keen on playing
a leadership role for the industry. Among those, some are very involved in
environment protection matters, such as the Bega Valley Shire EMS officer
(from Bermagui River to Pambula Lake) or one who implemented an EMS
at the individual farm level. These growers played a significant role in the
adoption of EMSs involving all farmers in each estuary. Other growers were
randomly chosen. Respondents were all rather smallholders owning a few
tables. Their equipment ranged from basic and hand operated to state-of-the-
art sorting machines. Almost all estuaries of the South Coast are equipped
with EMSs. The only estuaries that are not yet equipped are small ones with
only one or two growers.
These interviews were organized according to the following three points:
• Describe your practices, oyster farming in general and local conditions.
• Explain your involvement and your vision of oyster farmers’ role in water
management.
• Describe your relations with other oyster farmers with a special focus on
informtion sharing and the OMEGA Thau project.
These semi-open interviews usually lasted for more than one hour and were
all recorded with the interviewee’s approval. These recordings have all been
transcribed.
To get external points of view, I also conducted 3 other interviews with
the author of another information sharing document, the Oyster Industry Sus-
tainable Aquaculture Strategy (OISAS) (Section 8.1.3.1), member of the NSW
Department of Primary Industries, with the EMS facilitator and with the Shell-
fish program manager of the NSW Food Authority.
Some of the people I interviewed as well as others met in a workshop I
attended called “The role of natural resources management in the NSW oys-
ter industry” held in Sydney on November 26th, 2014. The idea behind this
workshop was that “by sharing knowing and information, and improving com-
munication across stakeholders, [it] will help foster stronger partnerships, and
projects that deliver better outcomes for the industry and the environment”
(OceanWatch, 2014). This workshop helped compensate the initial choice to
head South by enabling the gathering of North growers points of view.
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Figure 5.2: Estuaries were oysters are grown in NSW. Sydney is located in
the Georges River estuary. Visited estuaries are squared with red rectangles
(Adapted from OISAS, 2014).
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5.2.3 Thau Lagoon, again
Once back in France, I presented the results of my investigation to two growers
who were interested. I also intended to submit a survey to oyster farmers in
the Thau Lagoon. Thus, I designed a survey. The survey was aimed at Thau
Lagoon oyster farmers and is organized in the following way:
• Knowledge of local information documents (some of which I did not
know the existence during the first investigation) and the use they make
of them (those documents are presented in Section 8.2.3).
• Practices and involvement in water management as well as the role of
oyster farmers in the estuary and the catchment.
• Interactions with local institutions.
• Personal data.
The goal of the survey was to obtain answers that would allow more ex-
tensive comparison on a quantitative basis.
A meeting was organized with the Thau Lagoon local authorities, with
the attendance of CRCM director, and an Ifremer researcher. During this
meeting, I presented the results of my investigation, focusing on the EMS part
which seemed to interest those who were attending and suggested to launch
the survey.
Unfortunately, the survey was not approved officially. I had to use unofficial
ways to spread the survey. However, it did not prove sufficient. Only 20 people
answered, among those, 7 answered fully.
5.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, I exposed the rationale for choosing oyster farming in the Thau
Lagoon and estuaries in NSW. Those cases were chosen with two main reasons
in mind: easy access thanks to an existing network and compatibility with the
question of the thesis thanks to the existence of information sharing artifacts
in both cases.
To investigate the cases, I dwelt upon 34 semi-open interviews with oyster
farmers (17 in Thau and 13 in NSW) and local authorities (1 in Thau and 3 in
NSW); used official and gray literature; and attended meetings and conferences
using a participatory observation posture.
I realized that most information sharing in those artifacts were oriented
towards water quality management (or more precisely deterioration of water
quality mitigation), for a group of actors with limited capacity to act directly
on their resource. Poor water quality is a public threat for oyster farmers.
Interviews led to understanding that the main threat that oyster farmers are
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currently facing is a virus, an internal threat. Little information sharing has
been investigated on this question. I decided to turn to a method that allowed
to create scenarios and investigate whether information sharing would lead
to better virus management: Agent-Based Modeling (ABM). I present this
method in the next chapter.

Chapter 6
Agent-Based Modeling
In the introduction of this part, I presented the idea developed by Ostrom
(2007a) that there are no panaceas for Natural Resources Management (NRM).
The same idea applies to methods: there is no panacea either for how to explore
an object, especially such a complex one as information sharing (Chapter 4).
It would be unreasonable to argue that a single approach is relevant and/or
sufficient to investigate the subject. Except due to real-life constraints such
as time, space and budget, there is no reason to limit oneself to that single
approach (Poteete et al., 2010). Choosing a specific approach leads to shed
light on specific angles of a situation, or to project some reality on a defined
space that one can grasp.
I investigate the question of possible effects of information sharing for oys-
ter farmers regarding a threat that they all suffer from: a virus killing their
oysters. Does more information lead to better management and better out-
comes for farmers? This threat is ill-understood (Part III) and the question of
the influence of information sharing is hard to study and observe on the field.
The time frame is long (the virus kills once per year), experiences cannot be
repeated, and measuring precisely information sharing is difficult. Facing such
a situation and questioning the idea according to which more information shar-
ing leads to better results, it seemed natural to turn to ABM. ABMs, and their
simulation, enable precise controlling of variables and tracking of trajectories
in designed and reproducible scenarios.
A model can be used as a virtual laboratory in order to repeat a situation
several times using various scenarios. ABM is a tool that enables exploring
questions such as the one of this thesis (Janssen and Ostrom, 2006). ABM has
been used in a wide variety of contexts at various scales, from epidemiology (El-
Sayed et al., 2012), to markets (Rouchier, 2013), organizations (Fioretti, 2013),
social-dilemmas (Gotts et al., 2003) or environment management (Le Page
et al., 2013) among many others.
I first explain what an ABM is, what can be expected from a model and go
through some advantages and limits of the approach. Then, I detail what is
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intended by the term agent, and some of their key properties. Third, I inves-
tigate in more details the field of ABM for NRM. To conclude, I go through
the implementation details of ABMs with the description tools, Unified Mod-
eling Language (UML) diagrams (class, sequence and activity) and Overview,
Design concepts, and Details (ODD) protocol and the programming tools,
CORMAS and R.
6.1 What is ABM?
ABM is a method that allows to explore complex systems, and “offers a way
to model social systems that are composed of agents who interact with and
influence each other, learn from their experiences, and adapt their behaviors so
they are better suited to their environment” (Macal and North, 2010, p.151).
An ABM is a model in the first place. A model is an abstract representation
of reality. Minsky (1968, p.1) provides the following definition:
“To an observer B, an object A∗ is a model of an object A to the
extent that B can use A∗ to answer questions that interest him
about A.”
This definition highlights that modeling is purpose-oriented and has to
be considered as a projection. In our context, I need to clarify a few other
concepts for which I give broad definitions (Adapted from Treuil et al., 2008):
Dynamic model A model that includes the structure of a reference system
A as well as hypotheses or rules regarding the evolution of A.
Multi-agent system A dynamic system viewed as a set of agents evolving
in an environment and having direct or indirect interactions. The multi-
agent system paradigm is convenient as a transdisciplinary way of repre-
senting and studying SESs (Bommel, 2009). A formal definition follows
in the next section.
Agent-Based model A model of the world structured as a multi-agent sys-
tem.
Multi-Agent simulator An algorithm or program that can simulate the dy-
namics specified by the ABM.
Multi-Agent simulation The activity of executing the simulator, resulting
in simulation outputs that describe the evolution of the state of the ABM
over the simulated period.
A comprehensive and recent overview of the state of the field can be found
in the handbook Simulating social complexity (Edmonds and Meyer, 2013b)
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that provided elements of this chapter and that partly guided the creation of
the ABM developed in this thesis.
In this section, first, I detail the general philosophy lying behind ABMs
and the structure of a typical ABM. Second, I discuss some advantages and
drawbacks of this method.
6.1.1 “Micromotives and macrobehavior”
The title for this section is the title of a seminal paper in this field (Schelling,
1978, 2006) that explains clearly the philosophy behind ABM. The main idea
is to describe precisely how some entities, often called agents, interact in some
kind of environment, and then understand how small scale decisions of enti-
ties (micromotives) and how their interactions affect globally this environment
(macrobehavior). A specific attention is given on subjects such as feedback
and emergence. This special attention forces the modeler to pay attention to
the other side of the interaction: how macrobehavior influences micromotives.
This method is relevant for the study of complex systems since it enables
to link two, or more, levels of the studied system. For instance, in his famous
segregation model, Schelling (1971) describes a population of red and green
agents, that I call people for now, who live in a grid representing a town.
People know who they are living close to and have a certain tolerance level
(their micromotive) formulated as: “I accept to have at most x% of the other
type of population in my neighborhood, otherwise, I move”. The observed
macrobehavior is the emergence of clusters of similar population, segregated
neighborhoods, created by this simple behavior. Changes in the number of
happy people, i.e. those who are below their tolerance level, is the feedback
loop resulting from the observed macrobehavior (Figure 6.1). This model is an
impressive attempt at understanding how neighborhoods are formed in towns
without having to use macro arguments (such as planning) or to anticipate
global behaviors since programming and describing the model only focuses on
(simple) individual micromotives.
An ABM is composed of three main characteristics: the agents or individ-
uals, their interactions and the environment in which they operate. Agents are
discussed in details in Section 6.2. Their interactions are defined through some
kind of relationship resulting from an underlying typology. In the previous ex-
ample, agents are interacting with their neighbor in this way: is my neighbor
of my type? Formally, this ABM containing individuals moving in houses is
represented as a cellular automaton, a grid that has a certain number of states
and that react according to their neighbors state (Conway, 1970). With ABM,
it is possible to represent rich micro-processes and dynamic interactions, for
instance through fix or evolving social network topologies on the set of agents
that they use to exchange goods or information (Amblard and Quattrociocchi,
2013). Agents also interact with an environment that creates some constraints
or opportunities. Agents can for instance be located in their environment, have
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Figure 6.1: Initial and final situations for a 30% tolerance level using an im-
plementation of Schelling’s segregation model in NetLogo library (Wilensky,
1997). The emergence of clusters is clearly visible.
to interact with some existing structure such as a road, a field, other agents,
an organization or have to deal with some kind of external events such as rains
or droughts.
There are several definitions of a multi-agent system, of which ABMs are
instances, and I give here the widely-used definition written by Ferber (1999,
p.11). “A multi-agent system is a set {E,O,A,R,Op} composed of:
• An environment E, that is, a space which generally has a volume.
• A set of objects O. These objects are situated, that is to say, it is possible
at a given moment to associate any object with a position in E. These
objects are passive, that is, they can be perceived, created, destroyed
and modified by the agents
• An assembly of agents A, which are specific objects (A ⊆ O) repre-
senting the active entities of the system (Section 6.2 provides detailed
information about agents).
• An assembly of relations R which link objects (and thus agents) to each
another.
• An assembly of operations Op, making it possible for the agents of A to
perceive, produce, transform, and manipulate objects from O.
• Operators with the task of representing the application of these opera-
tions and the reaction of the world to this attempt at modification, which
we shall call the laws of the universe.”
6.1. WHAT IS ABM? 85
ABMs can be described using this formalism This definition indicates
a suitable paradigm for programming ABM: object-oriented programming.
Agents, and more generally objects have specific properties and are related
through some relations which recalls the way objects behave in object-oriented
programming (Section 6.4).
6.1.2 Advantages and limits of ABMs
As for all methodologies, ABM has some advantages and some limitations that
modelers should bear in mind.
6.1.2.1 Advantages
As Bommel (2009) explains, traditionally, mathematical tools have been used
to describe and scientifically model the world. However, mathematical models
are deemed to be tractable if the modeler wants to make something out of it:
either the model considers that all individuals are alike creating a particle-like
effect, using an average strategy, or the model considers the distribution of
the population along some variables (age, spacial distribution). Furthermore,
it is difficult to link the aggregated value of a variable and the value for a
single agent, there is no history or trajectory, preventing local tracking. I use
this advantage to devolve more time in understanding and modeling diverse
scenarios rather than finding mathematically tractable versions of models I
design.
In ABMs, there is no limit in following both aggregated and disaggre-
gated values, and in designing ways agents influence and are influenced by the
environment. The way an ABM is conceived, using agent-oriented or object-
oriented programming (this choice will prove more and more natural along
the chapter), makes it relatively easy to design several types of agents making
their decisions in different ways, creating and favoring heterogeneity. Herbert
Simon (cited in Edmonds and Meyer, 2013a) observed that humans tend to
act following a procedural rather than substantive rationality, i.e. people fol-
low a predetermined sequence of actions instead of optimizing the sequence
or always choosing the best option (see Section 6.4.1.2 for an instanciation
of this idea). Thus, people follow heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).
They tend to change their procedure only if it becomes unsatisfactory. Simon
(1982) also developed the concept of bounded rationality according to which
people do not have perfect information about their environment, that is fully
expressed in how people in models sense and understand their environment in
a partial manner. This idea is clearly fundamental in a thesis such as this one
since without bounded rationality, information has to be considered known
equally by all at all times.
After the design of an ABM, it is also relatively easy to make some changes
in the way some behaviors or relations work, without risking of having to end
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up with a completely different mathematical model, that becomes at best more
difficult and at worse intractable.
6.1.2.2 Limits
ABMs come with some limitations that I take into account as much as possible.
One of the main limitations lies in the difficulty that the modeler has to
generalize the outputs of the model. On the one hand, “if one has demon-
strated that a certain set of assumptions can result in a set of outcomes, this
shows that the modeled process is a possible explanation for those outcomes”
(Norling et al., 2013, p.43). A model cannot prove something of the form
∀X,Y , since X and Y are simplified versions (models) of reality impossible
to explore thoroughly. A corollary of this observation is that a model can
disprove theorems formulated in these terms. A model can show that ∃X,¬Y .
In the case of the model developed in this thesis, I focus on the second part,
investigating the question: does more information (X) lead to better resource
management (Y )? The goal here is to find some values of X that lead to Y ,
and some that do not.
Another issue is linked to results linked to programming itself: assumptions
made as for the way the system interacts, the internal behavior of agents or
the environment reaction. These assumptions can be made explicit for some of
them (such as declaring some unknown behavior as a random variable) while
others are quite difficult to make explicit (such as those deriving from the
modeler personal biases) (Bommel, 2009; Norling et al., 2013). Furthermore,
because of the complexity of models, it is often quite difficult for others to
replicate them, while it is a part of the scientific verification process (Norling
et al., 2013; David, 2013). The question of verification of ABMs is one of the
trickiest and covers a wide range of possible strategies that do not yet make
consensus but have to be linked to the purpose of the model (David, 2013). A
way to deal with this issue it to document in details the simulation to make
it easier for other to replicate it. This reason explains the choice of using the
ODD (Section 6.4.1.3) protocol proposed by Grimm et al. (2006, 2010, 2013)
to describe the model that forces the modeler to answer to a thorough set of
questions that leads to revealing as much of the model as possible..
It is important to remember limitations of approaches in order to under-
stand observed results. This point should be applied to all methodologies.
6.2 Agents
Agents are the main entities of ABMs. Models of agents can range from very
simple such as in Schelling (1971) segregation model to much more complex
ones such as agents endowed with beliefs, desires and intentions (BDI). Ferber
(1999, p.9) gives a thorough definition of an agent. He proposes to specify
agents in any ABM {E,O,A,R,Op} as “a physical or virtual entity which:
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• Is capable of acting in an environment E.
• Can communicate directly with other agents in A.
• Is driven by a set of tendencies (in the form of individual objectives or
of a satisfaction/survival function which it tries to optimize).
• Possesses resources of its own.
• Is capable of perceiving E to a limited extent.
• Has only a partial representation of this environment (and perhaps none
at all).
• Possesses skills and can supply services.
• May be able to reproduce itself.
• Behaves towards satisfying its objectives, taking account of the resources
and skills available to it and depending on its perception, its representa-
tions and the communications it receives.”
This definition is comprehensive and dictates how we should think an agent
in an ABM. Note that actual human being verify this definition.
Usually, two broad types of agents are defined: reactive and cognitive. Re-
active agents are supposed to directly respond to their environment or other
agents, while cognitive ones formulate goals that they want to follow. Archety-
pal examples of these types of agents could be an ant (reactive) and a hu-
man (cognitive). As usual, the definitions are not that clear and there is a
blurred boundary between reactive agents and cognitive agents: these cate-
gories should rather be seen as gradient (Bommel, 2009). Depending on the
model, a human agent can be designed as a reactive agent such as in the segre-
gation model. Many choices can be made when designing how agents behave
and react. In the model developed in the thesis, there are two main entities:
oysters and farmers. Oysters are clearly reactive entities. Farmers agents need
to interpret and react to new pieces of information. Thus, they are designed
as cognitive agents.
Agents could be all modeled as following the same behavior, but a strength
of ABMs is to be able to develop models in which heterogeneity is included.
This characteristic limits the emergence of average behaviors. It usually pre-
vents any analytical solving (which is a drawback compared to other types
of mathematical modeling), but regularities and determinism can be observed
empirically by performing intensive simulation plans. I used this strength and
defined several types of agents who have different goals.
Agents are a very modular concept that is the core of ABMs. Let us now
turn to the specific use of ABM in the context of NRM.
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6.3 Agent-based modeling for natural resources
management
SESs are complex systems for at least two reasons. First, there is no single
theory or scientific field that explain them. Second, some characteristics such
as social norms seem to emerge from individual behavior and interactions
between individuals. ABMs are particularly adapted tools for their study since
they provide a transdisciplinary paradigm and allow to specify micromotives
and observe resulting macrobehaviors (Bousquet and Le Page, 2004; Janssen
and Ostrom, 2006; An, 2012; Le Page et al., 2013). It has been applied to all
kinds of resources in a wide variety of contexts. In a review, Le Page et al.
(2013) give a number of references for applications in subjects as diverse as:
land-use dynamics (Ralha et al., 2013), water management (Barreteau et al.,
2004), forestry (Purnomo and Guizol, 2006), or wildlife (Anwar et al., 2007).
As Bousquet and Le Page (2004, p.314) put it in their review of ABM for
ecosystem management:
Scientists working in [the area of ecosystem management] need to
examine the interactions between ecological dynamics and social
dynamics. Indeed, for many years, this question was examined ei-
ther exclusively from the angle of “an ecological system subject to
anthropogenic disturbance” or, from the angle of “a social system
subject to natural constraints”. [...] For [20] years now, the chal-
lenge has been to develop a new approach focusing more on the
interactions between ecological and social components and taking
into account the heterogeneity of these components.
ABM is a suitable methodological answer to the requirement of switching
from a system constrained by another to systems in interactions. This per-
spective in a SES context allows, if not forces, a double investigation as much
on the ecosystem side as on the social side. There is no specific reason for
making ecology dominant over society, or society dominant over ecology. The
actual world around us is working in interaction, ecology and society shaping,
affecting, constraining and offering opportunities to each other.
6.4 The technical side of the ABM
Multiple tools exist to design, implement and describe ABMs. Some tools
are used to program, others to explain or specify. In the following section,
I introduce the description tools, UML class, sequence and activity diagrams
and the ODD protocol that I used to specify the model as well as the program,
CORMAS, that I used implement the simulation.
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6.4.1 Description tools
The object-oriented programming paradigm is well adapted for multi-agent
modeling and simulation. This paradigm encourages the creation of classes (an
instance of which is called an object) that have specific attributes (variables
with fixed or mobile values) and methods (actions the object can perform).
These different classes can interact in specific and precise ways defined by
the programmer. In the case of ABM, this paradigm is relevant since the
objective is to design agents that behave according to some sequences of rules
and interact with other agents or with their environment.
Note that some ABMmeta-models are based on specific agent-oriented pro-
gramming languages (e.g. NetLogo, Gama) that are “specialization of object-
oriented programming. The state of an agent consists of components such as
beliefs, decisions, capabilities, and obligations” (Shoham, 1993, p.51). How-
ever, using object-oriented languages is convenient since we can use the vast
knowledge and practices developed in this field, particularly code organization
and description.
Indeed, programming in such languages requires planning. The tools de-
scribed in the rest of the section are useful for that purpose. They have the
other advantage of making communication about the structure of the model
and discussion easier.
In the rest of the section, I introduce classical notational languages that I
will use to describe the ABM of the thesis: UML for class diagrams, sequence
and activity diagrams and the ODD protocol. This section only covers the
basic techniques that I used in the thesis, these languages have many other
specificities.
6.4.1.1 UML - Class diagrams
Unified Modeling Language (UML) is a notational language that was intended
as “a standard means of expressing design that would not only reflect the best
practices of industry, but would also help demystify the process of software
system modeling” (Fowler, 2004). Since there are several notations in the
language, I will precise the meaning of the symbols that are used in the thesis.
The first type of diagram used to describe models is the class diagram.
Figure 6.2 shows examples of classes taken from an ABM developed in Bommel
et al. (2012). All diagrams are drawn using the UMLet1 open source program.
Boxes are divided into three part. The upper part contains the name of the
class, in italic if abstract. The middle part contains attributes and the bottom
part, methods. Figure 6.3 shows a class diagram that focuses on interactions.
A simple line is an association (a Forager daughter class instance is associated
with exactly one instance of Plant); a diamond is an aggregation (a Landscape
1http://www.umlet.com/
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Plant
-K:int = 10
-r:f loat = 0.2
biomass:float
step()
logisticGrowth()
Forager
catabolicRate:int = 2
ferti l ityThreshold:int = 100
harvestRate:float
energy:int = 50
step()
move()
eat()
die()
reproduce()
consumeEnergy()
Restrained
harvestRate = 0.5
Unrestrained
harvestRate = 0.99
Figure 6.2: Example of simple and abstract classes with inheritance (Bommel
et al., 2012).
Plant Forager
Restrained Unrestrained
1 0..1
location  <is located on   occupant
Landscape
8
                neighbors
Figure 6.3: Example of interactions in a class diagram (Bommel et al., 2012).
instance is an aggregation of Plant instances); and a white triangle symbolizes
inheritance (Restrained inherits from Forager ).
6.4.1.2 UML - Sequence and activity diagram
A sequence diagram is a diagram that describes sequential procedures that
objects follow. This type of diagram is a technical implementation of Herbert
Simon’s idea of the fact that humans behave in a procedural rather than a
substantive way. The most important sequence diagrams in the case of ABMs
describe the main step method which is an organization of the objects sequence
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cell:VegetationUnit f:Foragerm:Scheduler
*step()
mixTheAgents()
        *step()
updateEntities()
Scheduler main stepForager step
consumeEnergy
move
eat
energy>=100
reproduce
energy <= 0
die
else
Figure 6.4: Example of activity and sequence diagrams (Bommel et al., 2012).
of behavior. The right side of Figure 6.4 shows an example of such a diagram
in the same model as in section 6.4.1.1. These diagrams are simple to read.
The entities designed in the top box performs the listed methods from top to
bottom.
An activity diagram is type of diagram used to described complicated meth-
ods (Fowler, 2004), such as step methods. The left side of Figure 6.4 shows an
example of the step activity diagram of the forager described in Figure 6.2.
6.4.1.3 ODD(+D) protocol
The Overview, Design concepts, and Details (ODD) protocol was proposed as
a standard protocol for describing ABMs in scientific papers (Grimm et al.,
2006, 2010, 2013). It was developed initially in ecology by 28 researchers as
a response to the lack of precise description framework for simulations and
has been globally welcomed in the community with at least 50 models using
the protocol 4 years later (Grimm et al., 2010). Even though it is possible to
apply directly the protocol to describe ABMs in the context of SESs, there has
been a refinement of the protocol specifically for the study of SESs or more
generally when human decision is modeled in some way. Müller et al. (2013)
propose the ODD+D (for decision) protocol that extends the classic ODD.
Table 6.1 shows the different elements proposed in the ODD+D protocol to
describe the ABM one has developed, or is currently developing. Each one
of these themes is designed to answer a set of questions (listed in Table A.1,
p.256) that I follow to describe the model.
The UML diagrams that have been detailed in the previous sections only
answers to parts of “entities, state variables and scales”, as well as the “process
overview and scheduling”, a tiny fraction of the global description of a model.
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Table 6.1: The ODD+D protocol (Adapted from Grimm et al., 2013; Müller
et al., 2013). Table A.1, p.256, lists questions associated with each structural
element.
Main block Structural element
Overview Purpose
Entities, state variables and scale
Process overview and scheduling
Design concepts Theoretical and empirical background
Individual decision-making
Learning
Individual sensing
Individual prediction
Interaction
Collectives
Heterogeneity
Stochasticity
Observation
Details Implementation details
Initialization
Input data
Submodels
6.4.2 Simulation and analysis tools
This section completes the “implementation details” section of the ODD. Nu-
merous platforms exist to program a ABM, see Nikolai and Madey (2009) for
a comparative review. Platforms can be very generic or more specific; focus on
communication or on agent decision-making processes; provide visualizations
or not. They are implemented in all kinds of programming languages and can
be created from scratch by users. Already implemented programs have the
advantage to help users in creating the simulation.
6.4.2.1 CORMAS
In the case of the thesis, the focus is on agents interacting around a natural
resource that they wish to use and understand. Given the ecology of platforms
that exist, I turned to a platform called CORMAS2, Common-Pool Resources
and Multi-Agent Systems (Bousquet et al., 1998; Le Page et al., 2012). This
platform comes with two important advantages: first, as the name suggests, it
2http://cormas.cirad.fr/indexeng.htm
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is oriented towards NRM and second, it is widely used in the laboratories I am
affiliated with. CORMAS is based on the smallTalk language (a pure object-
oriented language) and uses a visualWorks implementation which is moving
towards an open-source version on Pharo3. I used version 2014.5.14 adapted
for Ubuntu 12.04.
The basic principles of CORMAS is that there is an environment that
consists of an aggregation of cells. These cells are considered the basic spatial
entities (a field, water ...). The second element is the agents. These agents
can be located and/or social. Choosing a specific version of an agent enables
the use of different methods that are implemented. For instance, if agents are
social, they can have a network and exchange messages with other agents, if
they are located, they can move. Third, one can create passive objects that
can be manipulated by agents or the cells.
6.4.2.2 R
R is a statistics open-source software (R Core Team, 2015) that is widely used
in the statistics and data analysis community. It provides numerous packages
that are useful to analyze data. I used R version 3.2.2, and Rstudio version
0.98.1102 RStudio Team (2012), an integrated development environment for
R. I also intensely used some packages for the analysis of the ABM such as
dplyr to manipulate data (Wickham and Francois, 2015), tidyr to clean data
(Wickham, 2014) and ggplot2 to draw graphs (Wickham, 2009). I am thus
grateful to Hadley Wickham for implementing a precise and specific grammar
of graphics (Wilkinson, 2006) and precise and easy to use verbs dedicated to
specific uses in data analysis. I strongly suggest to the reader who needs to
analyze data to investigate these packages.
6.4.2.3 R-CORMAS
In an ABM, there are multiple attributes that the modeler can change. Explor-
ing values enables the modeler to understand the model or draw conclusions
about the phenomenon he/she is trying to unveil. CORMAS possesses internal
tools that allow to explore the space of parameters.
However, these tools are quite static (move around a value or divide a range
into equally distanced values) and do not allow easy handling of replications
while they are necessary to gum out stochasticity. To overcome these limita-
tions and inspired by the link that was created between R and Netlogo another
ABM platform (Thiele and Grimm, 2010), we decided (with Dr. Bruno Bonté)
to develop a link between R and Cormas. R role is to create a matrix of n
lines and p columns, where each line is a scenario containing the p values for
the variables that the modeler intends to explore. The role of CORMAS is
then to read the values sent by R and execute the simulation.
3https://github.com/cormas/cormas
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6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I described ABMs as a widely used tool that helps to under-
stand complexity, linking micromotivations and macrobehaviors. ABMs are
composed of three main elements: the agents, the environment and their in-
teractions. They have advantages such as describing the world in terms of
sequence rather than tractable mathematical formulas and are quite flexible.
However, they are difficult to replicate and verify. Despite these limitations,
they are a useful tool that I use in the rest of the thesis. After having described
agents in details, I focused on the use of ABMs in the context of NRM. In this
domain, it is considered as a tool that is increasingly important, as much for
prediction than understanding or participation. After having discussed these
theoretical points, I went into the detail with some technical tools that are
useful for creating and communicating ABMs. The UML paradigm and their
diagrams (class, sequence and activity) are used to describe technical parts
of the implementation either globally or locally. The ODD protocol is used
to communicate thoroughly a model in ecology and the ODD+D protocol is
specifically dedicated to communicate on models that include human decision
making. Finally, I described the implementation details of the model: the use
of the CORMAS platform coupled with the R statistics software.
Part III
Case Studies
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Case studies - Introduction
The following chapters contain the contextual part of the thesis to which I
apply the concepts introduced in Part I. The two case studies are focused on
oyster farmers, their relation with their environment and their role as actors
of a Social-Ecological System (SES).
As a first step, in Chapter 7, as advised by Edwards and Steins (1999),
I frame the general context in which oyster farmers act, that is in estuaries,
mouths of coastal catchments, highly diverse environments both ecologically
and for human usage. I use the SES framework to unite cases and see beyond
specific elements of cases, going into oyster farming through the ecology of
oyster farmers environment (estuaries and catchments), the biology of oysters
and techniques to farm oysters. This case provides an opportunity to discuss
the linked questions of scales and boundaries of SESs.
Then, in Chapter 8, I describe, drawing on the SES framework, the specific
two cases that I investigated in detail using the methods described in Chap-
ter 5: Thau Lagoon, France and several estuaries in New South Wales (NSW),
Australia. In the description, in addition to the historic, economic, social and
political elements, I focus particularly on information sharing artifacts that ac-
tors (oyster farmers or public authorities) have developed to cope with threats.
The use of the SES framework allows for a broad comparison of cases which is
presented at the end of Chapter 8. This comparison points out variables that
are significantly different in the cases studied: size and community.
To conclude, in Chapter 9, I present oyster farming through the lense of
threats, pointing particularly two threats: the microbiological one, a public
threat; and the virus one, private. In this chapter, I show that the concepts
developed and presented in Chapter 3 allow an easy framing of oyster farmers
situation.
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Chapter 7
Estuaries, Oysters and
Oyster Farming
Oyster farming occurs in the brackish water of estuaries. Estuaries surround-
ings have been inhabited and used by man for thousands of years (Day et al.,
2013c). Their importance to man of and the influence of man on estuaries are
recognized (Day et al., 2013b).
The case studies of this thesis are focusing on oyster farming, and thus
on estuaries. This case is relevant for several reasons: oyster farmers act
in a fundamentally open system difficult to study with the traditional goods
framework (Table 2.1, p.13) and are subject to threats (Chapter 9).
Studying these cases with the lense of the SES framework encourages the
analyst to describe system actors evolve in using a multidisciplinary perspec-
tive. As much as humans shape the environment they live in, the environment
shapes humans and their institutions. Someone trying to understand institu-
tions, rules, behaviors and norms of humans acting around a resource should
not overlook a description of their environment. In this chapter, I focus mostly
on the resource system actors use, the resource units they produce and how
they produce them, i.e. the ecological side of the SES. Such a contextual focus
is supported by Edwards and Steins (1999) who insist on the importance of
describing precisely the environment and interactions in a multidisciplinary
perspective.
First, I give a brief overview of the ecology of estuaries and catchment
basins to provide the reader a broad view of the system background. Then, I
focus on oysters and their important ecological functions, showing that they
can be considered bioindicator species. After that, I describe practices of oyster
farmers. Finally, I discuss choices that have to be made to describe a SES and
their implications for the analysis (Table 7.2).
This chapter is intended to be as general as possible, drawing on the knowl-
edge acquired through literature and interviews, to give a general view that
can go beyond the specific cases I had the opportunity to investigate in-depth.
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7.1 Catchments and estuaries
Catchments and estuaries can be considered nested systems, as shown in Fig-
ure 7.1. The turquoise and blue nested squares show possible limits of the
system. These limits are the result of a modeling choice. The difference lies
in considering some flows as internal or external and depicts representations
of the modeler, or of actors within the system. This modeling choice has
important outcomes, as I will show in Section 7.4 and in Chapter 10.
Figure 7.1 shows catchment basin and estuary as two different reservoirs
even though this choice could be questioned in the point of view of hydrology
(the estuary is part of the catchment). However, since we are mostly focusing
on actors’ points of view, it can be argued that for someone working mostly
on the estuary, the catchment can be seen as external and simply providing an
inflow of water. The nested part of the system is represented by the background
rectangles.
Whatever the choice, it is necessary to understand the basics of estuarine
ecology. First, I describe estuaries and some of their important characteristics.
Second, I take a step backward to briefly describe catchment basins, and then
link the two through water quality issues.
7.1.1 Estuaries
The commonly used definition of an estuary is: “a semi-enclosed body of water
that has free connection with the open ocean and within which sea water is
measurably diluted with fresh water derived from land drainage” (Pritchard,
1967; Dunster, 2011; Day et al., 2013c). This situation makes estuaries water
brackish. “There is a continuum of estuarine types. At one end of the spec-
trum exist lagoons (...), at the opposite end of the spectrum lie deltas. (...)
Between lagoons and deltas lie estuarine lagoons, estuaries, estuarine deltas,
representing a mixture and gradation of the two extreme coastal environments”
(Snedden et al., 2012, p.20). Differences are shown in Figure 7.2. The reader
can notice that this representation does not include the rest of the catchment
basin.
Lagoons and estuaries have close properties and in the case of this thesis,
there is no need for further distinction, since they will here lead to same types
of management, use, face similar threats and belong to close SESs. When citing
the names of real places, I will use the vernacular one (with the apposition of
estuary, river, inlet, or lagoon when appropriate), and I will use solely estuary
as a generic term when referring to this type of ecosystem. This is the way they
are referred to in the reference book Estuarine Ecology (Day et al., 2013a).
Estuarine ecosystems are composed of several ecosystems that form a com-
plex system. Estuarine environments are challenging to live in due to impor-
tant salinity and turbidity changes, mostly due to tides. Despite this element
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Estuary
Rain
Catchment
basin
Reservoir
Sea
Aquifer Water ﬂows
Seasonal
Events
Continuous
Figure 7.1: Coastal water flows: catchment or estuary?
Figure 7.2: Schematic representation of the continuum of inlet types from
lagoons to deltas (Snedden et al., 2012).
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(or thanks to), they are recognized as high productivity ecosystems (Day et al.,
2013c).
7.1.2 Catchments
Catchment basins are defined as the total area draining into a given reservoir
or impoundment area (Dunster, 2011). Water coming from all points of the
catchment exit in a point where it converges. Estuaries or lakes are typical exit
points. Activities that have a link with water such as farming or cities (use
and treatment of water) have consequences on the exit point of a catchment.
Estuaries are open systems. Actually, they can be considered as an interface
between the catchment basin and the sea or the ocean. A catchment basin is
a more closed system than an estuary since water can enter this system only
through rain or from underground reservoirs and to a little extent at the end
point (Figure 7.1).
7.1.3 Water quality
Water has characteristics that can be measured (chemical, physical, biological).
Water quality is the measure of all these elements in relation with something
(e.g. capacity of humans to use it, of animals to live in it).
Water quality in estuaries is influenced by activities on estuaries, and by
flows of water entering the estuary. Figure 7.1 shows water exchanges of es-
tuaries with other systems. Changes of water quality can come from within
(internal pollution), from the rest of the catchment, and from the sea (and
thus other catchments).
“Coastal primary production and phytoplankton biomass are strongly con-
trolled by the availability and supply rates of nutrients, especially nitrogen
and to a lesser extend phosphorous” (Paerl and Justic, 2013, p.98). There is a
substantial effect of human activities on water quality.
Agricultural fertilizer run-off coming from catchments has important con-
sequences on ecosystems such as eutrophication due to increases in nitrogen
and phosphorous (Schindler and Vallentyne, 2008). This massive inflow of
nutrients has an impact on estuarine phytoplankton. Phytoplankton can pro-
liferate in explosive ways due to fast growing rates in the order of one doubling
per day (Paerl and Justic, 2013). When there is a high inflow of fertilizers,
their growing rate can create algal blooms which affect negatively water qual-
ity. These algae use all the available oxygen in the water and create hypoxic
or anoxic conditions which are difficult to handle for other species. In the end,
the whole trophic web can be touched in dramatic ways. At worse, this over-
flow of nutrients can create dead zones such as in the Gulf of Mexico, or less
dramatically, limit the environmental carrying capacity of estuaries (Rabalais
et al., 2002).
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Water in estuaries1 and water quality are non-excludable and non-rivalrous.
Thus, they are public goods (Table 2.1, p.13). Water quality may be measured
through a wide variety of water quality indicators (Fairweather, 1999). For in-
stance, in Australia, water quality indicators are developed on five estuarine-
related components: aquatic ecosystem health; primary (swimming) and sec-
ondary (boating, fishing) contact recreation; visual amenities; and aquatic
commercial food production (NSWDEC, 2005). Each of these components is
related to a set of variables. A variety of indicators are defined to measure
water quality. For instance, short term impact of human activities in the estu-
ary is measured through the level of Escherichia coli (E. coli) which can lead
to health troubles (from diarrhea to death). E. coli levels are measured in
cfu/100 mL, i.e. colony forming units, an estimation of the number of viable
bacteria cells in a sample of 100 mL. For aquatic ecosystem health, the main
indicators are (harmful) algae blooms and the level of nutrients in the wa-
ter for the reasons stated above. More indicators can be found in NSWDEC
(2005) and in Table 8.1, p.120, which is dedicated to indicators related to
oyster farming.
Water quality in estuaries is strongly linked to catchment activities. Even
though water quality can be measured anywhere, since estuaries are exit points
of catchments, water quality in estuaries can be thought as a possible indicator
for sustainability of activities in the catchment, at least as far as water flowing
is concerned. If water quality affects species which are linked through a dense
relation web working at several levels (physical, chemical, biological), it also
affects people who use estuaries professionally or for leisure.
7.1.4 Users of estuaries
The interaction between humans and estuaries is old. This interaction is due
to the high productivity of estuaries (mostly fish and shellfish) and to their
positions at the border of river mouths and the sea that provides an ideal
location for trade (Day et al., 2013b). In this section, I will first evoke direct
users of estuaries and second, indirect users.
Estuaries are used directly by some categories of actors. I will order the uses
in terms of water quality requirements seen as a possible usage for humans.
Thus, I use E. coli increasing limit levels for this classification. I chose to
use the Australian levels but French levels are relatively similar. SAGE-Thau
(2015, pp.141-143) provides information about French legal levels.
Users that need the best water quality are oyster farmers (or shellfish grow-
ers more generally). It is forbidden to harvest and sell oysters when E. coli
are more than 14 cfu/100 mL. The second most demanding activity is pri-
mary usage (swimming) which is forbidden when E. coli levels are higher than
150 cfu/100 mL. The last one is secondary usage (fishing) that is forbidden
1I consider here water as an environmental element. Water going to estuaries may be
pumped for diverse activities and is thus rival.
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when levels are higher than 1000 cfu/100 mL (NSWDEC, 2005). These figures
show clearly that if the water is of a good enough quality to ensure selling of
shellfish, then its quality is good enough for all other usages. Shellfish farmers
are those who are the most impacted by variations in water quality. Shellfish
growers, fishermen, swimmers, surfers and other leisure users are the main
direct users of estuaries, in the sense that they are those who are in direct
contact with water. Another type of usage that is independent from water
quality is trade. Trade boats use the water of estuaries as a link between the
sea and the hinterland. Many of the big cities in the world are located near es-
tuaries (e.g. New York, Sydney, Cairo, Dacca, Sao Paolo) and contain harbors
that are used for trade (Day et al., 2013b). Apart from these major examples,
estuaries are often surrounded by cities.
The evocation of cities lead to unveil other kinds of less direct links be-
tween humans and estuaries. Cities extract water from some source and reject,
usually after treatment, water that can end up in estuaries. In this sense, all
inhabitants of coastal catchments with an estuary as exit point can be consid-
ered as users of estuaries. The other actors that have an impact on estuaries
are farmers as discussed in Section 7.1.3, mostly by spreading fertilizers that
run-off in the water, by extracting water for irrigation or through cattle chew-
ing coastal natural systems such as mangroves and producing manure that end
up in the estuary (Gietzelt et al., 2014).
Those different types of users lead to diverse interconnected effects, positive
or negative. Figure 7.3, adapted from Mongruel et al. (2013), shows some of
these using effects of microbiology variations. For instance, cities eﬄuents and
agricultural fertilizers can increase microbiological density in the water and
provide important amounts of primary food that fuels estuarine food webs.
Tourist use of estuaries is correlated with an increase of pressure on leisure
uses: an increasing demand of marinas, space for boating or surfing as well as
fresh fish and shellfishes. These two examples show that a compromise needs to
be found between these uses. To reveal this need for balance, a complex vision,
intertwining climate, chemistry, biology, infrastructures, policies, the economy
such as the one provided in Figure 7.3 or the SES framework is required.
7.1.5 Catchment and estuaries in short
Estuaries and catchments are related systems: estuaries are nested in a catch-
ment area. Estuaries have long been used by humans and are highly productive
systems. Some of these uses require high levels of water quality (in terms of
levels of some elements in the water for a specific use), other uses are linked
in an indirect manner. Aquaculture is the most demanding activity on estu-
aries regarding water quality. This is a reason for choosing this activity as
an emblematic usage of estuaries. Thus, we need now to dig deeper into oys-
ter farming. But to understand oyster farming, we first need to understand
oysters.
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Figure 7.3: Some of the influences in microbiological levels variations. I added a
feedback from shellfish farming to microbiological contamination since oysters
filter microbiological for food (Adapted from Mongruel et al., 2013).
7.2 Oysters
Humans extract two main types of food from estuaries: shellfish and fish (nek-
ton). These species belong to a complex food web that was evoked in Sec-
tion 7.1. Their abundance depend on other elements that are influenced by
climate and by human activities. Oysters, and more generally, molluscas can
be considered as bioindicator species.
7.2.1 Biology of oysters
Oysters are part of the benthic fauna and have been consumed by humans
for millenniums (Wilson and Fleeger, 2014). Oysters are tolerant to salinity
variations and can survive and grow in water containing from 5 to 42 practical
salinity units (1 psu is 1 g of salt per kg of water and sea water is at 34 psu on
average). They are located in the tide range of the estuary, on an oyster reef, or
bed. They are a suspensivore species, or filter feeders, which means that they
extract their food from the material suspended in the water column, including
phytoplankton and zooplankton, as well as any other material in suspension
(Wilson and Fleeger, 2014). This food can be considered a Common-pool
resource (CPR) to oyster farmers since it is non excludable and substractable.
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Table 7.1: Oysters as resource units. I removed RU4 - Economic value since
it depends on location.
† These variables are those proposed in Table 3.6, p.40.
Code Variable Value
RU1 Resource Units Mobility None - Except with handling
RU2 Growth or replacement
rate
Pacific oysters - 2 years for triploids,
3 to 4 years for diploids
RU3 Interaction among RU No direct interaction, share phyto-
plantkon
RU5 Number of units Millions
RU6 Distinctive characteristics None - Located on private leases, thus
easily recognizable
RU7 Spatial and temporal dis-
tribution
Fixed (cf. RU1) - On private leases
RU8 - Threats to resource units† (Chapter 9)
RU8a† Biological Microbiology, algal blooms, virus, sea
bream
RU8b† Human-related Microbiological peaks (tourism,
cities)
Oysters can live for several decades. Males release sperm and females eggs
into water. Eggs are fertilized and produce spat that are moved by currents
before they land on an oyster bed to fix on for the rest of their monotonous lives
that they spend under the rhythm of the tides, filtering water. Table 7.1 gives
the Resource Units variables for oysters using variables proposed in Table 3.6,
p.40. These variables are similar for oyster farming around the world.
7.2.2 Ecology of oysters
Oysters have been recognized as having a positive influence on estuarine ecosys-
tems (Newell, 2004; Shumway, 2011). As a filter feeder species, they extract
particles from the water column, limiting turbidity and providing space for
important benthic plants such as seagrasses. Oysters filter an estimated 0.5 to
1 ML of estuarine water during their lives, removing phytoplankton and other
suspended material (White, 2001).
In Shellfish aquaculture and the environment (Shumway, 2011), the authors
explore several positive effects of oyster farming and aquaculture on the en-
vironment. “Most shellfish aquaculture is thought to have an overall positive
effect on water quality, primary production, and biodiversity, except, as men-
tioned, for intensive culture in localized, poorly flushed waters” (Shumway,
2011, pp.195-196). Specifically, shellfish can be added in eutrophied estuaries
to be used as filters, allowing for instance light to reach deeper waters.
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7.2.3 Oysters as bioindicators
When actors try to evaluate the environmental efficiency of some policies, or
rules, or infrastructures, they face an issue due to the complexity of topics
such as conservation of ecological diversity. A recurrent strategy is to define
indicator species, “a subset of attributes that could serve as surrogates for
total biodiversity and be used as indicators to monitor the success or failure
of management practices to sustain biodiversity” (Lindenmayer et al., 2000,
p.942). There are several types of bioindicators that need to be carefully
chosen. The typology that I use in this Section it exposed in Lindenmayer
et al. (2000). In the light of complexity, the idea of erecting a single species as
indicator for all biodiversity seems dubious (Lindenmayer et al. (2000) discuss
this idea focusing on failures), as much as projecting all human behavior on the
single scale of money (or the more esoteric notion of utility). Some authors
tried to go beyond selecting a single species by using a list of species (that
comes with more difficulties) or by involving complexity using structure-based
biodiversity indicators. However, this strategy can be useful in some cases.
For instance, the presence of a specific type of plant is an indicator (a proxy)
of some kind of soil, or the presence of some types of nutrients or pollutants
e.g. the presence of an algal bloom reveals a high inflow of nutrients (type 5
indicator).
Oysters have long been known to accumulate metals and have been used
as an indicator for metal concentrations in estuaries in Hong-Kong Waters
(Phillips and Yim, 1981) or in the Gulf of Mexico (Rosas et al., 1983). In this
case, they are type 3 indicators: a species whose presence indicates human-
created abiotic conditions such as air or water pollution (Lindenmayer et al.,
2000). Oysters have been shown to be efficient type 5 bioindicators of nitro-
gen sources (Fertig et al., 2010) or to isolate poultry farming impacts (Fertig
et al., 2014) and even as a multi-bioindicator in a study where a local oyster
was “selected to evaluate the health status of three estuarine areas impacted by
anthropogenic activities along the Brazilian coast” (Valdez Domingos et al.,
2007, p.350). In the introduction of this study, the reader can find several
examples of the use of bivalves (including oysters) as biomonitors for contam-
inants or toxins for instance. In a study for the Australian public authorities
dedicated to the safeguarding of environment conditions for oyster cultivation,
White (2001, p.14) suggests oysters as a bioindicator of estuarine good health,
a means to support the industry. Type 3 and 5 (among others) are proposed
as indicators of abiotic conditions and/or changes in ecological processes.
Thus, oysters have a major effect on estuarine ecology, by filtering water
or limiting turbidity and have been shown to be a useful bioindicator species,
alongside with other types of bivalves. Now let us turn to the relation between
oysters and humans, through oyster farming.
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Figure 7.4: Archetypal overview of the breeding cycle of Crassostrea gigas in
the Bay of Bourgneuf, France (Tissot et al., 2012). Growing speed vary with
estuaries and figures should be taken with care.
7.3 Oyster farming
7.3.1 Practices
Here, I describe briefly the general process that farmers have adopted to grow
oysters. This process is explained in more detail by going through different
growing techniques used around the world in FAO (2001). Tissot et al. (2012)
represented a whole breeding cycle of Pacific Oyster Crassostrea Gigas (PO)
in the Bay of Bourgneuf, France (Figure 7.4). In this section, I will refer to
the stages of this figure.
Oyster farmers have several techniques to produce oysters. To find spat
(the spat collecting stage), they can use natural catchment or buy them in
hatcheries if available. Hatcheries provide several forms of oysters, mostly
the PO, which represented 97.4% of world production of oysters in 20052,
available under two types: the sterile triploid (which can only be obtained
2http://en.aquaculture.ifremer.fr/World-statistics/
Molluscan-Shellfish-farming/Production-per-family/Ostreidae
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from hatcheries (Guo et al., 1996)) and the diploid (the natural ploidy of
oysters).
Once bought or caught, the semi-farming stage starts. The spat is put
in growing baskets, racks, bags, or other types of material for them to grow.
At this stage, oysters have grown and need to be replaced in other types
of baskets or suspended on chords and attached with concrete until they big
enough. At that point, they go through the fattening stage. The growth length
is described for the diploid PO. Triploids grow faster than diploids since they
do not need energy for reproduction (Guo et al., 1996). The months figures
are given as an approximation. Different estuaries have different nutrient loads
and nutrients availability affect oyster growth (see model in Gangnery et al.,
2003). It is common for oyster farmers to be specialized in a specific stage of
the growth, benefiting from the appropriate conditions of the estuary they have
their leases in. These oysters are moved according to properties of estuaries
to optimize their growth. They carry along water, bacterias, and viruses.
They are sometimes called “highway oysters” (interview with oyster farmer,
November 2014).
7.3.2 On the difficulties to farm oysters
Oyster farming is an activity similar to farming in the sense that farmers grow
oysters that are placed on a table, grow and are harvested to be sold. Instead
of farming a plot of land, oyster growers use a plot of water (the first few meters
under water) to grow oysters. However, land-based farming takes place in a
land that can be enriched (using fertilizers) and from which pests and other
types of threats can (sometimes) be managed using pesticides or fungicides,
with consequences for the soil and for the surroundings (such as soil death,
water pollution, or algal blooms). These solutions, even though at the origin
of externalities, enable a farmer to cope with threats linked to the crop the
farmer wants to grow: for these issues, farmers can exclude themselves from
the threat, whether it is internal or not.
Even though there are effects of growing techniques (Girard et al., 2010),
oysters growers mostly depend on local estuarine and catchment ecology, with
their associated practices for farming or for water treatment (Mongruel et al.,
2013). Options available to land farmers are (almost) not available to an
oyster farmer. This unavailability provides substantial sparings in inputs, but
it makes oyster farmers quite helpless when issues arise. There would be no
point in trying to feed one’s oysters since food would be taken away by the
water flow. Sea bream eat baby oysters (in the Thau Lagoon), but oyster
farmers cannot use pesticides to deal with this threat (though they can ally
with fishermen). Collective solutions are required to deal with those threats
which are generally not excludable.
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Table 7.2: Estuary or catchment? Consequences on the analysis of the SES
for a selection of variables.
† Since the situation is here abstract, I indicate categories of actors instead of a
number.
Variable (Table B.1) Estuarine level Catchment level
RS1 - Sector Oyster farming, fishing,
leisure
Same + Cities, farmers
RS2 - Clarity of sys-
tem boundaries
Clear but important in
and out flows (Figure 7.1)
Clear from the point of
view of hydrology, does
not necessarily fit with po-
litical organization
RS3 - Size of resource
system
Size of the estuary Size of the catchment
(larger)
RS4 - Human con-
structed facilities
Oyster leases and sheds,
harbors, coastal housing
Same + Cities, farms ...
RS5 - Productivity of
system
Oysters, fish, amenities Same + agricultural prod-
ucts
A1 - (Number of†)
relevant actors
Oyster farmers, fishermen Same + farmers, water
management authorities
A8 - Importance of
resource (water)
Fundamental Important
ECO2 - Pollution
patterns
Most pollution comes from
catchment
Mostly internal
ECO3 - Flows into
and out of focal SES
Water flows come from
catchment and sea
Mostly internal with ex-
changes with sea
7.4 The SES as a choice
When one describes a SES, one needs to define the boundaries of the resource
system. As explained in Chapter 5, in the cases that I am studying in this
thesis, I use oyster farming as a key profession and the way information sharing
can help to deal with threats linked to oyster farming and more generally water.
While studying oyster farming, it could be tempting to limit the scope of
the resource system to estuaries, where oyster farming actually occurs (if we
exclude buying spat, moving oysters between estuaries and selling in markets).
This would be a relevant choice and would limit the geographical areas to the
one used by oyster growers. It depends on the question that we are trying to
address. If we are focusing on a virus that affects only oysters, then this choice
makes sense (Chapter 9).
However, if this choice is made, important flows would be external and
difficult to integrate in the analysis: water flows (Figure 7.1), microbiological
flows (Figure 7.3), or nutrients flows (Section 7.1.3) among others. Taking
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into account the importance of these flows, be them assets for oyster growth
(nutrients) or threats (microbiology) for human consumption, prompt the an-
alyst to enlarge the scope of the SES to catchment basins. Table 7.2 gives
consequences for the analysis on a selection of SES variables.
This distinction is important for the analyst and probably even more for
actors. If an oyster farmer limits his views solely on the estuary, then it would
be quite difficult for the farmer to consider ways to deal with threats that (s)he
has to face (Chapter 9). The actors would be stuck in a downstream situation
(Figure 7.1 shows this upstream (catchment minus estuary) downstream (es-
tuary) situation), where the upstream actors provoke strong physical influence
and not much can be done (Section 2.2).
Choosing catchments is of course more inclusive and allows a larger view
of the situation. However this comes with limits as well. When trying to grasp
catchments as a hole, one has to struggle to know what to include, what not
to include. When one chooses to consider a whole catchment as a SES, other
choices open up. For instance, should relevant actors (A1) include the whole
population of the catchment as well as tourists since they have an influence
on water and on the local economy, for instance by eating oysters? Should
they only be limited to those that have a specific impact (including those who
have improper water treatment systems and live by the river)? Should they
be limited to professional actors (including public authorities)? This type of
questions and choices extend to several other variables.
Those thoughts could lead the reader to think that it is impossible to
make definite choices. That may be the case but there are things that can be
asserted with more certainty. Whatever the choice an analyst or a (group of)
actor(s) makes between catchment and estuaries, these are the two possible
relevant levels. A smaller system (such as for instance limiting the size of
the resource system to oyster leases) would not make much sense since we
are trying to tackle issues related to water, which flows freely in estuaries. If
oyster growers are interested in water quality, they cannot limit themselves
to leases or it would be a dead-end (but showing publicly that these are well
taken care of could be a useful strategy, see Chapter 10). A larger system than
the catchment could lead to two different directions that follow a political path
(a political region that encompasses the catchment) or a physical one (such
as a larger catchment basin). The latter could be tempting if the catchment
basin was a subcatchment of a bigger river but we are dealing with coastal
catchments exiting in estuaries. The former would induce to include even
more elements than those listed at the catchment level and limit the ability to
use the diagnosis. Complexity would be too important for the analysis to be
clear and understandable. Table 7.3 shows consequences of system size choice
for the resource and for actors.
It is important to remind that many choices are linked to the definition
of systems. The example of the choice between catchment and estuaries illus-
trates this idea.
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Table 7.3: Consequences on actors and resource of system size. Systems are
nested.
System size Actors Water management
Oyster farm Single Impossible
Estuary Oyster farmers, fishermen Limited, mostly monitoring
Catchment area Numerous and diverse Hydrologically coherent
Larger Too many Too wide
7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I described estuaries and catchment basins. Oyster farmers
use estuaries daily for their professional activities since their leases are located
on such areas. Oyster farmers belong to catchment areas that exit in those
estuaries. The catchment is an important source of water for the estuary and
its quality is linked to water flows and practices from the catchment.
As suggested by the SES framework, to understand such a system, one
needs to investigate several characteristics of the system that transcend disci-
plinary boundaries. Thus, I delved into the ecology of estuaries, and of oysters
as a species that has an influence on their environment. Their influence is the
one of an indicator species that has an action on nutrient levels, on turbidity,
on microbiology, among others. Then, I described how oysters are grown when
farmed.
These general elements provide a context that links both French and Aus-
tralian cases and that could probably be applied to oyster farming around the
world. In the next chapter, I describe more precisely the two cases, focusing on
institutional elements as well as on information sharing systems. In Chapter 9,
I frame oyster farming questions using the goods and threats typologies.
Chapter 8
Two Cases - SES Analysis
This chapter is a follow up of the previous one that described the general
ecology of oyster farming. I present in detail the cases that I investigated: the
Thau Lagoon and several estuaries in NSW. Using the material, I complete
the SES analysis started in Chapter 7. For now, I insist mostly on variables
that are useful locally whereas interaction, outcome and threat variables that
will be addressed in Chapter 9. The use of the SES framework allows thorough
description of the cases.
Describing local contexts is important to understand more precisely the
situation the actors interact with daily. SES variables content for the two
cases are given in Table 8.3. First, for both cases, I describe global settings
such as history, geography, politics and institutional context, and then the
information sharing artifacts that I studied. The first case that I delve into is
the NSW one, then I detail the Thau Lagoon case.
8.1 New South Wales, Australia
8.1.1 History, economy, geography
Schrobback (2015) provides an up-to-date synthesis of the Sydney Rock Oyster
Saccostrea Glomerata (SRO) history and economic importance in Australia.
Oysters, and especially the native SRO, have been eaten by aboriginal com-
munities for thousands of years (A3)1 (White, 2001). Oyster farming is the
oldest aquaculture industry in Australia and in NSW, starting around 1870
(NSWDPI, 2013). This type of aquaculture is the fourth largest aquaculture
industry in Australia: in NSW it has been generating AUD33 million direct in-
come for 318 license holders employing 1600 people (OISAS, 2014). The num-
ber of oyster farmers range from 3 to 30 depending on estuaries (A1). They
1These codes are the variables codes in the SES framework, which can be found in
Table B.1, p.260. The elements detailed in the following two sections are summarized in
Table 8.3.
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are usually organized in small to medium familial businesses (A2) (Schrobback
et al., 2014) and live close to the estuary they work in (A4). In 2013, 2,979 tons
of oysters were commercialized (RS5) (NSWDPI, 2014).
In NSW, oysters are produced in 32 estuaries, shown in Figure 8.1. These
estuaries are under growing urban pressure and competing usage by numer-
ous types of users (S2). This situation is variable and demographic pressure
is less important in Wonboyn River where the catchment (335.4 km2 for a
5.6 km2 estuary) hosts a single village of around 150 people than in the Lower
Hawkesbury, with thousands of people living in this 21,624.1 km2 catchment
that contains a 114.5 km2 estuary (GS3*). Issues are clearly different as well.
There are 44 estuaries2 bigger than 5 km2 in NSW, and oysters are cultivated
in most of the biggest estuaries in NSW: 26 out of these 44. (RS3) The biggest
one is Port Stephens with a 134.4 km2 estuary in a 296.8 km2 catchment and
the smallest is Nelson Lagoon with a 1.3 km2 estuary in a 27 km2 catchment.
Sydney is located on the Georges River. From this point, two main regions are
defined: the South Coast down to Wonboyn River and the North Coast, up
to the Tweed River. These two extremes are distant by 1,400 km, and their
climate are quite different, from temperate in Wonboyn to tropical in Tweed.
Water quality is assessed with E. coli rates in the water. Depending on the
level of E. coli found all year around in an estuary, harvest areas are classified
in several levels. These levels are adjusted every year (Regulation and Code,
2010, p.14):
Approved harvest areas: growers are allowed to harvest and sell
oysters directly from the harvest area except in adverse conditions
(heavy rain evens...) – not exceeding 14 cfu/100mL. Restricted
harvest areas: growers are allowed to sell oysters after oysters
are depurated in UV-treated water for 36 hours – not exceeding
70 cfu/100mL.
Approved harvest areas are the optimal estuary condition to manage oyster
production, as growers do not need to take depuration time into consideration
prior to market.
The oyster produced is overwhelmingly the native SRO. In 2012/13, the
production of SRO generated $31,844,593, while the PO generated a mere
$255,213 (NSWDPI, 2014), a value that has declined because of the Ostreid
herpes virus (OsHV-1). This is linked to PO being considered as a noxious
species in NSW. Oyster farmers are asked to remove this species whenever
they see it in their estuary. This species is not considered noxious as it has
been naturalized in Tasmania or in Victoria. Growing triploid PO is legal
in 7 estuaries, and diploids can be legally grown in only one estuary (Port
Stephens). Flat oyster Ostrea Angasi cultivation is anecdotal and gaining
importance due to the herpes virus.
2http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/estuaries/list.htm
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Figure 8.1: Major oyster producing estuaries in NSW (OISAS, 2014).
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Figure 8.2: Oyster production levels in NSW (OISAS, 2014, p.6).
Husbandry practices differ from place to place. Several hatcheries exist
that produce both SROs and POs be it from nurseries stock or from natural
catchment. This business generated $1,823,071 in 2012/13 (NSWDPI, 2014).
Some oyster farmers buy their stock from these hatcheries, some catch their
own oysters, some do both. Important hatcheries are located in Tasmania,
Port Stephens and South Australia. Production methods differ, ranging from
manual handling to mechanized processes. Cultivation can occur in a single
place or be optimized by relocating oysters into estuaries with favorable prop-
erties at specific period of their lives. Viruses and other bacterias travel along
with those oysters. Depending on their location, different markets are reached.
The local one, Sydney, Brisbane for the North estuaries and even abroad.
Oyster farming production reached a peak in 1976/77 with 9,375 tons of
oysters, and has followed a steady decline path ever since. Figure 8.2 shows
the production trends of oysters in NSW from 1938/39 to 2011/12. This trend
is explained in OISAS (2014, p.6):
This has been attributed to many factors including supply-side
factors such as oyster disease, the effects of PO introduction and
the degradation of water quality in many coastal rivers, estuaries
and lakes.
Some of the estuaries that used to be the biggest producers have been al-
most entirely wiped out by such disease outbreaks, like Georges River, in Syd-
ney harbor (from 2,566 tons in 1971/72 to almost 0 in 2014), or the Hawkesbury
River (from 1,328 tons in 1969/70 to 285 in 2011/12) (OISAS, 2014).
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8.1.2 Settings and institutions
8.1.2.1 Political settings and public institutions
(S1-S3-GS4*) Australia is a developed stable federal constitutional parliamen-
tary democracy. Most of its population is located along the Ocean, especially
in estuaries. As is in the United States, each state of the federation has impor-
tant powers and is relatively independent from the others. There are six states,
three federal territories and seven external territories. In this document, we
will focus on NSW, one of the mainland states, since it is the location of the
studied estuaries. NSW is divided into areas ruled by local councils. Some of
these councils are gathered in institutions called Local Land Services (LLS)3
that replace former Catchment Management Authorities. There are 11 LLSs
in NSW, with four of them along the coast (North Coast, Hunter, Greater
Sydney and South East). LLSs are in charge of dealing with land matters
such as developments, trainings, and communication with local communities.
These nested organizations have defined responsibilities regarding environmen-
tal management. Some LLSs have been very active and supportive of oyster
farming activities and developments such as South East LLS (Gietzelt et al.,
2014), others have been less and are trying to catch up, as demonstrated in
the workshop that I attended in Sydney (Section 5.2.2).
Apart from these institutions, oyster farmers have to deal with specific ones
(GS1*):
New South Wales Department of Primary Industries (NSW DPI) “A
division within NSW Trade & Investment and works to develop and
sustain diverse, profitable food and fibre industries, and ensures best
practice management of our natural resources” and more specifically for
fisheries, it “develops, shares and protects the State’s fisheries resources
through fisheries management, science and research, sustainable aqua-
culture development, habitat protection and regulation.”4
NSW Food Authority A division of NSW DPI that ensures that food is
safe, “from production grassroots to retail” [Interview with Shellfish pro-
gram manager, 2014]. This authority is responsible for temporary clo-
sure of estuaries when necessary. Moreover, the NSW Food Authority
has developed a plan called th Oyster Industry Sustainable Aquaculture
Strategy (OISAS) which has been used in this chapter and is presented
in Section 8.1.3.1 (OISAS, 2006, 2014). They set best practice standards,
and finance projects for or related to oyster farming. They make offi-
cial maps of priority oyster and shellfish aquaculture areas, such as in
Figure 8.3.
Within the Food Authority, oyster farmers participate in a program:
3http://www.lls.nsw.gov.au/about-lls/what-we-do
4http://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/aboutus
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Hawkesbury River
NSW Oyster Industry Sustainable Aquaculture Strategy 2014
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Figure 8.3: Lower Hawkesbury - Example of location of oyster leases and sheds,
with property-right systems (RS9-GS7*)
NSW Shellfish Quality Assurance Program A section of the Food Au-
thority dedicated to shellfish management, among which oysters. Ac-
cording to its manager that I had the opportunity to interview in Novem-
ber 2014 (all quotations in this paragraph come from this interview), they
develop, in collaboration with oyster farmers, monitoring programs for
the industry, sampling plans and local shellfish programs called Qual-
ity Assurance Programs (QAP) (see below). The local programs are
half funded by oyster farmers in order to involve them. The program is
well accepted by local oyster farmers since the manager spent two years
mostly on the field (“I’ve been there since 2006, and for 2 years, I went
to the farms, wearing my boots, jump in the water with them. I think
they hadn’t seen that before. Like ’what is he doing in the mud?’. Talk-
ing to them, asking them questions, try to break down the barriers.”),
building relationships with them, getting to know personally an impor-
tant share of oyster growers, and especially building relationships with
a group he can contact when he would like to implement a project or
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a regulation. This narrative has been confirmed in several interviews
with oyster farmers who said that relations with authorities have been
much better in the last ten years. He says that in the end, “regulators
and industry need some separation, but at the same time, government
and industry want the same thing: they want a productive industry that
creates jobs, economic activity and obtain a safe product. Industry does
not want to make people sick. Government wants to help industry. They
all want the same thing.”
Finally, a boundary-organization is of importance in the investigation.
OceanWatch This national non-for-profit environmental organization5 emerged
from the fishing industry. I interviewed the manager of the Environ-
mental Management System (EMS) program, an OceanWatch initiative.
OceanWatch was initiated by a Sydney fishermen in 1989 who was wor-
ried about poor water quality. Their “work focuses on finding practical
solutions to environmental problems that affect our coastal environments
and estuaries. [They] also help commercial fishers take up new technolo-
gies and improved practices for a sustainable seafood industry.” They
are in strong connection with farmers and public institutions, helping to
bridge a gap between these actors. The main work done regarding oyster
farming is helping to build EMSs. They were also the organizers of the
workshop I attended in Sydney (see Section 5.2.2).
8.1.2.2 Oyster farming institutions
An oyster farmer in estuaries can belong to several professional organizations
adding to public institutions. Some are strictly for local and internal regu-
lations and monitoring, others are more linked to lobbying, or to marketing.
Here is a list of the relevant organizations I am aware of. For the local level,
there may be little differences, but there would be no point in listing all exist-
ing local organizations. None of these institutions are compulsory for oyster
farmers, except for the first one (GS5*-I6-I7).
Annual general meeting Every year, oyster farmers are compelled to or-
ganize a meeting in each estuary, elect a committee that organizes the
QAP and decides over annual levees for monitoring and testing. It is the
local counterpart of QAPs.
Sapphire Coast Wilderness Oysters (SCWO) This association6, founded
in 2011, emphasizes the role of oyster farmers as environment sentinels:
they are everyday on the water and heavily depend on water quality. It
5http://www.oceanwatch.org.au/
6http://www.sapphirecoastwildernessoysters.org.au/
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Table 8.1: Quality Assurance Program monitoring rules in NSW. All estuaries
have more or less the same requirements with a variation on the number of
testing sites depending on estuary size.
Seafood busi-
ness section
Product to be
tested
Variable to be
quantified
Limit Frequency of
testing
Oyster grower Cultivated oys-
ter (in oyster
lease)
Escherichia coli <2.3 E.coli/g
(direct harvest)
<10 E.coli/g
(restricted
harvest)
After an event
i.e. rainfall, sewer
pollution, peak
holidays (direct
harvest areas)
Every month
(restricted harvest)
Oyster grower Water from oys-
ter harvest area
(in lease)
Faecal coliforms 14 cfu/100 mL
(direct harvest)
70 cfu/100 mL
(restricted)
As per above
Oyster grower Phytoplankton
(from waters
close to harvest
areas)
Harmful algal
species
As per Phyto-
plankton action
limit included
in the Biotoxin
manual
Fortnight or during
algal bloom
Oyster grower Cultivated oys-
ter (in oyster
lease)
Paralytic, di-
arrhetic and
amnesic shell-
fish; Poisoning
toxins (PSP,
DSP, ASP)
Presence of
biotoxins
Fortnight if phyto-
plankton testing re-
sults positive
NSW food au-
thority and oys-
ter grower
Cultivated oys-
ter (in oyster
lease)
Heavy metals
(arsenic, cad-
mium, lead,
mercury...)
As per Aus-
tralian stan-
dards
Every 5 years
Seafood proces-
sor offering
Opened oysters Escherichia coli < 2.3/g Every 20 batches
ready-to-eat
oysters
Packed oysters Escherichia coli < 2.3/g Every 20 batches
Cooked
/smoked oysters
Listeria mono-
cytogenes
Not detected in
1 g
Every 10 batches
All oyster pro-
cessors
Non-reticulated
water used in
connection with
the production
and processing
of oysters
Escherichia coli Not detected in
100 mL
Not treated - every
month / Treated -
every 6 months
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is dimensioned at the size of the local council of the Bega Valley Shire,
encompassing estuaries from Wapengo to Wonboyn, in the South of the
South Coast. Adhesion is voluntary and 19 oyster farmers across the
four estuaries were members when this document was written. This as-
sociation puts forward EMSs as an important element to legitimize their
action and lobbying. Adding to this emphasis on environment, it acts as
a marketing association, representing oyster farmers in local events such
as fairs, and creating a quality brand for customers.
QAP (GS5*-I9) This program is designed as a monitoring program. There
is one QAP per estuary. “This is a mandatory industry funded program
designed to ensure that oysters are only harvested under strict water
quality and product guidelines that seek to ensure that public health and
high industry standards are observed and promoted.”7 The program is
actually funded half by oyster farmers and half by NSW DPI. Monitoring
is done on meat and on water (Table 8.1). Half of the funding comes
from public resources since monitoring water is of public benefit for other
uses as well [Interview with oyster farmer, 2014]. In the Hawkesbury
River, the program costs AUD 40,000 to AUD 45,000, depending on
rainfall events, to oyster farmers every year. This amounts to sampling
2 phytoplankton sites, 15 water sites and 12 oyster sampling sites at the
frequency mentioned in Table 8.1.
Australia’s Oyster Coast (AOC) This association8 exists along the South
Coast, has been founded in 2012 and gathers 45 growers across 8 estu-
aries. It is oriented towards marketing, mostly based on environmental
excellence, and export. Local tourism development around oyster eating
is also in the scope of the association through the creation of programs
such as the oyster trail.
NSW Farmers This association9 is the main farming lobby in NSW. It fea-
tures an Oyster Committee of 8 oyster farmers. They support the OISAS
and the EMSs, and advocate different projects for oyster farming such
as creating “a legislative framework which meets the needs of the oyster
industry” (OceanWatch, 2014). Many projects regarding oyster farming
as a whole are advocated by this association. At catchment levels, oyster
farmers may be at odds with land farmers, but apparently, no such issues
exist within the association [Interview with an oyster farmer member of
the Oyster Committee, 2014].
7http://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/fisheries/aquaculture/publications/oysters/
industry/oyster-industry-in-nsw
8http://australiasoystercoast.com/
9http://www.nswfarmers.org.au/advocacy/livestock/oysters (membership is re-
quired for access)
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Figure 8.4: AOC and SWOC logos
8.1.3 Studied information sharing artifacts
(I2) In this section, I describe the artifacts that I studied with a particular
emphasis. These artifacts that are not so common in Natural Resources Man-
agement (NRM). The NSW DPI produces many different documents, aggre-
gating information about production (NSWDPI, 2014), or about monitoring
(NSWFA, 2014), among many others10. Amid these documents, the one that
seemed the most interesting is the Oyster Industry Sustainable Aquaculture
Strategy (OISAS), which is described in the following section. Another kind
of information sharing artifact that was often cited during the interviews was
the EMS, developed by the oyster industry.
8.1.3.1 Oyster Industry Sustainable Aquaculture Strategy
The OISAS11 is a publicly available document that was first written in OISAS
(2006) and updated in OISAS (2014). I interviewed the writer of this artifact,
Tim Gippel, and in this section, quotations are from him. According to him,
the need for such an artifact “came out because it was recognized that the
industry was under a lot of pressure from increasing development on the coast
and for the impact it was having on water quality, particularly the impact
it had on sanitary water quality”. It was mainly written by the government.
Once written, the authors asked oyster farmers to provide some feedback while
explaining to them the goal of the document.
This document has had a different level of success among the growers, rang-
ing from “never heard of it” to “I know whole parts of it by heart”. According to
the author, it had another impact they did not predict, on the general public,
who can read a well-structured document on what the industry does and how.
This has the advantage of limiting complaints and making easier investment
requests.
10http://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/fisheries/aquaculture/publications/oysters
11http://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/fisheries/aquaculture/publications/oysters/
industry/industry-strategy
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The document is a self-constraining document for the government and local
councils since oyster farmers can go and cite passages which are legally bound-
ing. As the author says: “there has been a great deal of partnership that have
grown between oyster farmers and councils”. This is the only document of this
kind he is aware of, it does not exist in other states (“they would like to have
one”) and it is the only industry who has it (“the chicken industry came and
look at this saying they would like something like this”). “It is unique”.
It is structured as follows. First a vision statement announces the general
view on the future of the oyster industry, emphasizing on sustainable develop-
ment and links with environment. Then the industry is described, even though,
much more is left to learn about the oyster industry in NSW: a project is to
be launched in 2016 to study socio-economic features of this industry, adding
to the work recently done in Schrobback (2015) PhD thesis. Then require-
ment and description of goals for healthy oysters and estuaries, water quality
protection, aquaculture areas, environmentally sustainable practices and best
practices are described. The document ends with a risk assessment.
8.1.3.2 Environmental management systems
Usually, EMSs are documents “part of the global management system which
includes the organizational structure of the business, the planning activities to
sustain the industry the responsibilities, the practices, the procedures, the pro-
cesses and the resources necessary for development, implementation, achieve-
ment, evaluation and sustentation of the environment policy” (Cotoc et al.,
2013, p.1317). They help to “protect valuable environmental assets, man-
age local areas on the most suitable way and develop relationships between
people and the natural environment” (Mangra et al., 2014, p.1). They are
organization-oriented: “an EMS has the primary purpose of preventing nega-
tive effects on the environment and improving a firm’s environmental practices”
(Massoud et al., 2011, p.6). EMSs can be taken to meet a certification standard
or can be left as codes of practice. Two standards for certification exist: the
ISO 14001 international standard and the CE regulation 1221/2009n environ-
ment and audit management (Cotoc et al., 2013). Literature shows that EMS
implementation has positive outcomes for clients, costs (sparing unnecessary
waste) and image (Massoud et al., 2011; Psomas et al., 2011; Ronnenberg et al.,
2011; Cotoc et al., 2013), that several strategies can be followed (Nishitani,
2010) and that small businesses have many more difficulties in EMS imple-
mentation, despite achieving positive outcomes (Hillary, 2004; Collins et al.,
2007; Zorpas, 2010).
(I6-I7-I8-I9-I10-01-03-ECO2-ECO3) Within the NSW industry, EMSs have
first been developed in this traditional way: some oyster farmers wrote an EMS
for themselves. According to Andrew Myers, the OceanWatch EMS facilitator
whom I interviewed in November 2014 (quotations in this section are from
him), the first one to implement an EMS in NSW was an oyster farmer in
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Figure 8.5: Front page and internal / external risk matrices of a typical EMS
the Hawkesbury River in 2004, right before the Qx virus hit (Section 9.2.2).
This crisis got the remaining farmers together and they developed the first
estuary-wide EMS in 2005/06. About the same time, an EMS was developed
in the Clyde oyster growers. It was developed with OceanWatch as facilitator
and the local LLS for financial support. After these two first experiences,
the government announced in 2007 that grants would be available for oyster
farmers who would implement an EMS and after 2010, grants were allocated
for the development of estuary-wide EMSs. “Then it snowballed”.
There are two main aspects to EMSs: the first is “looking at how the in-
dustry can improve themselves, within the oyster industry, the other is looking
at what is happening on the catchment that could impact the oyster indus-
try”. In parallel, the government implemented program of grants: the grants
obtained can finance up to 50% of a project and are distributed conditioned
to the existence of EMSs.
As for the OISAS, this kind of estuary-wide documents are unheard of.
There are numerous EMSs created at the farm level, but to my knowledge,
there is no such thing as an industry-wide EMS in other industries.
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Figure 8.6: Picture of oyster farmers in an EMS (EMSTilligerry, 2014)
Structure These documents are all publicly available in a database12. A
complete EMS consists in three main parts. The first and main one is a long
(around 60 pages) document that is filled with information. The second one
is a single page leaflet containing very general information and intended for a
wide audience (Figure 8.7). The last part is a follow-up of the main document
that is planned every two years.
The main documents start with a statement “a voluntary, industry-driven,
environmental initiative” (Figure 8.5) that demonstrates the implication of
growers in the project. The main goals are announced at the beginning: “de-
mystify the industry and explain oyster farming practices”, “highlight the high
risk activities to the local oyster industry”, “improve environmental perfor-
mance of the industry and environmental conditions in [the estuary]” and
“demonstrate that oyster farmers are continually improving their environmen-
tal performance” (EMSWagonga, 2012, preliminaries). There is also a signed
commitment of oyster farmers of the concerned estuary, and often, a picture of
all of them (Figure 8.6). Then, the local environment, estuary and catchment,
as well as practices are described. After this, a detailed risk assessment is
given, divided in two main parts: internal, “risks that arise as a direct result of
oyster farming practices as well as issues of disease” and external, “risks that
arise from other people’s activities, or from natural events such as extreme
weather conditions” (EMSTilligerry, 2014, pp.28-29). For instance, the virus
is considered an internal risk since is it only of concern to oyster farmers. The
relation with the definition of threats given and investigated in this thesis is
obvious and will be detailed in Chapter 9. All the identified risks, which actu-
ally correspond to the definition of threats (Section 3.1.1) by their scope, are
analyzed, a probability of occurrence and resulting harm are associated with it,
defining key consequences and ways to mitigate the threat, in association with
indicators. This document is destined to “oyster farmers and local councils or
12http://www.oceanwatch.org.au/our-work/ems-nsw-oysters/ems-database/
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Figure 8.7: Example of EMS leaflet - Brisbane waters
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very interested random people”. EMSs go into much details for internal risks,
listing up to dogs barking making too much noise for neighbors. As explained
in Chapter 7, oyster farmers act in intrinsically open systems. External issues
are of more importance (see risk matrices of Figure 8.6: rare and insignificant
internal risks are numerous; and almost certain and severe internal risks are
linked to viruses and pests) than internal. This element may be explained by
a willingness to demonstrate how much efforts oyster farmers make, with the
intention of convincing others to make efforts on their side.
The leaflet (Figure 8.7) presents in a very general and accessible way the
main principles of the EMS, such as what the oyster farmers are doing for the
environment and how one can help. These leaflets are available in places like
local tourist information booths, or camping sites. The updates are designed
as follow-up documents where oyster farmers aggregate information to fill the
indicators they defined in the risk assessment matrix. They then use this
document to improve and update the general EMS or add new information
that was previously lacking.
8.1.4 Conclusion - NSW
In this section, I described the general background NSW oyster farmers evolve
in and the information sharing artifacts that they devised. Oyster farming is
present all along the NSW coastline, including the most important estuaries.
Oyster growers have to interact with numerous internal and external institu-
tions. The OISAS and the EMSs are artifacts that are quite versatile and are
often used, both at the internal level for the oyster industry and at the exter-
nal level when there is a need for interaction with other actors (government,
developers, communities). In Chapter 10, I will investigate how growers used
the documents to deal with public threats.
Now let us turn to the Thau Lagoon case which is similar due to the
prevalence of oyster farming in the Lagoon, but which presents important
differences, as pointed out in Section 8.3.
8.2 Thau Lagoon, France
In France, I focused on a single SES: the Thau Lagoon. A recent synthesis of
issues and perspectives for the future of the catchment is available in French in
SAGE-Thau (2015), a comprehensive planning document written by the very
active local public authorities13. A great part of the following information
comes from this document and from reports resulting from projects such as
Abadie et al. (2004). When no reference is indicated for a figure, it comes from
SAGE-Thau (2015).
13Section 8.2.2 argues why this document can be considered as a reference for the catch-
ment area.
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Figure 8.8: Thau catchment area - The blue line is the limit of the local water
management scheme which correspond to the catchment area. The red line is
the limit of the local urban development scheme. Source: http://www.smbt.
fr/espace-carthographique
8.2.1 History, economy, geography
The Thau Lagoon is located in the South of France, on the Mediterranean
coast (RS9). This 7,500 ha lagoon is almost separate from the sea by a narrow
band of land called lido and is not subject to tides (there are almost no tides
in the Mediterranean sea) (RS3). It is located within a catchment of 418 km2
where 126,657 people lived in 2012 creating a strong urban pressure (18.5% of
urbanized areas) which is to be under better control thanks to new development
schemes (S2). In the catchment, there is one main city, Sète, founded in
this location since it was possible to develop a deep water harbor which is
still important in the local economy. Sète is the 11th French harbor with
3,5 million tons of goods traded in 2012 PortSete (2013) and a fishery. The
lagoon is directly accessible through 5 villages (plus Sète) that all have water
access through small harbors to the lagoon. It is crossed by a former important
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trade canal, the canal du Midi (a UNESCO site14) and the canal du Rhône
à Sète, which links the Mediterranean sea and the Atlantic Ocean. Now it is
mostly used for tourism and generates a non negligible revenue for the region.
The Thau Lagoon is used by fishermen, oyster farmers and tourists both
on boats and as bathers. This area is supposed to give priority to fishing and
oyster farming activities and thus to water quality monitoring and improve-
ment (SAGE-Thau, 2015, p.71). (A1) 497 license holders work along the shore
of the Thau Lagoon employing 2,000 people. (A2) 94% of firms have less than
5 full-time workers (including the owner) and even 58% of them employing no
one else (Gervasoni et al., 2011). (A4) The sheds are located in 5 main harbors
(Mèze, Marseillan, Loupian, Sète and Bouzigues) and tables occupy 2,000 ha.
(RS5) They produced 8,200 tons of oysters and 3,500 (plus 2,000 in the sea)
tons of mussels in 2011 that represent 90% of total production in the Mediter-
ranean and 10% of French production, generating e 26.1 million directly and
e 86.7 million including trade (Gervasoni et al., 2011). (A8) 42% of producers
have another activity, mostly (59.5% of them) fishing.
(GS10*-A3) There has been traces of oyster growing back to the Romans
but professional oyster farming started during the 19th century and really
kicked off after 1945 (Giovannoni, 1995). Competing with fishermen, oyster
farmers got increasingly more surface on the lagoon for their tables and oyster
growing reaching 2,000 hectares of oyster leases (RS3). Things were running
smoothly when, in 1975 (and then in 1982, 1983, 1987, 1990, 1997, 2004, 2007),
a very important “malaïgue” (bad water), a destructive anoxic crisis, occurred.
This was the first blatant sign of poor water quality. The lagoon is the main
reception basin of all water coming from catchment, with rain run-off passing
through farms, and towns. Another sign of poor water quality was the ban
of sales in 1989 linked to important E. coli rates in water (Sécolier, 2009).
As shown in Table 8.2, the number of days of closure can be important, up to
113 days in 1999. Because of these events, the grade attributed to the lake is B
(corresponding to restricted harvest area) since 2003 (the best being A) which
forces oyster farmers to depurate their oysters for at least 48 hours in depura-
tion basins before selling them for consumption. The A grade (corresponding
to approved harvesting areas) enables selling directly after harvesting. Results
are getting better thanks to numerous investments such as in water treatment
plants (SAGE-Thau, 2015). This can be seen in Table 8.2: the number of
closures dropped significantly since 2007. An oyster farmer that I interviewed,
formerly researcher at Institut Français de Recherche pour l’Exploitation de
la Mer (Ifremer), was even worried that this treatment would lead to a dead
lagoon with no nutrients whatsoever entering the lagoon since oysters are filter
feeders (Section 7.2). Indeed, water treatments, especially when rain water is
also treated, destined to limit E. Coli rates affect also other elements that are
necessary to life.
14http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/770
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Table 8.2: Closures in days of the Thau Lagoon - The lagoon has been down-
graded in 2007 to B category
Year E. Coli Alexandrium Total
1998 30 22 52
1999 113 0 113
2000 104 0 104
2001 0 28 28
2002 34 19 53
2003 34 0 34
2004 25 0 25
2005 8 0 8
2006 49 0 49
2007 0
2008 12 0 12
2009 0 0 0
2010 0 0 0
2011 54 0 54
2012 12 0 12
2013 0 0 0
2014 29 0 29
2015 0 0 0
Production is oriented towards POs that represent 99% of French produc-
tion (Oden et al., 2011), and a few flat oysters, after a virus decimated the
formerly grown Portuguese oyster, Crassostrea angulata, in the 1970s. There
are no local hatchery: spat is bought and imported from hatcheries or nurs-
eries located along the Atlantic coast. 97% of oyster farmers buy oysters from
hatcheries, 28% only triploid PO (Gervasoni and Ritter, 2014). Attempts of
local natural catchment have started in 2009 and show promising yet unstable
results (Rayssac et al., 2011). Producers are thus dependent on external pro-
duction basins for their activity. Since 2008, POs have been affected by Ostreid
herpesvirus (OsHV-1) (Pernet et al., 2012, 2014) that kills 54% of oysters on
average, with 88% of producers reporting between 25 and 75% mortality rates
(Gervasoni and Ritter, 2014).
(A6) According to several interviews, producers are quite independent from
each other, with limited communication, little or no contacts with others, com-
peting for retail prices. Oyster farmers said that they led their businesses as
they intended and did not need to work with others. An example of this be-
havior was given by an oyster farmer who testified that several attempts of
coordination on retail prices failed because of free-riding: there was always
someone who yielded to sell at lower prices. Network structure is thus quite
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loose, mostly limited to close neighbors (sheds are close by) but the method-
ology used is not sufficient to strongly derive network results (GS9*). When
I introduced the subject of information sharing, an oyster farmer cut me off
saying “Ah ... information sharing ... First, we need to know each other, be-
cause we do not know each other, that is the problem”. Other oyster farmers
answered in the survey that “we should be more able to communicate our prac-
tices with local people” or that “we should broadcast to a more general public
what we do”.
8.2.2 Political setting and structured institutions
(S1-S3-GS4*) France is a constitutional stable and developed democracy with
a tradition of strong state power.
France is part of the European Union which has strong requirements for
water quality, especially through the Water Framework Directive (WFD) (Di-
rective 2000/60/EC).
The WFD introduced in 2000 new and ambitious objectives to
protect and restore aquatic ecosystems as a basis for ensuring the
long term sustainable use of water for people, business and na-
ture. The WFD has incorporated into a legally binding instrument
the key principles of integrated river basin management bringing
together economic and ecological perspectives into water manage-
ment. (WFD, 2012, p.3)
Previously mainly managed by the state, French local authorities became
increasingly more prominent due to decentralization laws (Schmidt, 2007).
There are numerous public organizations that overlap each other or not. This
(very) complex organization can be simplified by saying that there is a central
state, regions, departments, inter-communal authorities, and municipalities.
Those organizations are nested and have different roles. The Thau lagoon, is
located into the Languedoc-Roussillon region, in the Herault department, and
is under the supervision of two inter-communal authorities, one in the North
(Communauté de Communes du Nord du Bassin de Thau - 6 municipalities)
and one in the South (Thau Agglo - 8 municipalities). Those 2 inter-communal
authorities divide the Lagoon in two parts, North and South.
Due to this division and local rivalries, there was a deadlock on develop-
ment schemes after the failure of local organizations that failed to be recog-
nized as legitimate such as Apogée (Maurel, 2012). The State then requested
the creation of a local management structure called the Syndicat Mixte du
Bassin de Thau (SMBT) in 2005, a territorial engineering structure, which
was to be in charge of the development of local development schemes such
as Schéma d’Aménagement et de Gestion des Eaux (SAGE) for water man-
agement (SAGE-Thau, 2015), or Schéma de Cohérence Territoriale (SCOT)
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for land planning. The limits of the SAGE and the SCOT broadly coincide
(Figure 8.8). They correspond to the catchment area of the Thau basin (not
counting underground aquifers). This point enables coherent political decisions
at an adapted scale (Buller, 1996) since spatial (catchment), administrative
(local), institutional (laws, regulations), management (strategies), informa-
tion (between positivism and constructivism) and stakes are logically framed
(Daniell and Barreteau, 2014). This correspondence is not general in France.
An important point for the SMBT is participation of professionals and
general public so as to gather different points of view and interests. Members
of SMBT emphasize participation for the creation process of the documents
described above (SMBT, 2012). To build SCOT, the SMBT organized 12
public meetings paired with a mobile exhibition, numerous meetings with lo-
cal stakeholders, especially fishermen and oyster farmers who are considered
particularly important regarding water management (SMBT, 2012).
(S4) Adding to these local political institutions, oyster farmers have to deal
with specific institutions:
Direction des Affaires Maritimes (marine authority) Depends on the
Ministry of Ecology, sustainable development and energy. It15 is the
authority in charge of security and use of waters. It also helps local
authorities to deal with these matters. For oyster farmers, it deals with
certification and license issues, thefts and pollutions.
Agences de l’eau (water agencies) Those agencies (Rhône-Mediterranean-
Corsica in the case of Thau) are in charge of monitoring pollutions and
contribute to sustainable management of water resources. They write
documents called SDAGEs16 which are the base for writing local SAGEs.
Ifremer This research institute “through its research work and expert advice,
contributes to knowledge of the oceans and their resources, to monitor-
ing of marine and coastal environments and to the sustainable develop-
ment of marine activities. To these ends, Ifremer conceives and oper-
ates tools for observation, experimentation and monitoring, and manage
the oceanographic databases.”17 It is the competent authority to de-
cide over water monitoring, and can decide temporary closures and sell
bans (I9). It has led researches for the oyster industry such as impact
of oyster farming (Deslous-Paoli et al., 1998), socio-economic attributes
(Gervasoni et al., 2011), mortalities (Gervasoni and Ritter, 2014) and is
currently leading research projects for diversification (other shellfishes)
and natural catchment in the Thau basin.
15http://www.dirm.mediterranee.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/
16http://www.eaurmc.fr/le-bassin-rhone-mediterranee/
le-sdage-du-bassin-rhone-mediterranee.html
17http://wwz.ifremer.fr
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Cepralmar This public institute18 created at the regional level has three main
missions extending over the Mediterranean coast (Cepralmar, 2007):
help professionals and industry develop their projects, foster a sustain-
able and integrated management of the coast, facilitate participation and
dialogue between actors (professionals, users, public sector, researchers)
over projects and development. Among their projects lies the “Réseau
de Suivi Lagunaire” (RSL19) which aims at monitoring lagoons along
the Mediterranean coast, specifically regarding euthrophication. This
network is publicly funded.
(I6-I7-I8 ) At national and local levels, oyster farmers have a lobby, to which
they are compelled to be members of, to defend their interests: the Comité
National de la Conchyliculture and the Comité Régional de la Conchylicul-
ture de Méditerranée (CRCM). They lobby for oyster farming role in the
lagoon, against users such as marina developers or leisure boaters for in-
stance. They can work with fishermen, through the fishermen organization
called prud’homies or against them depending on the subject. Giovannoni
(1995) offers a fascinating exploration of the Thau fishermen. According to
the director of the CRCM “there is a global tendency towards collaboration
now since they both face similar issues and many oyster farmers are fishermen
as well”. There are even sea breams that eat oyster spat wreaking havoc for
growers which leads to increasing collaboration, an example of low excludable
and highly internal threat for oyster farmers which is a common-pool resource
for fishermen. The CRCM leads local collective projects such as collective
storage in the sea. They hardly succeed because of lack of oyster farmers will
for projects like these. “All that can be done at the individual level is done at
the individual level” (interview with CRCM director, 2014). It also has a mar-
keting purpose through defense of image of product (which is already high).
The CRCM tries to defend oyster farming as a sustainable practice using lines
such as “oysters filter water and thus participate in water purification”.
The survey that I designed intended to investigate oyster farmers knowl-
edge and opinions about CRCM actions. Unfortunately, this survey failed to
be launched because of CRCM direction blocking it (Chapter 5).
8.2.3 Studied information sharing artifacts
The information sharing system that first drew my attention is the formerly
named OMEGA Thau project, now VigiThau, that I present first. I also stud-
ied other artifacts that I introduce afterwards. I would have liked to explore
deeper these artifacts, using the failed survey. Because of the limited number
of responses, I only use qualitative elements of the survey. Even without the
18http://www.cepralmar.org
19http://rsl.cepralmar.com/
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survey, it is interesting to know that these information sharing artifacts exist
to compare with the NSW situation.
8.2.3.1 OMEGA Thau
This project, started in 2007, has been developed within the SMBT and has
accomplished important progress to this date. OMEGA is an acronym for en-
vironmental management and warning tool for the Thau Lagoon. The SMBT
consulted scientific researchers, local authorities, professional fishermen and
oyster farmers (through the CRCM). Three main goals are cited for the project
(Brocard et al., 2010). The first one is to understand better source and transfer
mechanisms for microbiological pollutions from the catchment to the lagoon.
The second is to create a decision aid for public investment taking into account
was is defined as the top priority for the region: excellent water quality (high-
lighted in SAGE-Thau, 2015). Last, it enables the creation of an early warning
system (Figure 8.9) of upcoming pollutions for users, swimmers, fishermen or
oyster farmers as can be seen in figure using a combination of weather forecast,
models and data.
Important data collection, model creation and fitting work was done dur-
ing the last 8 years resulting in a usable prediction tool that fits the three
established goals (SMBT et al., 2009). In the end, the project has led to the
definition of a new measure called the maximal admissible flow (MAF) for E.
coli (SMBT et al., 2010). This step is now over. A new step is considered now:
using the same water flows model to predict and understand possible floods.
The artifact is mostly using the model to simulate flows in an automatic
manner. Warnings are transmitted to CRCM who give the information to
grassroots oyster farmers. The model allows for a fine granularity and precision
in water flows, leading to accurate predictions in different areas of the lagoon.
Figure 8.9 shows those predictions in different part of the lake, for shellfish
harvesting or collecting, as well as swimming conditions. The model estimates
these levels up to 5 days. Normal access to the platform gives this type of
information. Information per se is not given by actors but by a network of
sensors distributed around the catchment and in the Lagoon. Users can give
specific observations of potential risks to water. This artifact is dynamic:
updated in real-time, and predictions change everyday.
Interviews with oyster farmers occurred from April to June 2014. This
period was the calibration phase of the website. The project had been going
on for 7 years already. None of the oyster farmers, except the ex-researcher,
and one who is a member of the CRCM told me they knew about the project
when I asked them. They often told me that they doubted it would be of
any use, or at least that they would use it. Their argumentation was put in
the following manner. Microbiological blooms lead to temporary sell bans,
but do not harm the oysters. Since oysters need depuration, they have water
depuration basins, which can be used for a limited storage. For now, they
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Figure 8.9: OMEGA Thau webpage - Previsions of water quality for shells and
swimming.
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use weather forecast to decide over storing oysters for a few more days. Since
the microbiological flows cannot be predicted for more than a few days, this
information would not be an important advantage. Some even feared that this
would lead to more regulations.
The OMEGA Thau project was presented to the public during a workshop
organized in Sète on September 25, 2015.
8.2.3.2 Other artifacts
Three other artifacts seemed to be the closest to collective action documents.
I intended to explore how much oyster farmers know and use them using the
survey. Since only a few oyster farmers answered the survey, in the analysis I
only use the comments that they wrote down and not the statistics.
Crisis management protocol This document is destined to help oyster farm-
ers react quickly in case of crisis. According to the few answers, this
document is well-known and used by oyster farmers.
Guide for oyster farming in Languedoc-Roussillon This beautifully made
guide is destined to all oyster farmers, especially new comers. It con-
tains all kinds of information, regulations and advice for good practices
(Cepralmar, 2008). The guide is very accessible, illustrated with nice
pictures and quite appealing. According to the acknowledgment section,
7 oyster farmers were consulted as well as numerous people from different
organizations.
Guide for good practices for oyster farming This document is close to
EMSs. It contains a risk assessment and recommendations for best prac-
tices (Berger et al., 2007). Risks are listed in two categories: global
impact of the industry and individual impact linked to practices. It is
the result of an internship and was made by interviewing different types
of local actors, including quick interviews of 38 growers and deeper in-
vestigation with 4 oyster farmers.
8.2.4 Conclusion - Thau Lagoon
In this section, I described the Thau Lagoon case where 500 oyster farms are
located in a catchment with significant urban pressure and farming activities.
Oyster farming is a major activity that has considerable social and economic
local consequences. Local authorities have developed an early alert system
called OMEGA Thau that can be helpful for oyster farmers to improve risk
management. Other artifacts have been developed as well. However, there
seem to be little interest and intended use of these artifacts.
Let us now compare the two cases and begin to understand how close and
yet different they are.
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Table 8.3: Comparison of SESs in NSW (globally) and Thau Lagoon. SES boundaries are limited to oyster farming
related elements. Most of those elements are discussed in more details in the previous sections.
I removed Resource Units variables since they are exactly the same, refer to Table 7.1, p. 106 and Resource Systems
variables which have been discussed in Table 7.2, p. 110.
Variables with a † refer to variables proposed in Chapter 3, see Table 3.6.
Variable NSW Thau Basin
S1 - Economic development Developed Developed
S2 - Demographic trends From sparsely populated to important urban pres-
sure
Very important urban pressure
S3 - Political stability Stable democracy Stable democracy
S5 - Markets Local, Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne, interna-
tional
South of France
S6 - Media organizations ABC Rural, Fish magazine (Fisheries Research
and Development Corporation), fisheries newslet-
ters
Local newsletter but not distributed (interview
with oyster farmer), CRCM blog http://www.
srcm.fr/blog/
S7 - Technology From manual handling to automatic processing -
Triploids in a restricted number of estuaries
From manual handling to automatic processing -
Triploids
GS1* - Policy area Environment Environment
GS2* - Geographic scale of GS Varying from 1 council for several catchments (e.g.
Bega Valley Shire) to several councils per catch-
ment (Lower Hawkesbury)
SMBT at the catchment level
GS3* - Population From 150 to tens of thousands 120.000 under SMBT jurisdiction
GS4* - Regime type Democratic Democratic
GS5* - Rule-making organizations (see previous sections)
GS5a* - Public sector NSW DPI, Food Authority, Shellfish program,
LLS, councils
SMBT, Ifremer, Marine authorities, water agen-
cies
GS5b* - Private sector Oyster farmers businesses Oyster farmers businesses
GS5c* - Nongovernmental SCWO, AOC, NSW Farmers CRCM, CRC (national body)
GS5d* - Community-based QAP, Love our lakes Cooperative des 5 ports
Continued on next page ...
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Table 8.3 – continued from previous page
Variable NSW Thau Basin
GS5e* - Hybrid Ocean Watch Cepralmar, local commission on water (CLE),
CGI
GS6* - (Significant) rules-in-use - See EMSTilligerry (2014) for NSW or Cepralmar (2008) for Thau
GS6a* - Operational Sell bans due to poor water quality Sell bans due to poor water quality
GS6b* - Collective-choice Water monitoring rules Water monitoring rules
GS6c* - Constitutional-choice Zoning Absence of zones
GS7* - Property rights system Private leases on designated areas of estuaries
which are crown-land
Private leases, with access to area restricted to
licensed oyster farmers on a public estuary
GS8* - Repertoire of norms and
strategies
GS9* - Network structure From few relationships to clique Relatively few relationships with others, mostly
limited to neighbors
GS10* - Historical continuity Up to 180 years continuously Started around 1900 with boom after 1945
A1 - Number of relevant actors From 1 to 30 500
A2 - Socioeconomic attributes From father to son and newcomers From father to son and newcomers - Low formal
education
A3 - History or past experiences Virus crises Virus crises
A4 - Location Near production area Near production area
A5 - Leadership / entrepreneurship Some proactive growers (e.g. those responsible for
EMS)
Some leaders with charisma / Innovation (new
culture techniques)
A6 - Norms (trust-reciprocity) / So-
cial capital
Trust is being built (Chapter 10) Little trust, gather when threats arise
A7 - Knowledge of SES / Mental
models
See Tables 10.1 and 10.2 From quite focused on their farm to global catch-
ment vision
A8 - Importance of resource (depen-
dence)
Only source of income for some, coupled with fish-
ing, restaurant and other activities for others
Only source of income for some, coupled with fish-
ing, restaurant and other activities for others
A9 - Technologies available Stick culture, tray culture, baskets, rafts ... see
EMSTilligerry (2014)
Tray culture, baskets ... see Cepralmar (2008)
I1 - Harvesting Independently done by each farmer on their farm Independently done by each farmer on their farm
I2 - Information sharing Word of mouth, monitoring, newsletters (Ocean-
Watch), EMS
Word of mouth, chief of harbor, commissions, text
messages
Continued on next page ...
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Table 8.3 – continued from previous page
Variable NSW Thau Basin
I3 - Deliberation processes Meetings every year Little or through representatives
I4† - Threats to collaboration Thefts Thefts, competition on prices
I5 - Investment activities Depollution activities Collective water basins, underwater turbines (only
projects)
I6 - Lobbying activities Marketing, Through CRCM and various commissions
I7 - Self-organizing activities Creating the EMS and following proposed actions
I8 - Networking activities Via Catchment Management Authorities and
marketing organizations (AOC, SCWO)
Through CRCM
I9 - Monitoring activities QAP (Table 8.1) Through Réseau de Suivi Lagunaire
I10 - Evaluative activities EMS and Annual General Meeting Veterinary, public monitoring
O1 - Social performance measures Evolution of number of farmers, income, loss due
to closures
Evolution of number of farmers, income, loss due
to closures
O2 - Ecological performance mea-
sures
Water quality, mortality, closures Water quality, mortality, closures
O3 - Externalities to other SESs Limit euthrophication Limit euthrophication
ECO1 - Climate patterns Warming and increase of extreme events in re-
gards to rainfall/storms
Warming and increase of extreme events in re-
gards to rainfall/storms
ECO2† - Public threats
ECO2a† - Non internal pollutions Microbiological flows, sewage overflows, fertilizer
run-off
Little
ECO2b† - Facilities Sewage treatment plants, tourism facilities Sewage treatment plants, tourism facilities
ECO3 - Flows into and out of focal
SES
Boats (tourism, fishing), water Boats (tourism, fishing), water
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8.3 Discussing the cases
In this section, I compare broadly the two cases, pointing out the main differ-
ences using the variables proposed in the SES framework.
Table 8.3 compares the Thau Lagoon and NSW cases using the SES frame-
work. Since there are several SESs in NSW, ranges are given instead of specific
values. I chose to describe the SES at the estuary (including the shore) level
instead of the catchment one, so as to focus on oyster farming mostly. Sec-
tion 7.1 gives an overview of the consequences of this choice.
Elements provided in this table come from various sources. First, they
come from official oyster farming artifacts, mostly those listed in the previous
sections, such as EMSs (e.g. EMSTilligerry, 2014) and the guide for good prac-
tices (Cepralmar, 2008) in which rules, technologies, property-rights are listed
or evoked. Contextual elements such as in Governance System are sourced
in official documentation such as SAGE-Thau (2015) or OISAS (2014). Some
elements are linked to actors perceptions or beliefs. I filled these variables
using mostly interviews and meetings with actors (oyster farmers, public ser-
vants, and researchers) that gave me a range of possibilities. I also used official
statistical studies for hard figures, such as Gervasoni et al. (2011).
This table shows that those cases are relatively similar. This should not
come as a big surprise given all the elements exposed in the previous chapter
on the ecology of oyster farming. Oyster farmers are subject to the same kind
of threats, oysters grow in estuaries and growing techniques do not come with
an important variety. PO, diploid or triploid growing is subject to restriction
in part of NSW estuaries, while it is approved in Thau. In both countries,
most spat is produced in an industrial manner in hatcheries.
A first major difference between those cases is the question of size. In
NSW, there can be up to 30 growers in one estuary, while in Thau, 500 busi-
nesses are active, employing 2000 people. This particular point is extremely
important regarding interactions and thus outcomes (Nagendra and Ostrom,
2014). Information sharing, processes leading to artifact creation, conflicts
and solidarities vary due to this element. Information sharing is at the core of
this thesis, differences will be discussed in detail in Part IV. It is impossible
for Thau oyster farmers to know in person all other farmers, while a complete
network may exist in NSW estuaries. As it is visible on the map (Figure 5.1,
p.74), oyster farmers are not located in a uniform manner along the shores
of the Lagoon. They are organized in patches, often with more than 30 oys-
ter farmers, but with more reasonable number of farmers than on the whole
Lagoon.
A second important point to keep in mind while trying to investigate ac-
tor’s role in water management is the concept of community. A community
can be defined as “a group of people living in the same locality and under the
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same government”20. This concept is present for all types of matters in Aus-
tralia, and more generally in the Anglo-Saxon world. During interviews with
oyster farmers in NSW, I have heard several times a willingness to show their
commitment to and involvement for their community. Oyster farmers had
partly this idea in mind while writing their EMSs: one the reasons for writing
the EMS is to “demonstrate that oysters farmers are continually improving
their environmental performance” (EMSWagonga, 2012, Introduction). By
choosing transparency, over their activities and practices, they were willing to
demonstrate that their activities are legitimate, clean, if not beneficial to the
environment, ensuring positive externalities such as contributing to the image
the region. Chapter 10 explores this question in more details.
In France, except one oyster farmer who kept evoking being part of a
greater whole than the estuary, or organizing shore clean-ups, there was no
mention of such a concept as community. Thau Lagoon oyster farmers seemed
to rely more on their own families (during heavy workload periods such as
Christmas) and on the State who is supposed to take care of issues such as
microbiological peaks.
The Thau Lagoon is considered a single water unit as far as closures are
concerned. In NSW, often, even in smaller estuaries than the Thau Lagoon,
several zones are defined: some can be closed for harvest and others opened at
the same time. I will develop this element and its consequences in Chapter 10.
8.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I described in detail the two case studies that I investigated:
the Thau Lagoon in France and several estuaries in NSW. Having explored
several estuaries in NSW provides the advantage of not limiting the study to
two cases which would be a path to simple comparison.
Both studies are located in developed countries, framed with numerous
and relatively similar rules, especially those regarding oyster farming. Oyster
farming already has a long history (longer than a person’s life) in both cases.
Oyster farmers are dealing with a wide variety of institutions, either public,
private or non governmental. They are both subject to specific rules on water
quality leading to regular bans on sells.
I provide a comparison of the cases using the SES framework. This compar-
ison revealed how close those cases were. Important differences exist in terms
of information sharing and other types of interactions and thus outcomes. In
NSW, EMSs have been developed by oyster farmers at estuary levels. Infor-
mation sharing artifacts are less known and used in the Thau Lagoon case.
Two main differences appear between the cases: size (less than 30 compared
with 500) and the notion of community, more rooted in NSW. Projects such as
collective implementation of information sharing artifacts is more difficult in
20http://www.thefreedictionary.com/community
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the Thau Lagoon since the number of actors is much higher (they are 15 times
as numerous as in the estuary with the biggest number of oyster farmers in
NSW).
Chapter 9
Goods and threats for oyster
farmers
In this chapter, I use the theoretical elements developed in Part I to describe
goods and threats in the context of the case studies. For their activity, oyster
farmers have to deal with all types of goods and face threats of all types.
One of the interests in studying oyster farmers is the fact that they work
in an intrinsically open system. While most studies on the commons focus
on relatively closed systems, the present work examines actors who have to
deal primarily with a public good. Collectively, oyster farmers face two main
threats: bacterial overflows that lead to sell bans and the herpes virus that
decimates oysters. The virus is not yet well understood by science.
First, I detail the resources and goods oyster farmers use for their activities.
Then, I show that Ostrom’s CPR principles do not apply to this specific case
study and thus do not easily extend to public resource management. Finally,
I expose threats oyster farmers face and show that this angle is an adapted
one to frame what farmers deal with to grow oysters. Information sharing
solutions to the two main threats for oyster farmers are studied in Part IV.
9.1 Goods for oyster farmers
Oyster growers are part of a resource system that makes them use goods and
resources that belong to all types of the goods typology (Table 2.1, p.13).
CPRs are not at the core of the resources they use. Since the main resource
used by oyster farmers is public (water, and more specifically water quality),
this case provides an opportunity to try to apply Ostrom’s design principles
to see whether they would extend to public resources management (Table 2.4,
p.17). The task proved difficult.
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Table 9.1: Goods and resources for oyster farmers: a resource system.
† image can be considered a public good all can use or a CPR that is modified when
used.
Substractability
Low High
Excludability
Low Public good Common-pool resource
Water quality, shore, es-
tuary, genetic pool, image
of oysters†
Spat, phytoplankton
High Club good Private good
Lease areas, label Oysters, tables, oyster
sheds, boats
9.1.1 Goods and resource system
Oyster farmers use and interact with goods of all types. Table 9.1 shows a
selection of goods and resources that are of importance to them. As we have
seen in Chapter 7, oyster farmers are heavily dependent on water quality which
is a public good. Oysters (private good) are located on leases (private good
limited in duration), that are located on estuaries (public waters or crown land
in Australia). Access to lease areas is limited to professional oyster farmers
and is thus a club good. They use their private boats to reach their leases. To
process oysters, growers possess oyster sheds (private good) that are located on
the shore of the estuary (public land, at least in France and NSW). In places
where oyster farmers practice natural catchment of spat, spat can be considered
a CPR. This method favors a diverse genetic pool (a public good). They are
also collectively responsible for the public image of oysters by ensuring that
consumers do not eat oysters that can make them ill, or even die.
Thus, for their daily activities, oyster farmers are entangled with all pos-
sible types of goods that are all of importance to them. They are fully part
of a resource system with blurred boundaries (RS2) because of their heavy
dependence on water quality. Cox et al. (2010) distinguish two parts within
the clear boundaries principle (Table 2.4, p.17): actors (the type of users and
property-rights are clearly defined) and resource (the resource used is easy to
circumscribe). As discussed in Chapter 7, the size and limits of the SES, estu-
ary or catchment, can be debated and argued resulting in a trade-off between
being able to grasp a coherent group of actors and being able to internalize
most (water) flows (Table 7.3). Drawing boundary lines is not an easy task in
this case, and it is difficult to find a definitive and satisfying closure.
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9.1.2 Common-pool resource principles
The necessary principles given by Ostrom for successful CPR management
hardly apply to the context of oyster farming.
As repeated throughout this thesis, the main resource oyster growers deal
with is water quality, a public good. It is strongly influenced by behavior
and environmental dynamics that are external to oyster farmers’ decisions.
Ostrom’s principles are applicable when users of the resource are those whose
decisions influence (besides environmental dynamics) the state of the resource
and its sustainability.
I use the formulation and codes of design principles given in Cox et al.
(2010). In the previous section, I already discussed that boundaries are blurred
(1), either for the actors (1A) or for the resource (1B) and that there is a trade-
off between those two elements (Table 7.3, p.112). Congruence between appro-
priation and provision rules and local conditions (2) is only partly applicable.
Appropriation should not be understood as in a classical CPR: oysters are
grown on tables that are located on a piece of (flooded) land that is appropri-
ated, similar to a farm land. From that point, interactions are rather limited.
Local conditions are taken into account since some places of the estuary are
more suitable for oyster growing than others. Collective-choice arrangements
(3) exist (see the description of the case studies in Chapter 8) but can influence
water quality mostly through efforts oriented towards actors who are not oyster
farmers (Chapter 10). The same limitation applies to monitoring (4): there is
limited internal monitoring (such as law suits to those who sail close to oyster
leases or those who release brown waters directly in the estuary) since moni-
toring would be efficient mostly regarding actors who are not oyster farmers.
Thefts are the most internal element that oyster farmers can monitor, some-
times with important consequences (ostracism) for the person who is caught
(Figure 9.1). I have no specific information on graduated sanctions (5), except
that the only information that I heard of was ostracism against a person who
had been discovered guilty of theft. In this case, spraying the oyster farmer’s
shed was an efficient but rather brutal sanction, and a way to share the in-
formation that one should not steal oysters from others. Conflict-resolution
mechanisms (6) exist within the local instances, in France and in NSW. Oyster
farmers are recognized rights to organize (7). The emerging institutions deal
with internal issues and research, set standards (especially in the case of NSW
through the EMSs), and try to influence local political authorities to take their
interests into account. In both France and NSW, there were nested enterprises
(8), with several institutions trying to tackle issues at different levels.
The design principles have been developed with CPR management in mind,
not public resources. The example of oyster farmers dealing with water quality
clearly shows that they cannot easily be extended to public resource manage-
ment. The major threat to CPR is exhaustion (or overexploitation) and those
principles are designed with this threat in mind. The major threat linked to a
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Figure 9.1: An oyster shed sprayed with “Go away bastard!” and “Thief!” on
the shore of the Thau Lagoon.
public good is the absence of its provision, i.e. , the question of making sure
that the resource is properly funded or maintained due to the possible pres-
ence of free-riders. In the case of water quality, what should be provided for
is the absence of polluting inputs. In this situation, instead of using the lense
of public good, it would be clearer to use the one of a public threat. Threats
are a useful lens to frame questions related to oyster farming.
9.2 Threats for oyster farmers
In this section, I describe the main threats linked to oyster farming using
the 〈A, C, I, D, E〉 formalism developed in Chapter 3. First, I give a general
overview, then I go into more details to the two main threats: microbiologi-
cal overflow and virus outbreaks. Microbiological prevision and mitigation is
the core of the OMEGA Thau (Section 8.2.3.1) project and the virus is the
problem most frequently cited by oyster farmers. These threats are those that
are common to all estuaries where oysters are grown and are those that are
considered the most severe and likely in EMSs risk matrices (cf. Figure 8.5,
p.124). This explains the focus on these two threats.
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Table 9.2: Threats of different types linked to oyster farming. Threats are
inspired by the two case studies.
Internality
Low High
Excludability
Low Public Common
Microbiological peaks, al-
gal blooms, sewage treat-
ment plants
Virus transmission (com-
mon scenario), winter
mortality, invasion of
noxious oyster species
High X Private
Virus transmission (pri-
vate scenario), sea bream
9.2.1 Microbiology
Microbiological peaks are one of the main threats to oyster farmers (A) since
they alter water quality (C), leading to temporary closures. Run-off from upper
catchment, malfunctioning of local water treatment plants, poorly adapted
individual house treatment, cattle manure close to shorelines all lead to higher
than acceptable microbiological rates or even peaks during heavy rains, putting
at risk people who eat oysters.
Water quality is measured using E. coli levels in the water and oyster
farmers are the most demanding users or estuaries regarding water quality
(Section 7.1.3). Thus, oyster farmers have a strong interest in maintaining or
at least favoring good maintenance, acceptable microbiological levels. Levels
acceptable to harvest oysters guarantee water quality for all other uses.
Instead of proposing a classic public good provision problem, I propose
to frame this element as a threat. In this case, maintaining water quality
amounts to limiting global flows in the estuary. Thus, the question is not
about providing a solution for water quality to be kept at acceptable levels,
rather fostering and promoting practices (D) and creating new infrastructure
(I) that allow water quality to maintain its current level.
For oyster farmers, the microbiological threat is non-internal and non-
excludable: it is a public threat. The resource characteristic under threat
is water quality and, as a consequence, access to the market (C) (usually, mi-
crobiological peaks do not damage oysters but make them dangerous to eat;
on the contrary, microbiological abundance favors a high growth rate). The
threat depends on a combination of infrastructure, decisions and environmental
dynamics. Related human infrastructure I are water treatment plants, inap-
propriate house facilities, house boats, farms (through cattle and fertilizer).
Decisions D that directly impact water quality are those such as discharging
black waters from boats in estuaries. Decisions D to tackle the threat can range
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C
D Fertilizer inputImprovements in
water treatment
E Weather
I
A Oyster farmers
Catchment ﬂows
Treatment plants
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aﬀectimpact
(indirect) impact
(direct)
Water quality
Figure 9.2: The micriobiological threat.
from from upgrading treatment plants, enforcing rules on house water treat-
ment, and investing in fences to prevent cattle manure from being too close
to water. The main environmental dynamics E are linked to water flows, in
the catchment and in aquifers, as well as the weather: heavy rains, especially
after a long dry period, lead to important microbiological outbreaks. These
examples are inspired from the French and Australian situations.
9.2.2 Virus
Oyster farmers (A) have been facing viruses that can kill up to 100 % of
oysters. Viruses are threats to oysters lives (C). It is natural to define virus as
threats.
Viruses have provoked crises for oyster farmers throughout history. A vi-
olent virus decimated the Portuguese oyster Crassostrea angulata in 1971-73
in France (Deltreil, 1973). This species had to be replaced by one which was
more resistant, the PO (Grizel and Héral, 1991), which is now the primary
species grown in France and around the world.
Oyster farmers in the Hawkesbury River, NSW, Australia have been wiped
out because of a virus called the Qx (Queensland unknown) virus that killed
up to 98% of SRO in 2004-5 (Butt and Raftos, 2007).
A virus, the OsHV-1 (ostreid) herpes virus, also called the Pacific Oys-
ter Mortality Syndrome (POMS), is currently wreaking havoc on the PO all
around the world (Cameron and Crane, 2011). The virus has spread quickly
around the world because oysters are moved several times during their lives.
Moving oysters (D) has been prohibited between some estuaries in NSW to
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Figure 9.3: The virus threat.
limit this effect and prevent the spread of the virus to previously unaffected
areas. The virus situation was evoked during interviews with oyster farmers
as their most important problem.
The virus is worse than temporary sell bans due to microbiological issues
since it kills oysters, while bans simply delay the moment in which oysters can
be sold. This explains the lack of interest shown by interviewed Thau Lagoon
oyster farmers regarding the OMEGA Thau project.
When temperatures rise in summer and the water temperature is between
17 and 24 degrees Celsius (Pernet et al., 2012), the virus becomes lethal (E) and
within a few days, a massive amount of oysters, from 40 to 100 %, disappear
(Oden et al., 2011). If the consequences are well-known (Girard and Pérez
Agúndez, 2014), the virus modus operandi (E) is not yet understood (Paul-
Pont et al., 2013). Pernet et al. (2012) or Whittington et al. (2015) point at
oyster farming practices (D). Pernet et al. (2014) investigate energetic reserves
and food quality (E). There is no consensus on how to cope with this threat and
information is being gathered, models built, and results discussed (Cameron
and Crane, 2011).
Oyster farmers also do not know how the virus acts but have several differ-
ent representations of its modus operandi (E). During interviews, some oyster
growers told me that the virus mostly touched triploid oysters, but this hy-
pothesis has been proved untrue (Pernet et al., 2014), others blame hatcheries
(I) that limit the genetic pool of oysters, favoring a high lethal rate. Some
actors claim that they were not touched because they practice natural catch-
ment (I, D) (the virus mostly kills spat and young oysters and those that are
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caught are only those that survived according to them). Oyster farmers who
have been severely hit and who decided to continue growing oysters were rather
desperate about their situation. Finally, some oyster farmers worried about
the quantity of oysters farmed in their estuary, saying that proximity and
monoculture favored the expansion of the virus (D).
The virus threat is an internal threat. Even though there could be con-
sequences on tourism and on the local economy, the threat impacts mostly
oyster farmers. It is not clear whether the threat is excludable or not. Some
oyster farmers said that they had no mortality due to their choices. Thus,
it is possible to qualify the threat as private or common and make scenarios
accordingly.
Using the categories given in the definition of threats, it is possible to say
that the threat is characterized by ill-understood environmental dynamics and
decisions of oyster farmers over the type of oysters they grow, and the quantity
of oysters they decide to grow. Infrastructure contain hatcheries.
9.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have shown that oyster farmers use all types of resources
and goods, the principal one being water (quality). Oyster farmers’ situation
does not fit Ostrom’s CPR design principles well since they apply to resources
subject to exhaustion in relatively closed systems, which is not the case of
water quality. Water quality is subject to deterioration. Instead of framing this
question using the public good provision framework usually proposed for public
good management, I propose to use the threats framework which provides
an easy-to-use model of a situation. The question is not about providing
sufficient means for a public good to exist, rather favoring practices that limit
the public good from being spoiled and polluted. Adding to microbiological
threats, oyster growers are preoccupied about a virus that severely hits their
oysters. This threat is an internal one which is not well understood. In this
case, formulating the question as a threat rather than goods or resources seems
more apt.
Threats provide a useful way to frame the major challenges oyster farmers
face. Framing oyster farming challenges in this manner is easier to read and
more intuitive than with the goods typology. Furthermore, filling the infor-
mation necessary to describe thoroughly threats lead to discovering gaps in
knowledge that need to be investigated and, as I will show in the following
part, allows to look for proper solutions, possibly using information sharing,
in the case of this thesis, and possibly through other means that I do not
investigate here and reserve for future research.
Case studies - Conclusion
Oyster farming is particularly interesting and poorly studied in the research
on collective management of goods and resources. The main resource farmers
depend on is a public good, water quality, that is used by various types of users,
and coming from areas farmers cannot control. Contrary to CPRs where issues
come from insiders defection behavior, public goods such as these suffer from
issues that are mostly external from oyster farmers’ point of view.
Water in estuaries principally comes from the catchment area and the sur-
rounding sea. Its quality is affected by direct users of the estuary and by
nearby users: cities, farmers. Because of this fact, limits of the focal SES are
unclear. Setting the boundary around the estuary leaves most of the main
resource out of reach, while setting the boundary around the catchment leads
to include a large number of actors of different types.
Oyster farmers are the most demanding actors in terms of water quality
measured as a quantity of E. coli in the water. If water quality is good enough
for oyster farming, then all uses are guaranteed. In that case sustainability,
at least in terms of water quality, of practices of catchment actors can be
demonstrated.
Investigating real cases with the goal of unveiling a SES calls for an in-
terdisciplinary work. Different variables lead to various fields of study, in a
fractal way. Each field opens up again as a vast combination of information,
knowledge and complexity. Deciding when to stop digging is a non-trivial
task. The very concept of emergence makes it difficult to know at which level
of complexity and details to stop. In the thesis, I had to study and take into
account the elements that seemed most essential to understand the cases. I
made choices, and others could have been justified as well. Oyster farmers deal
with oysters and a basic understanding of the biology and ecology of oysters
is necessary to frame the general context. Oyster growers practices have to
be described to grasp goals and constraints actors deal with everyday. One of
the most relevant points consists in the fact that oyster farmers have limited
leeway of action on the animals they grow: they cannot feed them, nor cure
them.
I dug two cases. The first one is the Thau Lagoon, were 500 oyster growers
farm around a single lagoon. The second one consists in several estuaries
located along the NSW coast. Each of these estuaries are exploited by a much
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smaller number of farmers (from 1 to 30). Practices are roughly similar. Both
of these cases are located in stable democratic and developed countries were
actors can express their voices and concerns. In both situations, actors have
to deal with several (sometimes nested) institutions to deal with their activity.
Due to the importance of water quality, these actors somehow have to raise
their concerns using a way to share information. The results of this part of
the situation are exposed in details in Part IV.
Information sharing in these cases is not organized in the same way. In
the NSW case, the main artifacts, called Environmental Management Sys-
tem (EMS) are written and maintained by oyster farmers themselves. These
open-to-all documents describe the catchment and estuary farmers act in, oys-
ter farming activities and main regulations, as well as internal and external
threats linked to oyster farming and how to deal with them. These documents
are updated every two years and come with easy to read, accessible leaflets
addressed to the main audience such as local dwellers and tourists. In the
Thau Lagoon, the study focused on an information sharing artifact, OMEGA
Thau, based on scientific modeling and sensory data developed by local public
authorities in the hopes of predicting microbiological flows, in the short (due
to weather conditions) and long (due to new constructions) terms. Oyster
farmers can be warned earlier of temporary bans on sells risks.
Oyster farmers have to deal daily with all types of goods under different
property regimes. They are fully part of a resource system, a resource system
bigger than them because of the water quality element. Thanks to the example
of oyster farming, I have shown that Ostrom’s CPR design principles do not
extend easily to actors who deal with a public resource.
Oyster farmers have to cope with two main threats. The first one is the
target of the French information system: microbiology peaks that happen
because of raining events and improper water treatment. This threat is a
public threat that involves a large number of elements and processes. The
second main threat, cited by most farmers that I interviewed, is the ostreid
herpes virus OsHV-1 that is decimating POs around the world since 2004. This
threat is an example of internal threat. Science does not yet fully understand
how the virus works, or how husbandry practices influence lethality.
I investigated oyster farming and linked threats. What are the conse-
quences on those threats for oyster farmers, oysters and water of the imple-
mentation of a new type of infrastructure: information sharing artifacts?
Part IV
Results
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Results - Introduction
In Part III, I presented oyster farming in general (Chapter 7) and in the context
of the specific case studies of the Thau Basin, France, and New South Wales
(NSW), Australia (Chapter 8). In Chapter 9, I framed oyster farming stakes
around two main threats: the microbiological one, linked to water quality; and
the virus one, linked to oyster lives. The first threat is public, and the second
internal.
In this part, I investigate consequences of on actors, on resources and mu-
tual relations, of a decision D made by actors A to implement a new type of
infrastructure I, an information sharing artifact. The artifacts may contain
information and may have an influence on any component of the 〈A, C, I, D, E〉
tuple.
Part IV is divided in two main chapters, each dealing with one of the two
threats described previously. As shown in Chapter 4, stakes for information
sharing for each type of threats are different. These two threat cases allow
for an examination of those stakes through the study of a real context for the
microbiological threat and using an agent-based model for the virus one.
In Chapter 10, I discuss how the implementation of Environmental Man-
agement Systems (EMSs) in NSW and OMEGA Thau made differences, or
not, for the main categories of actors at all levels of the ENCORE framework
in the public threat under scrutiny. I also show changes that these new infras-
tructures made in the Social-Ecological System (SES) and its perception by
actors.
In Chapter 11, I expose the agent-based model that I developed and an-
alyzed to understand what could be the consequences of implementing an
information sharing artifact, in addition to existing social networks where in-
formation is exchanged, for actors business and oysters health.
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Chapter 10
Information Sharing for Public
Threats: Microbiology
In this chapter1, I discuss how oyster farmers in the Thau Lagoon and in NSW
are dealing with a specific public threat affecting oysters sells: the microbi-
ological threat. Different strategies have been implemented in those places.
As explained in Part III, the microbiological threat is disturbing directly oys-
ter farmers mostly as a result of activities impacting water in the catchment
surrounding the estuary where oysters are grown.
As exposed in Figure 9.2, p.148, the microbiological threat is framed in
the following manner: oyster farmers constitute A. Oyster farmers are wor-
ried about water quality (C). C is affected by catchment water flows, by local
treatment plants or private houses, or by fences around farms close to the
shore (I). Decisions D that affect C include improvements in water treatment
(indirect), or house boat pouring black waters in the estuary (direct). Micro-
biological peaks are due to heavy rain events or particular weather conditions
(E). To oyster growers, this threat is non internal. In France, and in several
estuaries in Australia, sale bans affect whole estuaries and growers cannot in-
dividually exclude themselves from the threat (except if they grow oysters in
another estuary). Thus, the microbiological threat is a public threat for oyster
farmers. How can information sharing help?
I explore strategies that have been developed by actors of the case studies
with the lense of information sharing artifacts. I mostly draw upon EMSs
for the NSW case and upon OMEGA Thau for the French case. EMSs are
documents written by farmers, dealing with numerous questions, including the
microbiological one, and OMEGA Thau is developed by local public authorities
and is mostly focused on following water and microbiological flows. How do
these artifacts make the SES evolve? What is the effect of these strategies on
the resource and the actors?
1This chapter is adapted from Paget et al. (2016), a paper published in Natural Resources
Forum analyzing the NSW case. The whole paper is reproduced in Appendix C.
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First, I give consequences of implementing EMSs for oyster farmers in
NSW, using the ENCORE framework (Section 4.4) as well as evolutions in
the SES. Then, I study the French case using the same frameworks. Finally, I
draw conclusions that can be learned from those cases.
10.1 Dealing with microbiological threat in NSW
Actors managed to collectively create information sharing artifacts, EMSs,
that led to increase their legitimacy over water quality management, enabling
stewardship over water. This example is a positive case of downstream actors
empowerment in a case of public threat. I show this transition by using an
adaptation of the ENCORE framework and the SES one.
10.1.1 Legitimization of stewardship over water management
In NSW, internal changes in information sharing, through the creation of Oys-
ter Industry Sustainable Aquaculture Strategy (OISAS) and more importantly
EMSs, played a part in legitimizing the role of oyster farmers as stewards over
water (quality) management.
EMSs are described in Section 8.1.3.2, p.123. They are composed of three
main elements. The main document, detailed, specific and containing a de-
scription of all risks. The second one is a leaflet intended for a broad audience.
The last one is an update in which farmers fill indicators to track evolution of
risks. Figure 10.1 shows how EMSs are linked to the microbiological threat.
To ensure good water quality, oyster farmers have to cope with other ac-
tors’ actions, and have to deal with upstream catchment users and processes
(i.e. external risks in the EMS terminology, public threats using the threat
typology). There were also misunderstandings throughout the community re-
garding oyster farmers’ impacts on the estuary and on the legitimacy of crown
land use. EMSs development allowed the community to learn about typical
industry practices and roles as stewards of good water quality. EMSs are
information-laden documents. Table 10.1 shows their impacts on different
populations using the ENCORE framework.
In this case, I use ENCORE to evaluate how implementing artifacts (here
EMSs) can make different types of actors evolve on the subject of the microbi-
ological threat, and water quality, on ENCORE dimensions. All changes listed
in the table did not occur in all estuaries where EMSs have been developed.
EMSs have different roles as interface across actor boundaries. They enable
oyster farmers to state an official and argued position which can be efficiently
communicated when necessary. They are information artifacts that allow com-
munication between different categories of actors. According to Gietzelt et al.
(2014, p.2):
When South East Local Land Services first engaged with the
10.1. DEALING WITH MICROBIOLOGICAL THREAT IN NSW 159
A
I
C
E
D of non A
D of A
EMS part of
describ
es
explains need
 for
evaluates reg
ularly
demonstrates impact
shows need for 
Figure 10.1: Information regarding (microbiological) threat included in an
EMS. About D: A contains oyster farmers; non A contains other actors such
as government and councils, farmers ... Differences made by the artifact for
these actors are detailed in Table 10.1. See also Figure 9.2, p.148, to get a
description of the microbiological threat using the threats formalism.
oyster industry in 2003, [oyster farmers] were frustrated with their
lack of influence over processes and practices threatening their in-
dustry. When issues [...] caused the temporary closure of oyster
harvesting, their response was generally reactionary, and they did
not have a loud and collective voice when expressing their concerns
to government and the community.
Gietzelt et al. (2014) explain how local councils and the oyster industry
worked hand in hand to develop EMSs and address issues raised, to the point
of creating an ongoing Oyster Partnership Program in 2006. This Program
partly subsidizes a position of EMS implementation officer and promotes oys-
ter performance monitoring programs (RS7, I9, O2) among other actions. Fur-
thermore, upon submission of a development application to a Council, conse-
quences on water quality are to be considered and oyster farmer representatives
consulted in case of possible impact (I10, O2) (OISAS, 2014).
Table 10.1 shows how these documents make differences in all dimensions of
the ENCORE framework. Globally, due to evolution of normative and cogni-
tive mindsets, actors who produced negative externalities (high microbiological
flows) are more prone to make decisions and adopt practices (operational and
external dimensions) that take water quality into account. By publicly show-
ing their personal efforts, oyster farmers managed to smooth relations with
other stakeholders and improve the equity feeling.
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Table 10.1: Possible evolution of actors according to ENCORE dimensions if an
EMS is implemented. I listed potential effects on parts of the microbiological
threat.
† OF = Oyster farmer(s).
Dim Differences generated by of EMS implementation
E
xt
er
na
l
OF† Cleaning up of derelict and polluting infrastructure,
investment in sustainable infrastructure (I, D)
Govt and councils Can use oyster farmers knowledge and presence to
assist when monitoring
Farmers Fencing off cattle to limit access to the estuarine
foreshore (I), regrowth of riparian vegetation (I)
House owners Better on-site sewage system (I)
Community Safety during swimming and recreational fishing (C)
N
or
m
at
iv
e OF OF should provide stewardship over water, others
should be made aware of their impacts
Govt and councils OF should provide help as stewards of the water-
ways
Farmers Need to play a role in keeping good water quality
House owners and
community
Should be made aware that they can have an impact
on water quality
C
og
ni
ti
ve
OF Government is not an enemy
Govt and councils Oysters are good indicators of estuarine health
Farmers Farming activities can impact water quality (D)
House owners Micro behaviors can affect the whole system (D)
Community Aware that OF are not harmful (if not beneficial)
to the environment, OF is associated with clean en-
vironment, suitable for tourism, generating income
for the local economy
O
pe
ra
ti
on
al OF Reducing high internal threats by implementing
threat mitigation procedures (I, D)
Govt and councils OF are integrated in decision processes (I, D)
Farmers Maintain cattle out of the water, behind fences (I)
House owners Improve or maintain sewage treatment (I, D)
R
el
at
io
na
l OF Legitimate members of the community, can talk to
others with pride
Govt and councils OF are knowledgeable partners
Farmers OF are partners in environment quality
House owners Accept better OF requests for costly improvements
Community Common interest in tourism
E
qu
it
y
OF Feel that they have input
Govt and councils Better acceptance of decisions
Farmers and house
owners
Agree to invest knowing OF make efforts
Community Legitimate use of crown resource
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10.1.2 Evaluation of consequences on the SES
The identification of boundaries and content of the SES by its actors has
dramatically changed with the creation of these documents. EMSs are new
resources available to oyster farmers to act on an object of core importance
to them: water quality and the estuary in general. As shown before, they are
used in many different ways: during development application processes; for
raising awareness; to allow farmers to voice their views; and for interacting
with council. OISAS is another government-owned resource that can be used
in similar cases to ensure optimal water quality. The SES framework analysis
shows (Table 10.2) that these new resources have had an effect on a consid-
erable number of variables of the SES. One of the most important is that it
allowed the size of the system (RS2) for the oyster farmers to be redefined in
a tangible manner. Instead of being focused and constraining actions to the
estuary limit, the system now includes the whole catchment and the processes
that could indirectly affect oyster farming practices. This had an impact on
pollution patterns (ECO2) and flows into and out of focal SES (ECO3): pol-
lution events are now internal, and thus can more easily be addressed and
flows in and out are reduced because the system is defined at the catchment
level, which prevents water from entering from other systems, except from
the sea. This could happen thanks to the definition of new rules at all lev-
els: constitutional, collective and operational (GS*). These rules have affected
information sharing, self-organizing, monitoring, networking and evaluative
activities. They even defined social and ecological performance measures that
will allow efficient monitoring of outcomes. Figure 10.3 shows the evolution of
oyster farmers’ representation of the system (A7).
Table 10.2 has a column called “transition”. This column gives the means
that led to the change of perspectives given in the table as well as those of the
ENCORE dimensions (Table 10.1). One of the main elements that allowed this
transition is the very process of collectively building the document. Elements
such as “meetings” are core in the transition process: they force actors to think
through their own activities, elements linked to their activities, and lead to a
collective discussion and then stabilization (in the artifact) of topics.
10.1.3 Partial conclusion
NSW oyster growers have managed to create documents that are highly re-
spected by public authorities and other stakeholders (cf. Gietzelt et al., 2014),
that legitimated their use of a public resource and their role as stewards of
water in the eyes of different stakeholders.
Actors are thus empowered through the implementation of this artifact.
These documents are information-laden in the sense that they make differences
in the eye of multiple stakeholders, including oyster farmers themselves. In
that case (see Section 10.3), information sharing artifacts existence lead to a
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Table 10.2: Evaluation of consequences of the implementation of the environ-
mental information sharing system on a selection of the SES variables (Sec-
tion 2.3).
Variable Initial features Transition Features after implemen-
tation
RS3 - Size of RS Estuary Effective internal-
ization of issues
Catchment
RS7 - Predictability
of system dynamics
Difficult Indicators multi-
plied
More precise (e.g. growth
and mortality)
GS2 - Non govern-
ment organization
Only compulsory
local ones
Emerged through
meetings
SWCO, AOC
GS3 - Network
structure
Porous Meetings Very dense, at lease at the
estuary level
A6a - Trust / Reci-
procity
Little Meetings Improved, for environ-
ment at least
A7 - Knowledge of
SES / Mental mod-
els
Upstream actors
responsible
Holistic view Part of a catchment
A9 - Technology
available
Any Long-term thinking
while elaborating
Sustainable, non polluting
at least internally
I2 - Information
sharing
Little Forced through
meetings on con-
sensual subjects
Among actors, with others
I3 - Deliberation
process
Meetings for wa-
ter quality
Canalized through
meetings
Regular meetings at sev-
eral levels
I5 - Investment ac-
tivities
Water and meat
monitoring
Identified through
meetings
New technologies (individ-
ually), clean-up
I6 - Lobbying activ-
ities
Dispersed Made easier with
hard documents
More centralized
I8 - Networking ac-
tivities
Dispersed Hard documents
exist, EMS officer
More systematic (incl. in
government processes)
I9 - Monitoring ac-
tivities
Point localized
monitoring
Government impli-
cated
Extensive, partnership
with government for
stewardship, growth and
mortality
I10 - Evaluative ac-
tivities
Little Range of indicators
defined
Extensive
O1 - Social mea-
sures
Little Deep thinking
about sustainabil-
ity
Sustainability is core
O2 - Ecological per-
formance measures
Little Deep thinking
about sustainabil-
ity
Precisely defined
ECO2 - Pollution
patterns
Many, upstream,
dispersed
Scale change Now effectively internal
and more reachable
ECO3 - Flows into
and out of focal
SES
Flow from catch-
ment
Scale change Now internal and more
reachable
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closure of the upstream downstream system through an information flow.
The NSW case is an example of downstream actors who develop informa-
tion sharing artifacts that make a difference as much for them as for other
formerly unreachable upstream actors who impacted a resource used by those
downstream actors. Public authorities welcomed this initiative by sponsor-
ing a process for which both parties have aligned interests: both categories
of stakeholders wish to maintain good water quality, to keep the employment
rate, to sell oysters and to develop an attractive region. Consequences of this
implementation are praised by actors, by public authorities, but the direct
impact on water is difficult to measure (interview with NSW food authority,
November 2014): many factors apart from the artifact implementation may
impact water quality; changes in practices may have been adopted without
the existence of the artifact. Despite the absence of measurable consequences,
impacts of the process are multiple, and mostly positive, as shown by the
ENCORE framework and transitions seen in SES mental model.
10.2 Dealing with microbiological threat in Thau
In the Thau Lagoon, the main artifact implemented oriented towards the mi-
crobiological threat is OMEGA Thau, a system developed by local public au-
thorities and scientists that models and monitors water flows in the catchment.
As a spin-off, water quality information destined to oyster farmers, swimmers
and recreational boaters are transmitted. Information on potential imminent
sale bans is provided in timely fashion to oyster farmers, so that they are able
to take measures to prepare the ban and continue selling oysters.
10.2.1 A difference that makes a difference?
Thau Lagoon oyster farmers are subject to the same microbiological issues as
NSW growers. Yet, the artifact that has been developed has different conse-
quences on the system. The ENCORE framework is appropriate to analyze
those consequences (Table 10.3). I chose the same type of stakeholders as in
the previous section, except for house owners that I replaced by project spon-
sors, stakeholders for whom the impact of the existence of this model is more
relevant.
Consequences for oyster farmers are limited in the short run, but may
be more substantial in the long term. As a reminder, traditional small scale
activities (“petits métiers” (Giovannoni, 1995; Sécolier, 2009)) are placed at the
heart of local development schemes of this catchment (cf. SAGE-Thau, 2015)
and are well represented in local instances, especially during the participation
phase dedicated to develop those schemes (SMBT, 2012). Legitimacy of oyster
farmers and fishermen, at least in the eye of public authorities, over the use of
the resource is granted and demonstrated through these documents.
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Figure 10.2: Information regarding microbiological threats included in
OMEGA Thau.
OMEGA Thau in itself has limited consequences for oyster farmers on
the short run since predictions are heavily dependent on weather forecast and
growers know that heavy rains usually have sale bans as a result. Their depu-
ration basins are constrained in size and are usually too small to be able to
store more than a few days worth of oysters.
Interviews have revealed that grassroots farmers were not aware of the
existence of the OMEGA Thau project (despite meetings organized by the
Syndicat Mixte du Bassin de Thau (SMBT)), even after several years of de-
velopment. Adding to this fact, most farmers told me that having information
a little earlier would not significantly change their practices for the reason
stated above. According to an oyster farmer interviewed in April 2014: “We
will never get information more accurate than the weather forecast. [...] If we
are informed that it is going to rain, we stock oysters in our depuration basins.
No need for big models”. This element allows to conclude that the difference
created by the existence of OMEGA Thau does not make much difference for
oyster farmers and can thus be considered as non-information.
On the long run, the situation is different. This model provides accurate
predictions of consequences on water flows of new developments. Sponsors
have to integrate this element to propose projects. Water quality on the long
run can be mastered with more precision than before. Water quality, measured
in terms of days of bans on sales have been improving steadily during the last
decade as shown by Table 8.2, p.130.
Despite possibly limited direct effects on oyster farmers, the implemen-
tation of this artifact will probably lead to improvements of water quality
management in the catchment. It is necessary to mention that this artifact
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Table 10.3: Possible evolution of stakeholders according to ENCORE dimen-
sions if OMEGA Thau is known by stakeholders.
† OF = Oyster farmer(s); ‡ WQ = Water quality.
Dim Differences generated by OMEGA Thau implementation
E
xt
er
na
l
OF† Almost no effect on the short run; Improvements
in knoweldge and impacts on WQ‡
Govt and councils Can use system to monitor water flows and pre-
dict WQ for developments (I, D)
Farmers None
Project sponsors Need to take WQ into account (I, D)
Community Safety during swimming and recreational fishing
(C)
N
or
m
at
iv
e OF Authorities are responsible for WQ management
Govt and councils Public authorities should take care of WQ
Farmers None
Project sponsors Should pay attention to consequences on WQ
Community None
C
og
ni
ti
ve
OF Public authorities do what they can to guarantee
WQ
Govt and councils Can master future developments projects im-
pacts and understand water flows
Farmers None
Project sponsors Individual projects have global consequences
(I, D)
Community Water quality is an important issue
O
pe
ra
ti
on
al OF Limited (warning a little earlier) (D)
Govt and councils Possess a decision aid tool to predict conse-
quences of new developments (I, D)
Farmers None
Project sponsors Need to pass model test (under admissible levels)
R
el
at
io
na
l OF Good relations with public authorities
Govt and councils Are legitimate monitors of WQ
Farmers None
Project sponsors May feel more constrained
Community Good image of local authorities
E
qu
it
y
OF Feel that their resource is managed correctly
Govt and councils Better acceptance of decisions
Farmers None
Project sponsors Unknown
Community Unknown
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is not the only means through which local authorities are improving water
quality and water management in the whole basin. Participation of actors
in drafting documents (information coming from n people to an institution I
as proposed in Table 4.4, p.55) is a central element of their schemes creation
strategy. Moreover, deals with localities and messages to the general public
(from I to n) promote a lower use of biocides2.
Interviews have shown that there is little solidarity among oyster farmers in
normal conditions (“we are kind of single people”). They compete on prices, no
coalition has ever resisted to free-riding temptations. However, oyster growers
have a sense of community when a decision is deemed unfair, for instance long
sell bans due to localized events. In those cases, farmers may join their forces
to obtain a reconsiderations on bans.
10.2.2 Partial conclusion
In the Thau Basin case, the information sharing artifact is mostly a technical
tool that is little known by actors (though solid on the modeling side). Effects
of its implementation are limited to increasing knowledge on water flows (which
is the goal of the artifact). Percolation effects are much more limited than in
NSW (see Table 10.3).
However, water quality is improving, projects are better mastered and
constrained. The information sharing artifact is here not the central element of
the global strategy for resource management. It is only one of many strategies
deployed by local authorities, and oyster farmers are already legitimate users
of the resource. They are consulted when strategies are implemented.
In Table 10.2, I have shown differences made on actors’ mental models in
NSW due to EMS implementation. Most transitions are linked to the creation
process and not to information itself. In Thau, differences made by OMEGA
Thau on the SES are negligible since the artifact improves direct scientific
knowledge unlike the global process that led to changes in the NSW case.
There were no global meetings with oyster farmers that allowed discussion
and changes in perception of the SES. Thus, I did not create a table as for the
NSW case.
The number of oyster farmers in the Thau Lagoon makes a collective im-
plementation of these projects difficult. There is a representation of farmers
interests through their official lobby, the Comité Régional de la Conchyliculture
de Méditerranée (CRCM) public authorities communicate with. Furthermore,
public authorities are seen as responsible for water management.
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Table 10.4: Comparison of IS artifacts - what information do they provide?
Artifact C I D E
EMS General Assessment Aggregation;
Consequences
OMEGA Thau Microbiological
flows
Prediction Projects Measures
10.3 Discussing strategies
A question of scope Let me recall the main sub question of the thesis
tackled in this chapter: what are the consequences of information sharing
artifacts’ implementation and existence to face a public threat, specifically the
microbiological threat?
In both cases, information sharing artifacts have been implemented. In
NSW, the artifact originates from the oyster farming industry, while in Thau,
the artifacts emanates from public authorities. In both cases, the artifacts
gather information regarding the microbiological threat (Table 10.4), even
though EMSs are wider. One is updated every day using weather forecast
and multiple sensors, the other is updated every two years, using aggregated
information gathered along the years.
In NSW, actors have created an artifact which consequences go far beyond
a mere deepening of knowledge since it had consequences on their own soli-
darity and network, had tightening effects with other stakeholders, including
local authorities as shown using the ENCORE framework (Table 10.1). They
managed to close a loop, evoked in Section 2.2.3, p.18 and Figure 2.1, p.19,
using information as feedback and making allies of local authorities. Changes
are shown in Figure 10.3. EMSs can be used as a communication tool between
oyster farmers and upstream actors, even without local councils intervention.
Figure 10.4 shows that the information sharing artifact OMEGA Thau
is connected only to regulators and local councils, not touching (originating
from or going to) other stakeholders. Local authorities are institutions that
are boundaries between local actors and the environment, which goes hand in
hand with local economics due to the high economic value of the environment.
Direct measures of impact of information sharing artifacts are difficult to
evaluate. First, those artifacts are quite recent and effects of measures and
practices triggered by the existence of these artifacts are not immediate. Sec-
ond, some practices, improvements or developments are independent from the
existence of the artifacts and yet have an effect on water quality.
2http://www.smbt.fr/content/lutte-contre-les-pesticides
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Figure 10.3: Consequences of EMS implementation. In dotted red, links that
did not exist before the implementation.
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Figure 10.4: Consequences of OMEGA Thau implementation. In dotted red,
links that did not exist before the implementation.
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How to convince actors? According to OceanWatch facilitator, success
in implementation of an industry-emergent artifact is fundamentally linked to
the creation and appropriation process. In NSW estuaries, there are a limited
number of oyster farmers, ranging from 10 to 30, making meetings with all
actors possible. Initially, a few proactive farmers decided to create EMSs for
their farm, realizing soon that their leeway was limited due to the openness of
the system they act in. In their own estuaries, proactive farmers managed to
convince the other oyster farmers, backed by OceanWatch who is a legitimate
organization for actors in the seafood industry, interfacing public authorities
and industry.
The first estuary-wide EMSs began this way. After the first example, and
advocated both by OceanWatch, drawing on previous success, and by profes-
sional farmers, the process became increasingly clear: OceanWatch facilitator
manages to find the local champion, the actor who is respected and listened
to by others, convinces him of the importance and outcomes of implementing
an EMS and finally the process, a series of meetings, begins.
Actors that I interviewed in France complained about the lack of inter-
actions with others, about their individualism and about a lack of cohesion
or even a sense of community. Projects such as implementation of an EMS,
emerging from meetings among actors and not created by an intern doing re-
search in a laboratory, may be of help to make the dimensions listed in the
ENCORE framework converge towards more cohesion for various types of ac-
tors. Implementing such an artifact may be a possible way to go beyond the
listed frustrations.
In the Thau Lagoon, there are more than 500 sheds. It is thus impossi-
ble to organize meetings with everyone and ask about their opinions. Sheds
are located along the shore in patches. Those patches contain a more rea-
sonable number of actors. A similar process as the Australian one may then
be launched. As explained above, this strategy needs to be carefully planned,
introduced by local, influential, and respected actors who are convinced of the
interest of such a process. Since oyster farmers possess a local lobby that is
supposed to be in charge of collective issues, the project may originate from
there. When I came back to France to present findings on the Australian case,
the lobby proved interested in the existence of such a document. Water quality
issues are overseen at the catchment level by local public authorities and oys-
ter farming and fishing are located at the center of local development schemes.
Implementing such EMSs would probably mostly make oyster farmers’ mental
model involve, through the generation of discussions, more than have direct
effects on water quality.
These observations show the importance of the creation process which has
to be carefully thought in advance so that actors accept the idea of going
through such a lengthy route.
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10.4 Conclusion
To face a public threat, in our case microbiological overflows threatening water
quality, information sharing is thus a possible and effective option.
In the Thau Lagoon, the artifact has demanded considerable research and
consolidation work. The result is a neat tool that can mostly be used to
predict water flows (and soon consequences of floods) for a few days and model
outcomes of new developments regarding water quality. Using the ENCORE
framework (Table 10.3), I have shown that consequences of this information
sharing artifact are mostly limited to the intended initial goal: to monitor and
predict flows. The system and actors not directly concerned with the artifact
were only partly affected.
In NSW, farmers who developed “estuary-wide” EMSs together, managed
to create collateral beneficial effects for themselves and with others types of
actors of their surroundings, including the rather abstract “community”, as
shown in the ENCORE table (Table 10.1). One of the main of these effects
is legitimation of their role as stewards, and even sentinels, over water, specif-
ically water quality. This case enables to emphasize the importance of the
creation process of artifacts.
Furthermore, the NSW case shows an example of downstream actors, who
have to suffer upstream actors externalities and managed to create a feedback
flow of information from downstream to upstream. This action paved the way
to an effective change in practices and relations between those actors, with
the help of public authorities. Information sharing through the creation of
an artifact, an external representation, is here a way to effectively change the
scale of how actors perceive the system they act in. Information sharing is here
a way to strengthen links between actors of the same profession and create or
improve links with other types of actors.
Chapter 11
Information Sharing for Private
Threats: Virus
In this chapter, I focus on a threat that oyster farmers growing Pacific Oys-
ter Crassostrea Gigass (POs) around the world experience: the ostreid herpes
virus OsHV-1, that can kill up to 100% of oysters. To oyster farmers, this
threat is internal since the only users affected are oyster farmers. It is not
clear however if it is excludable or not: is it linked to the collective behavior
(the macrobehavior) of oyster farmers or linked to individual practices inde-
pendently from each other?
Three elements prompted me to create an agent-based model to study in-
formation sharing contribution in the virus context. Firstly, OsHV-1 has been
evoked regularly by oyster farmers I interviewed as the main issue they cur-
rently have to face. Secondly, Nash and Rubio-Zuazo (2012) have developed
an information sharing system as a proof of concept (according to the au-
thors) called the Oyster Information Portal that would combine information
about quantities, mortalities and growing rates so that oyster farmers could
acquire knowledge and adapt. Oyster farmers proved interested in the concept.
Thirdly, tracking participation and outcomes of information on the long run
is an impossible task: situations are not reproducible and other factors have
influences. Agent-Based Modeling (ABM) offers the opportunity of tracking
and reproducing those elements.
It is not sure how excludable the virus threat is and several scenarios can
be considered. Since the focus of the thesis is on information sharing conse-
quences, I decided to build a model were interactions are placed at the informa-
tion sharing level only, with a goal of collective learning on the virus dynamics
leading to individual decision-making. I took the option of designing the threat
as a private threat where the virus acts at the batch level independently.
In this chapter, first, I use the Overview, Design concepts, and Details
(ODD)+D protocol (Section 6.4.1.3, p.91, see also Grimm et al. (2013); Müller
et al. (2013)) to describe the model. Second, I analyze simulation outcomes.
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11.1 Agent-based model description
In this section, I describe the agent-based model that I developed to investigate
how information sharing can influence actors and the resource they produce.
I follow the ODD+D protocol (Grimm et al., 2013; Müller et al., 2013) by
answering to the listed questions in the cited papers (the table containing all
questions is reproduced in Table A.1, p.256).
11.1.1 Overview
Purpose What effects can information sharing have on adaptive manage-
ment of a renewable natural resource used by some actors in the context of an
internal threat, i.e. the herpes virus? As postulated in Chapter 4, for this type
of threat, the main goal of sharing information is for agents to learn environ-
mental dynamics. Does information sharing increase their knowledge of the
resource and its dynamics? Can it lead to better outcomes for the environment
and for the agents? Does implementing an information sharing system help
oyster farmers to adapt to this virus they do not fully understand?
This ABM is designed as an exploratory one. It is not conceived as an
operational and predictive decision aid model that could be used by local
actors.
Entities, state variables and scales There are three main classes of enti-
ties in the model: OysterFarmer, Oyster and WaterCell. Figure 11.1 shows
the main classes of the model using an UML class diagram.
OysterFarmer They are cognitive agents. Based on interviews and following
an oyster farmer suggestion, I designed three main behaviors (type) in
the set {economicus, conservative, conscious}. I describe the be-
havior of these classes of agents in the “Individual prediction” strutural
element.
Oyster PO are the only oyster species considered. Three types of PO can be
grown. The Natural, an oyster that has to be caught in the wild, only in
summer. The other two are Hatchery oysters: Triploid and Diploid.
Triploids grow in 6 trimesters, while diploids and naturals grow in 12.
Both kinds of hatchery oysters can be ordered all year long. All oysters
are considered in batches containing up to 10,000 oysters. These batches
are placed on tables. More information on oysters biology and ecology
can be found in Section 7.2, p.105.
WaterCell This is the spacial entity. Viral elements are located in the water
and regularly kill oysters. Mortality is an increasing function of oyster
quantity and density (see Section 9.2.2, p.148 for a discussion). I de-
signed three virus dynamics scenarios including a null one (Figures 11.2
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Figure 11.1: UML class diagram representing the ABM main classes.
and 11.3 show virus scenarios and consequences on oyster farmers ex-
pected income). I chose a simple virus model presented in Gilligan (2002)
to see impacts of information sharing in these scenarios. The virus hits
depending on quantity of oysters located on a table only. I chose to assign
to the virus a sigmoid function of oyster quantityt q: f(q) = K
1+a.e−rq de-
fined for q ≥ 0 where a is a parameter that allows changing the sigmoid
mid-point abscissa, r a parameter that modifies the curve steepness and
K is the maximum of the function. Thus, a virus scenario is defined by
three triplets, S =< Sn, Sd, St > where Si =< ai, ri,Ki >, allowing the
parametrization of the sigmoid function for each of the three types of
oysters.
Three scenarios are considered:
• The first scenario, no mortality, is the reference scenario, used as a base
for comparison.
• In the second scenario, there is a virus that hits oysters. The virus is
the simplest to understand and designed so that mortality curves never
overlap: ∀q ∈]0; 10, 000],Mt(q) > Md(q) > Mn(q).
• The third scenario is close to the second one. In this case, curves overlap
at some point. Triploids end up being those with the highest mortality
rate when quantities reach a specific point.
Process overview and scheduling Figure 11.4 shows the relations that the
agents have with the environment and the information sharing system through
the main loop. An agent observes outcomes of her practices in her oyster
farm. She shares information through her network and the information sharing
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Figure 11.2: Annual mortality as a function of oyster quantity for the two
scenarios with virus mortality.
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Figure 11.3: Theoretical expected income along oyster quantities taking into
account oysters growing cycle length. In the “no overlapping” scenario, natural
oysters give better income whatever the chosen quantity. Whatever the quan-
tity, for a given oyster type, the maximal income is obtained around 2,500 and
3,000 oysters per batch. In the “overlapping” scenario, hatchery oysters are
the best option, with little difference between triploids and diploids. If oyster
farmers choose batch sizes over 6,000 oysters, the best economic option is to
choose natural oysters.
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Figure 11.4: Main loop of the model.
system. Information provided to friends and to the information system are the
same, but the values that flows back to the agents are different since they are
based on different sets of information. This information is compiled through an
aggregation method (see “Learning”, p.178) that enables the agent to update
her beliefs and then choose a strategy. These strategies are implemented and
impact the environment (the oysters and the virus).
The main step is shown in the sequence diagram (Figure 11.5). Each step
lasts for a trimester: several steps only occur during specific trimesters in the
year. The virus attacks only during the second trimester and oyster farmers
choose their mix at the end of that trimester. Natural catchment can only
occur during summer, the third trimester of each year.
11.1.2 Design concepts
The following paragraphs contain all concepts listed in the ODD+D protocol
in an order that makes the description as easy to read as possible (Müller et al.,
2013). As explained above, there are three main classes in the model. Among
them, Oyster and WaterCell have very simple behaviors. Thus, I focus on
OysterFarmer.
Theoretical and empirical background I used a mixture of empirical
and theoretical elements to construct the model. As explained in Chapter 5,
empirical data comes from the case study investigation with semi-structured
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Figure 11.5: Sequence diagram for the main step of the model. Such a step
lasts for one trimester.
interviews, participatory observation, and used gray and official literature and
reports.
Theoretical choices have been guided by An (2012) who suggests some
categories that may be used by modelers of human decision-making in cou-
pled humans and natural systems (CHANS). I use several of these categories.
First, I ruled out participatory methods (the model is first intended as theo-
retical), space-based decision making (oyster farms are fixed) and evolutionary
programming (behaviors, but not beliefs and decisions, are fixed during the
initialization). I focused on psychosocial and cognitive models: agents have
beliefs about the environment and the consequence of their actions on their
income and production (see “Individual prediction”, p.178) which can be partly
shaped by an institution, the information sharing system. I implemented differ-
ent decision models for each type of OysterFarmer. Specifically, “economicus”
use a microeconomic model of utility maximization and “conservative” use a
heuristic rule following a procedural rationality (Simon, 1976).
Narukawa (2007) describes thoroughly a large number of decision models
based on information coming from different sources that have to be aggregated.
Information fusion can be done basically following two modeling frameworks:
probability and fuzzy reasoning. I chose a probabilistic approach since obser-
vations (as described further) are realizations of events based on independent
and identically distributed random variables. Since agents are using these
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Table 11.1: Networks scenarios used in the model
Type of net-
work
Description Expected effect
Neighborhood
graph
Each agent is friend with immedi-
ate neighbors (2 on each side)
Slow diffusion of infor-
mation, local learning
Preferential
attachment
Variation of the small world net-
work where new nodes are at-
tached preferentially to those who
are most connected.
Fast diffusion of in-
formation, some nodes
who have more influence
than others
Homophily
network
Agents are preferentially linked to
agents who have chosen the same
mix
Clustering and slow dif-
fusion of information
realizations to build personal beliefs and need to cope with uncertainty, a
probabilistic approach based on a weighted average operator is natural (see
“Learning”, p.178).
Individual sensing Agents sense production and mortality rates of oysters
located on their farms. They gather exact information. Agents get information
about other oyster farmers’ results through the means of social networks and
an information sharing system (see “Interaction”, p.177).
Interaction The virus acts independently on each oyster farm, there is no
specific interaction at the resource level. Rather, interactions occur at the in-
formation sharing level: networks and central information sharing system. Net-
work types influence learning and innovation diffusion (Jackson et al., 2008).
Thus, I designed three graph scenarios (Table 11.1). Agents send informa-
tion to and receive it from friends through their network. The first scenario,
neighborhood graph, is based on interviews of oyster farmers in the Thau La-
goon saying that they often had little or no relation with others, and mostly
with neighbors. This observation is possibly specific to the Thau Lagoon and
may even not be precise enough to describe the local network since I did not
conduct a social network analysis.
The second is a classical network found in many real life examples: the
preferential attachment network (Barabási and Réka, 2002). Its main char-
acteristics are its small diameter and the presence of hubs (nodes with high
degree), allowing fast spreading of information through the network. The first
two networks are created during the initialization.
The last type of network is based on homophilia (Golub and Jackson, 2010;
Jackson and López-Pintado, 2013), where oyster farmers that choose the same
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strategies are more likely to exchange information. The network is entirely
recreated every 12 steps (3 years). Since agents collect mostly information
from people who are alike, the main expected effect of this kind of network is
to make innovation processes slower.
Collectives Agent do not interact directly in a collective. However, there is
a collective object: the information sharing system. I use the typology given
in Chapter 4 to describe thoroughly the information sharing system. The goal
of the system is to collect information about mortalities experienced by oyster
farmers practicing different methods. All oyster farmers can write personal
and local information, all oyster farmers can read aggregated information. It
is possible to consider that a dynamic fraction of the population contributes
or reads, but the study of extreme situations needs to be conducted first to
determine whether the model should be pushed further. Granularity of infor-
mation received by agents is limited to a single value (actually, a set of values
for each type of oyster): the system averages agents observations for all types
of oysters and classes of oyster batches. The information system is updated
annually since the virus hits once a year.
The information system is well designed since the information it gathers
and computes is a theoretically convergent model of the virus dynamics. The
more information the system gets, the more precise the information aggregated
in the model is. There are two possible discrepancies between virus dynamics
and the representation in the model: no agent chooses a specific practice,
leading to absence of information; too few agents provide information, leading
to biased results.
Learning Learning comes through observation of the environment, infor-
mation exchange with friends and information aggregated in the information
sharing system.
For each type of oyster, oyster farmers obtain three distributions of ob-
servations: their personal observations, their friends’ observations and the
aggregated information provided by the system. Then, agents perform a com-
bination (a weighted aggregation) of those distributions to obtain their own
beliefs on mortality rates. See Table 11.2, Figure 11.6 and the paragraph
on “Individual decision making”, p.180, for a description of mortality belief
construction.
Personal learning is the main goal of information exchange in the present
case of private threat. Collective learning appears in the external representa-
tion created by the information sharing system that agents use for their own
decision making.
Individual prediction The distributions obtained during the learning phase
allow agents to make their prediction of future mortalities and update their
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Figure 11.6: Averaging of individual, friends and information system observa-
tions with coefficients (a, b, c) = (13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3). This operation is done for each of
the three types of oysters.
Table 11.2: Aggregation scenarios - coefficient used for distribution aggrega-
tion. Scenarios are compared to the no information sharing one. ISS = infor-
mation sharing system
Own Friends ISS Type Expected outcome
1 0 0 No information shar-
ing
Slow learning curve
1
2
1
2 0 Own and friends ex-
perience
Increased learning
1
2 0
1
2 Own and ISS Increased learning
1
3
1
3
1
3 Equal trust among
sources
0 0 1 Use only the ISS Important variations -
Converge to the same
strategies with little ex-
ploration
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ideal quantities of oysters per batch, the first step of their decision-making pro-
cess. Their predictions are actually beliefs that can be erroneous since based
on their own experience, their friends’ and the information gathered in the
information sharing system.
Individual decision-making Figure 11.7 shows the activity diagram for
agents decision-making. An agent has to choose sequentially every year their
ideal quantities per batch Q =< Qt, Qd, Qn > for each type of oysters and a
mix M ∈ M of oysters among triploids, diploids and naturals, where M is
the set of possible mixes in proportions. M consists of only one type, two or
three types of oysters equally divided, i.e. 7 choices1.
Oyster farmers are endowed with tolerance levels, the same for all farmers,
Tmin and Tmax, with Tmin < Tmax that they use to increase or decrease the
number of oysters they think is good per batch. The increase and decrease
are of a parameter q > 0. These parameters can be modified to make farmers
more or less risk adverse or taker. Thus, they use the following formula to
choose their ideal quantity Qi, i ∈ {t, d, n}, at time t + 1, for all three kinds
of oysters:
Qi(t+ 1) =

Qi(t)− q if mort(Qi(t)) > Tmax
Qi(t) + q if mort(Qi(t)) < Tmin
Qi(t) otherwise
(11.1)
Q is updated in the same way for all agents. It is the answer to the
following question: “If I had to use these oysters, how many should I use per
batch?” After choosing these ideal quantities, agents can choose a mix using
an expected profit computation.
Several models for decision making are designed according to the category
the agent belongs to, specifically:
1. If the agent is economicus, she uses a microeconomic model where she
maximizes her utility (the expected profit) over the set of mixesM she
can choose from using the following formula:
M = argmaxMi∈M
∑
i∈{n,d,t}
Mi.Qi.(s× (1−mort(Qi))expo(i)− bi) (11.2)
where s and bi are respectively the selling (which is independent from
oyster type) and buying prices, expo(i) is the exposure of each kind
1
M =
{
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Figure 11.7: Activity diagram: belief update and decision making process
of oysters. Since triploids live only 18 months, they are on average
exposed 1.5 times during their lifetime, while other kinds are exposed
3 times. (1−mort(Qi))expo(i) corresponds to the believed survival rate.
For simplicity, I made the hypothesis that mortality is independent from
oyster age.
2. If the agent is conservative, then she will keep M i as long as it is
satisfactory. The agent is satisfied if M i provides a positive income. If
she is no longer satisfied, then she chooses randomly a mix M ∈M and
computes the profit using Equation 11.2 until she finds one she predicts
would give her a positive income.
3. If the agent is conscious then she never changes M i, growing only nat-
ural oysters. This type of agent is important in the population for infor-
mation sharing purposes.
Heterogeneity Agents are heterogeneous mainly in two ways:
1. Type: This has an influence on the decision making process, more pre-
cisely the mix choice.
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2. Information use: Agents have different ways of weighting information
from the three sources.
Stochasticity The virus randomly affects according to fixed probabilities
following the scenarios described in “Entities, state variables and scales” (Fig-
ure 11.2). During the initialization, oyster farmers are endowed with a random
number of tables. The preferential attachment network has some stochastic
elements (the order of agents enter the network and the agent they are first
connected with) and the homophilia network is shuﬄed every 12 steps follow-
ing a stochastic rule. When they need to change their mixes, “conservatives”
randomly try different mixes until finding an acceptable one.
To gum out stochasticity, I have chosen to repeat 40 times each scenario.
This number is high enough to make convergence effective.
Observation Data are collected at each time step. The following indicators
are saved: mortality rates and total production for the environment; batch
size, mix types and agents’ beliefs.
11.1.3 Details
Implementation details The model is implemented in Cormas v.2014.5.14.
(Bousquet et al., 1998; Le Page et al., 2012), a multi-agent developing plat-
form specifically designed for situations where humans interact with a natural
environment. It proposes an agent-based meta-model organized around three
main classes of entities: agents, spatial entities and objects (passive entities).
It is coded in the smallTalk language and uses a VisualWorks software. Sce-
narios were generated and outcomes analyzed with R v.3.2.1 (R Core Team,
2015) through RStudio v.0.98.1102 (RStudio Team, 2012). This model led to
developing a module that links R and Cormas. Model, data, scripts and docu-
mentation are available on open ABM (at the moment of printing this thesis,
the model is submitted and should be available).
Initialization At the initialization, oyster farmers are equipped with tables,
and a random mix (only natural if the farmer is ’conscious’), tables are loaded
with batches of oysters in the proportions given by the mix. Farmers are not
aware of the existence of the virus and have beliefs of zero mortality for all
oysters. See next section to get initial parameters.
11.1.4 Submodels and parameters
Oyster farmers type distribution I defined three scenarios for population
distribution. A type is described with a triplet of proportions of each type
of farmers < Peconomicus, Pconservative, Pconscious >. I supposed that there
are always “economicus” agents. I studied situations where there are only
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Table 11.3: Experimental plan.
Factor Parameter(s) Modalities Scenarios
Farmer type < Peco, Pconse, Pconsc >
< 1, 0, 0 >, < 12 ,
1
2 , 0 >,
< 512 ,
5
12 ,
1
6 >
3
Number oyster
farmers Number 10, 25, 50, 100 4
Decision
making
{Quantity,
<Tmin, Tmax>}
{500, <40,70>},
{500, <60,80>},
{2000, <40,70>},
{2000, <60,80>}
4
Virus Mortality rates Figures 11.2 and 11.3 3
Information
sharing and
social networks
<Personal, Network, ISS>
with Personal, ISS ∈ {Yes,
No}, Network ∈ {None,
Neigh, Pref, Homo}
<Yes, Any, No>,
<Yes, Any, Yes>,
<No, None, Yes>
9
“economicus” < 1, 0, 0 >, “economicus” and “conscious” < 12 ,
1
2 , 0 > and
the three types < 512 ,
5
12 ,
1
6 > (“conscious” are a rare type).
Number of oyster farmers I chose four scenarios: 10, 25, 50, 100. All
oyster farmers are given an initial budget allowing them to fill twice all
their tables with triploids.
Social network scenarios I chose three scenarios: neighborhood, preferen-
tial attachment and homophilia networks (see “Interactions” and Ta-
ble 11.1).
Information sharing I defined five information sharing scenarios, where agents
mix their own experience, their friends’ and information gathered in a
collective system (Table 11.2). Also see “Learning”.
Decision making This factor is driven by two dimensions: the importance of
change in quantities, q, and risk aversion, Tmin and Tmax (see “Individual
decision-making” and Equation 11.1). I have kept two values for q: 500
(small change) and 2,000 (big change); and two sets of values for the
< Tmin, Tmax > ordered pair: <40,70> (risk adverse) and <60,80> (risk
taker). There are four decision making scenarios.
Virus Three scenarios are tested: no virus and virus with or without overlap-
ping lethal rates (Figures 11.2 and 11.3).
In total, there are 4 × 2 + 1 = 9 combined scenarios for graphs and infor-
mation sharing. There are 3× 4× 4× 3 = 144 for the rest of the parameters.
In total, I tested 9 × 144 = 1296 scenarios. All those scenarios were run and
repeated 40 times. These scenarios are summed up in Table 11.3.
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11.2 Analysis
To analyze simulation outputs, I follow the main steps of the model as de-
scribed in Figure 11.4. Such a method enables a thorough tracking of con-
sequences of information sharing at different stages. First, I examine the en-
vironment (i.e. oysters) displaying variations of graphs on three indicators:
mortality rates, total production and size of batches. After showing simple
graphs, I plotted differences between information sharing scenarios and the
no information sharing one, and between network scenarios with and with-
out information sharing system. Then, I focused on agents tracking evolution
of oyster farmers’ beliefs (distance with theoretical virus dynamics and pure
beliefs) and practices (types and change of mixes).
I looked at an aggregated level. Most graphs of the following tables re-
sult from the aggregation of 48 different scenarios (4 population, 3 types of
oyster farmers and 4 decision scenarios) each repeated 40 times. The idea
behind these graphs is to try to find general behaviors allowing to draw broad
conclusions or to suggest ways to explore further.
For most of the following graph tables, I represented Virus × Informa-
tion scenarios: virus situation in rows and information sharing scenarios in
columns. Neighbor, Preferential and Homophilia are situations where agents
share information through different types of networks (Table 11.1). The ap-
position of ISS (as for Information Sharing System) adds to the previous type
of network.
11.2.1 Oysters and environment
Global view The first indicators are linked to the environment, and thus
oysters, through density and health. I inspect three indicators: mortality rates
(Figure 11.8), total quantity of oysters (Figure 11.9) and average size of batches
(Figure 11.10).
Figure 11.8 shows that in the “overlapping” scenario, triploids mortality
rate plateaus at 60% for all information sharing scenarios, except the “ho-
mophilia” that reaches 65% and the “ISS only” that displays lower rates, 55%.
In the “no overlapping” one, triploids initial mortality rate of 80% drops to 60%
in 20 steps for the personal, neighbor and preferential attachment situations,
with or without ISS (and even down to 45% in the “ISS only” scenario), while
the homophilia scenario leads to higer mortality rates (65%). The other two
types of oysters follow the same path with an initial increase over 20 steps and
further decrease with the same type of differences between informatin shar-
ing scenarios (these differences are more specifically tackled in the following
paragraph).
As far as production is concerned, a combination of Figure 11.9 and 11.10
allows to understand how oysters are grown in the estuary. Cyclic variations
are an artifact of initialization. In the “overlapping” scenario, production of
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Figure 11.8: Mortality rates.
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Figure 11.9: Quantity of oysters.
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triploids is low during 10 steps and steadily increases in all scenarios, with a
bigger production in scenarios where information is shared (compared to the
“personal” scenario). Naturals and diploids follow the same pattern with an
initial increase of production that gradually declines at the expense of tripoids.
The size of triploid batches hardly change, while the size of batches of naturals
and diploids increases first to decrease after respectively 40 and 20 steps. In
the “no overlapping” scenario, initial production and size of batches of naturals
is doubled within 5 steps to decline progressively at the expense of a slight
growth in triploid production, stored in batches of small size (3500 oysters
while batches may contain up to 10,000). The “ISS only” scenario shows a
particular behavior with lower sizes of batches for an increased production of
naturals and lower production of triploids in “no overlapping”.
Adding information In this paragraph, I adapted the graphs described
above to compare information sharing scenarios with the “personal” one. Lines
are above (resp. below) zero if the value has increased (resp. decreased) com-
pared to “personal” (I calculated “value of new scenario minus value of ’per-
sonal’ scenario”). Figure 11.11 shows differences in relative mortality rates. In
the “overlapping” scenario, the addition of any type of information sharing, ex-
cept “ISS only”, leads to a decrease of mortality rates for diploids and naturals
of 10%, and an increase of less than 5% for triploids. In the “ISS only” sce-
nario, drops in mortality rates are valid for all types of oysters. These changes
begin to be noticeable after 5 years (20 trimesters). In the “no overlapping”
scenario, changes are minor regarding triploids for all scenarios except in the
“homophilia” network case where results are worse, and in the “ISS only” one
where triploids mortality ebbs by more than 20% to finally reach minus 15%.
Mortality rates for naturals show little variations along time, while diploids
converge towards a minus 10% in all cases but the “homophilia” that leads to
results close to non information sharing scenarios.
Figure 11.12 represents differences in total quantity of oysters grown. It
appears that in the “no virus” case, oyster farmers tend to choose and grow
triploids (not represented in the figure). It is coherent with what occurs in real-
life since it is by far the best economic option. Agents initially favor natural
oysters with a decrease of this quantity and an increase in triploid growing
along time in the “no overlapping” scenarios. The “overlapping” scenarios show
a higher rate of triploids being grown. The impact of information sharing
scenarios here are difficult to perceive, but the “ISS only” scenario leads to
amplified effects compared to the other situations.
Finally, in Figure 11.13, I plotted the differences in average batch size. In
the “overlapping” scenario, batch sizes for triploids increase in a similar fashion,
reaching a size of 1,000 more oysters after 20 years than in the no information
sharing case. Diploids follow a close trend, and naturals are diminished, except
in the “homophilia” scenarios where values keep following changes observed in
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represent the difference between the named scenario and “personal”. A line below
zero means that sharing information leads to lower mortality rates. The apposition
of “ISS” adds the information sharing system to the previous network type.
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Figure 11.12: Differences in quantity of oysters compared to “personal”.
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Figure 11.13: Differences in average size of oyster batches. Maximum size is
of 10,000 oysters.
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the “personal” scenario. The “ISS only” case has once again a specific behavior
with batches of diploids and naturals quickly dropping by respectively 1,000
and 2,000 oysters. This number is increasing again after this drop. In the “no
overlapping” scenario, trends are similar, except in the “ISS only” case where
triploid batches are also diminished by 2,000 oysters in the beginning, catching
up with no information levels after 40 steps (10 years).
Globally, these graphs show that the use of information by actors leads to
significant changes in mortality rates, in batch sizes and quantity of oysters
grown. Implementing an ISS systematically diminishes mortality rates. The
“ISS only” case shows a specific behavior that calls for more investigation.
ISS vs no ISS One of the main goals of the model is to understand conse-
quences of implementing an information artifact. In this paragraph, I follow
this idea to plot the same indicators as in the previous ones focusing on com-
paring information scenarios with and without artifact for each type of initial
network. Results are shown in Figures 11.14, 11.15 and 11.16.
Whatever the network, mortality rates (Figures 11.14) are always lower
with the addition of the ISS, except for triploids that do not show any im-
provement, while triploids represent the most important production. The
most drastic effect is obtained when the ISS is added to the “personal” scenario
(mortality rates diminish by 10% for diploids and naturals in the “overlapping”
case).
Total quantity of oysters in the estuary (Figure 11.15) are similar with and
without ISS, once again except in the “personal” scenario where changes are
tangible. The last graph showing average size of batches (Figure 11.16) gives
similar results: changes linked to the addition of an ISS are limited except in
the “personal” case that displays wider variations than with the other types of
scenarios.
Globally, the addition of new information is mostly useful when agents
have no direct record of experiences of other oyster farmers, that is, in the
“personal” scenario. This effect is due to the availability of a much wider set
of experiences through the ISS than with their own. In cases where oyster
farmers have access to a network of other farmers, differences created by the
ISS are close to null.
Global production So as to understand effects of information sharing in
the long run, I represented the cumulated total of production and mortality
over time in Figure 11.17 and 11.18 using the same comparisons as in the
previous paragraphs (comparison to “personal” and situations with - without
ISS). In these graphs, I plotted results as variations in percentage for oysters
regardless of type.
When comparing to the “personal” scenario (Figure 11.17), we can see
that in the “overlapping” virus case mortality and production increase, espe-
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Figure 11.14: Differences in relative mortality rates.
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Figure 11.15: Differences in total quantity of oysters.
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Figure 11.16: Differences in batch size. Maximum size is of 10,000 oysters.
Figures show, for each type of information sharing network scenario dif-
ferences between situations with and without ISS. A line above zero (resp.
below) means that production or mortality increased (resp. decreased) by x%
with the addition of new types of information sharing media.
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cially in the homophilia case (more than 10% increase in mortality and almost
10% increase in production), while the “ISS only” situation is the only one in
which production and mortality initially decrease to catch the levels of the
“personal” scenario after 20 years. In the “no overlapping” case, except for the
“homophilia” scenario, overall mortality and production are decreased by 5%,
and by 15% at the beginning for the “ISS only” scenario that catches back
the “personal” scenario at the end of the simulations. As in the previous virus
scenario, “homophilia” scenarios lead to steady increases in both mortality and
production over the years. This graph shows less visible effects than those that
can be observed in Figure 11.11 since triploid mortality hardly changes in the
various information sharing scenarios while it is by far the most popular choice
of oyster in all scenarios.
The general tendency when comparing situations with and without ISS is
that the effect of the ISS is limited (Figure 11.18). It is most visible in the “no
overlapping” case when an ISS is added to the “personal” situation. The effects
in other situations are negligible (less than 5% variations over 20 years).
11.2.2 Oyster Farmers
What are the global effects on agents?
I observed two different sides of oyster farmers. Following the step listed in
Figure 11.4, first, I investigated how agents’ beliefs evolved with information.
Second, I looked at how their practices (their choice of oysters to grow) changed
with time, tracking along choices made by agents. It is useless to study income
which is a multiple of production (the market buys all oysters at the same
price).
Beliefs I measured how oyster farmers’ beliefs changed in two ways: the
range of beliefs and the distance between beliefs and the real virus dynamics.
The first indicator measures dispersion of beliefs among the group of agents,
i.e. convergence in mental representations, while the second measures whether
these beliefs are close to a real knowledge of the virus.
Figure 11.19 shows boxplots, mapping distribution on mortality beliefs at
three different steps: after 2, 5 and 20 years. I chose to display the “over-
lapping” scenario, the equivalent graph for the “no overlapping” being similar.
Along the years, except for the “personal” scenario, dispersion of beliefs is de-
creasing and seems to be converging towards values roughly shared by agents.
The addition of the ISS leads to an even more condensed range of beliefs.
However, this convergence in beliefs is not necessarily correlated with a
more accurate knowledge of the environment dynamics. Figure 11.20 repre-
sents the euclidean distance between what oyster farmers believe and the real
virus dynamics at the end of the simulation.
In the model, the situation where agents have beliefs closest to the real
virus dynamics is the “economicus” only one where bars are shorter than in
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Figure 11.17: Cumulated differences in mortality rates and production over
the year compared to the “personal” scenario. A line above zero (resp. below)
means that production or mortality increased (resp. decreased) by x% with
the addition of new types of information sharing media.
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Figure 11.18: Same as above with a comparison of the effect of adding an ISS
to a network.
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Figure 11.19: Dispersion of oyster farmers’ beliefs on mortality rates for different batch sizes. In rows, I represented different
time steps corresponding to 2, 5 and 20 years after initialization.
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the other two situations. Small variations of quantities and low risk taking
leads to beliefs closer to the truth than others. The addition of any type
of information system (a global one and/or a network) creates more precise
results (beliefs are closer to the truth by 20%), especially in the “economicus,
conservative and conscious” scenario, except in “big change - high risk” where
the “ISS only” beliefs are less precise than with other types of information
sharing. Except from those observations, for a given population mix, results
do not vary according to information sharing scenarios.
Practices As for oyster farmers changing their mixes (Figure 11.21), the ag-
gregated effect is once again difficult to grasp. Differences between population
types scenarios are clearly visible: when the population is entirely constituted
of “economicus” agents, changes occur much more frequently than with other
types of agents. It is possible to see that the addition of various networks types
and the information sharing system moves the curves to the left, fastening the
decrease in changes. The pure ISS case exhibits the quickest drop in mix
changes. Differences between information sharing scenarios are not blatantly
apparent but these represent an aggregation of diverse scenarios which gums
out trajectories. This limit does not prevent these graphs from being instruc-
tive. The most noticeable, and seemingly shared by all scenarios, element is
that the share of oyster farmers changing their mixes converge towards zero.
This observation gives the idea of building convergence indicators that would
measure the time step at which this convergence occurs.
Evolution in practices can be globally observed in Figure 11.22 where I
represented choices of oyster mixes by farmers. In all cases, triploids are pre-
ferred compared to other types of oysters. In the “no virus” scenario, those
who do not choose to grow triploids are “conscious” oyster farmers who only
grow naturals and “conservative” who never have a reason to change their ini-
tial mix, randomly allocated during the initialization. In the “no overlapping”
scenario, natural oysters seem to be chosen at the beginning: they are the
best economic option. Little by little they are replaced with triploids while
they are less profitable. The “overlapping” scenario shows a faster growing
rate for triploids than for the others, possibly due to difficulties in interpre-
tation of mortality information. For a given virus scenario, it is possible to
observe differences between information sharing scenarios, but only in terms
of convergence speed.
In Figure 11.21, it appears that changes are convergent, but it is difficult to
observe differences clearly, even with a graph of differences. This fact prompted
me to define an indicator of convergence for mix changes that I defined as the
time step after which less than x% of agents change its mix. I called such an
indicator change convergence. This is a limit in the influence of information.
Since only a single value is defined per scenario, such an indicator allows for
a disaggregation of scenarios compared to the previous representations which
194 CHAPTER 11. IS FOR PRIVATE THREATS: VIRUS
Economicus Eco − Conservative Eco − Conserv − Conscious
0
2
4
6
0
2
4
6
0
2
4
6
0
2
4
6
Big − High
Big − Lo
w
Sm
all − High
Sm
all − Lo
w
Pe
rs
on
al
Pe
rs
o/
IS
S
Ne
igh
bo
r
Ne
igh
/IS
S
Pr
ef
er
en
tia
l
Pr
ef
/IS
S
Dy
na
m
ic
Dy
n/
IS
S
IS
S 
on
ly
Pe
rs
on
al
Pe
rs
o/
IS
S
Ne
igh
bo
r
Ne
igh
/IS
S
Pr
ef
er
en
tia
l
Pr
ef
/IS
S
Dy
na
m
ic
Dy
n/
IS
S
IS
S 
on
ly
Pe
rs
on
al
Pe
rs
o/
IS
S
Ne
igh
bo
r
Ne
igh
/IS
S
Pr
ef
er
en
tia
l
Pr
ef
/IS
S
Dy
na
m
ic
Dy
n/
IS
S
IS
S 
on
ly
Information sharing
D
is
ta
nc
e
virus Overlapping No overlapping
Euclidian distance between beliefs and real mortality at time = 5 years
Figure 11.20: Averaged euclidean distance between oyster farmers’ beliefs and
real virus dynamics after 5 years. The closest the bar is to 0, the closest oyster
farmers’ beliefs are to reality. In columns are the 3 population scenarios, in
rows, the 4 decision-making scenarios and each couple of columns represent one
of the 9 information sharing situations. “Economicus” only show the closest
belief to reality. The effect may be linked to a wider exploration than other
types of farmers due to their search for maximal income.
combined them. In Figure 11.23, I have plotted the convergence indicator
for 5% of farmers and plotted the three quartiles of the 40 simulations as
concentric disks.
The addition of an ISS systematically leads to faster convergence, with a
dramatic effect of almost immediate convergence in the “ISS only” scenario, ex-
cept when there are only “economicus” agents. In “personal” and “homophilia”
scenarios, there is no convergence whatever the other parameters of scenarios.
Within a single facet, for instance “Neigh/ISS”×“NO-ECs”, convergences may
vary from simple to double due to parameters such as decision or population
size which makes global conclusions on the role of information sharing hard to
draw.
Information hastens convergence, but does faster convergence lead to better
results for the environment and agents? Total production during the simula-
tion is an indicator that can be used as one linking the environment and agents
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Figure 11.21: Share of oyster farmers changing their mixes along time.
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Figure 11.22: Oyster farmers choice of mixes. Tr (respectively Di and Na)
stands for triploid (respectively diploid and natural) and mixes represent com-
binations of the previous pure choices.
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Figure 11.23: Change convergence (time step after which less than 5% of oyster farmers change their mix choice). A single point
represents 3 quartiles (white is first, brown second and black third) for this indicator across replicas of the same simulation.
For decisions, S represents small changes (500 oysters per season) and B big changes (2,000 oysters); L is for low risk (risk
averse) and H is for high risk (risk taker). Rows are virus coupled with population types scenarios: O stands for overlapping,
NO for no overlapping; E is economicus, ECs is economicus and conservative, ECC is economicus, conservative and conscious.
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Figure 11.24: Total production as a function of change convergence.
since mortality impacts production and agent choices are production-oriented.
Figure 11.24 shows total production as a function of convergence speed. In this
graph, I grouped scenarios according to population ratios. When population is
constituted only of “economicus”, total production is systematically lower than
with the addition of other types of agents. Maximal production is obtained
when the three types of agents are present. The “ISS only” situation leads to
surprisingly dispersed results for “economicus” where production changes from
simple to double. Observing this figure confirms that there is little difference
in the model for production for the various information sharing scenarios.
11.2.3 Conclusion on results
I have observed several aspects of the simulations. First, I investigated envi-
ronmental indicators: mortality rates, total number of oysters in the estuary
and batch size. I used two visualizations: I plotted differences with the no in-
formation sharing (“personal”) scenario; and the differences of situations with
and without ISS. Then, I observed whether agents’ beliefs converged towards
one another, and towards real dynamics. Finally, I looked at agents choices.
All these elements allowed to measure global consequences of information shar-
ing scenarios for the environment, beliefs and strategy nodes of Figure 11.4.
These graphs resulted from an aggregation of multiple scenarios, usually 48,
replicated 40 times. Conclusions obtained on different parts of model steps are
summed up in Table 11.4.
The most important effect of adding an ISS is when actors do not have ac-
cess to other farmers’ experiences through social networks. In situations where
198 CHAPTER 11. IS FOR PRIVATE THREATS: VIRUS
Table 11.4: Impacts of ISS implementation on the different aspects of the
model.
Aspect Consequence of ISS implementation
Prodution Variable according to other networks and virus sce-
narios (within limits of ±10%)
Mortality Variable according to other networks and virus sce-
narios (within limits of ±10%)
Beliefs Increased concentration of beliefs
Distance from truth Independent from ISS implementation, depends on
other variables (population heteogeneity and deci-
sion)
Mix choice Triploids are always preferred despite higher mor-
tality rates and not being the best economic option
(in the “overlapping” case)
Convergence speed Always faster with an ISS
there is a social network, effects on production and mortality are negligible and
do not all go in the same directions: mortality and production are increased
in the “homophilia” case and are decreased in others.
As far as agents are concerned, beliefs are widespread with personal infor-
mation only, are less dispersed and are systematically more concentrated when
an ISS is available. The ISS allows a convergence in beliefs within agents. This
convergence is not correlated with a more precise knowledge of the virus dy-
namics since the distance between beliefs and real virus dynamics is unchanged
throughout information sharing scenarios.
Oyster farmers end by choosing mostly triploid oysters, even in the “no
overlapping” case where natural oysters are more profitable whatever the quan-
tities of oysters in batches. This convergence towards the choice of growing
triploids happens faster when an ISS is implemented.
In the model, there may have not been enough possible strategies for oyster
farmers to adapt. This limited range of options is a fact in real-life, making
it difficult for oyster farmers to adopt practices to solve the virus threat. It
is possible that sharpened knowledge can be limited to this, without possible
implementation in actual practices. As explained in Section 9.2.2, p.148, when
viruses hit French or Australian oyster farmers, they finally had to swap oyster
species.
11.3 Conclusion
In this section, I explored possible consequences of information sharing scenar-
ios for actors who face a private threat: a threat that affects oyster farmers (an
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internal threat) and that oyster farmers can exclude themselves from. During
interviews, oyster farmers raised concerns about a virulent virus that strikes
oysters once a year. I decided to build an agent-based model featuring several
information sharing and virus scenarios. I added other variables that needed
to be integrated to the model: decision making, population size and hetero-
geneity.
Building the model led to unveil oyster farmers decision making schemes
and constraints, paving the way to an increasingly precise understanding of
choices and practices. What could be the consequences of implementing infor-
mation sharing in the described situation, on the agents and on the environ-
ment?
After building the model, I performed an analysis by comparing different
aspects of model outcomes by comparing information sharing scenarios in two
main manners: comparison with the no information sharing scenario; and com-
parison with and without ISS for each network scenario. The aspects that I
investigated are production, mortality and batch sizes for the environment; be-
liefs and distance to real virus dynamics as well as mix choice and convergence
for agents.
The analysis of the model shows that the effects of ISS implementation
are not clear and straightforward in all evaluation dimensions. The ISS is
mostly effective when there is no other means of communication such as a
social network. We can observe a convergence in beliefs without them being
closer to the true virus dynamics and convergence is all the more important
when an ISS is available. Shared knowledge leads to faster convergence in
practices choices but not to the most profitable.
The model does not include costs of ISS development, cost of appropriation
and time allocated to information sharing and interpreting by actors and is
purely oriented towards analysis of a content shared by all farmers in estuaries.
Even with these limits, impacts of ISS implementation are here limited and
ambiguous.

Part V
Discussion
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Chapter 12
Discussion
In a global context of intense pressure on natural resources, especially water
and its quality, the goal of the thesis was to study possible impacts of infor-
mation sharing artifacts implementation to help manage a natural resource
at local levels. Intuitively, implementing such artifacts should lead to better
knowledge of the resource, and thus better management by actors (even when
they do not know each other) as suggested by Young et al. (2006).
In this document, I question this hypothesis by exploring two case studies
on oyster farming. Oyster growers act in estuaries which are intrinsically open
environments: the quality of their water is mostly affected by users acting
outside of it. Oyster farmers are even the most demanding actors in terms
of water quality: if water quality is good enough for oyster farming, then all
other uses of estuarine water are guaranteed.
I conducted this research by combining methodological approaches: two
case study investigation using interviews, participatory observation of meetings
and study of artifacts; together with a theoretical agent-based model inspired
by case studies. Studying artifacts led to identify the concept of threats:
tackling them is the main reason for developing such artifacts. Thanks to this
concept, I was able to explore information sharing stakes linked to the three
types of threats that I have found in the case studies.
In this chapter, firstly, I critically discuss the methodology that I em-
ployed in the thesis. Then, I discuss, advantages, limits and perspectives of
the concept of threats as it has been proposed in Chapter 3 and applied to
the case studies. Finally, I draw lessons to learn from the outcomes regarding
information sharing to deal with threats in the context of Natural Resources
Management (NRM) and propose steps to move forward and confirm those
findings.
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12.1 On the methodological approach
The subject of information sharing artifacts impact on NRM is vast and several
methodological approaches are possible. The method that I used consisted in
investigating two different cases on oyster farming, a single and wide lagoon
in France, and several estuaries in New South Wales (NSW). To conduct the
field study, I relied on interviews and participatory observation of meetings.
I used the Social-Ecological System (SES) framework to compare situations
and spot variables that could be considered significant in explaining differences
in information sharing use. Finally, to broaden the scope of the study by
exploring another kind of threat than the microbiological, a threat regularly
evoked by all farmers, I decided to develop an agent-based model on the herpes
virus. I go through these steps with a critical approach.
12.1.1 Case studies
Two cases Choosing to study two different cases, one of which, the Aus-
tralian one, involved several sub-cases, quickly enabled me to observe each
case in light of the other. Spotting important variables, such as size effects,
or the sense of belonging to a community, proved much easier after starting to
investigate the second case (the Australian one).
Going deep into the study of specific contexts is a lengthy and time-
consuming process (see next section), also a rewarding one. Misleading con-
clusions linked to local specificities would have prevented the identification of
what I consider to be the main findings of the thesis: the identification of
a subset of important variables leading to possible assertions on information
sharing effects and the definition of the concept of threats.
Initially, there was a focus on OMEGA Thau that was understood as a
participatory artifact that farmers could collaborate to. This system proved
to be mainly developed by and for the use of local authorities. This tool has
been praised as a very advanced one and the Syndicat Mixte du Bassin de
Thau (SMBT) is known to be a proactive local council, especially regarding
environmental issues. However, this tool did not prove enough to complete an
investigation on how local actors may be involved in NRM using information
artifacts. Except from a fraction of them being consulted during dialogue
phases and being at the center of local development schemes (SAGE-Thau,
2015), Thau oyster farmers seemed to feel little responsibility for water quality,
and unaware of the existence of the artifact.
The study of the Australian case led to discover Environmental Manage-
ment Systems (EMSs), documents that emerged from the oyster industry. This
fact prompted me to enlarge the scope of information sharing artifacts, and
thus the scope of the thesis, to non-technological ones such as simple static text
documents. Those types of artifacts could be evaluated using the ENCORE di-
mensions and proved to have a larger impact than the technologically-advanced
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one developed in Thau. Through the development process of these artifacts,
actors achieved reflexivity over the resource and their practices, confirming
Young et al. (2006)’s intuition according to which reflexivity is an essential
characteristic of adapted management.
If one is testing hypotheses in real settings, one should be aware of the
importance of framing accurately the context in which the model is tested, as
Castillo et al. (2011) warn. On the other side, when hypotheses and theories
emerge from the study of specific contexts, a comparative study allows to get
rid of irrelevant and misleading details, that may have been deemed important
at first. The present study solely focuses on oyster farming, and stakes that I
defined for information sharing may be too context-specific and could evolve
with the addition of new studies.
Beyond local specificities of the present case studies, the two-case method-
ology that I followed proved an important step that enables switching from
context-specific facts towards more general ones and favors a dialogue between
cases. I studied them in order to test an initial assumption, which is one of
the main use of case studies as Poteete et al. (2010) explain. The study of
two cases allowed to limit one the drawbacks linked to conclusions that one
can draw from single-case studies pointed out in Poteete et al. (2010): findings
lack external validity. The initial assumptions that I developed regarding the
role of information sharing for NRM, and more specifically in the context of
oyster farming, evolved greatly after investigating a second case thanks to the
development of initial hypotheses that the second case infirmed. A limit while
studying several cases is the “limited leverage in the analysis of cross-case vari-
ation” (Poteete et al., 2010, p.36). I overcame this limitation using the SES
framework as a tool for comparison. As shown in Chapter 10, information
sharing has impacts ranging from more accurate previsions (Thau Lagoon) to
changing mental models of most actors (NSW). The range defined by those
two studies would have been limited to one side if I had not investigated two
different cases.
Choices are necessary to make while studying cases due to mundane con-
straints such as access to field, data or people as well as time and funding. Con-
sidering these constraints, an intial study on cases that share a large amount
of variables such as the cases of this thesis is a coherent choice. The experience
of the process followed during this thesis leads me to advocate strongly for the
study of at least two case studies before jumping to conclusions.
On the investigation of case studies In this thesis, I investigated a broad
relation (between information sharing and NRM) that cannot be clarified in
a definitive manner but on which assumptions are often made. A contextual
focus is a perfect opportunity to question and qualify general normative state-
ments on such relations. In order to come out with answers specific enough for
actors to use practically, a focus on precise types of SESs is a perfect entry. For
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Table 12.1: Organizing a case study.
Step Expected outcome
Determine a type of SES that is subject to the prob-
lem, questions and linked hypotheses to investigate
Obtain adapted case
type
Read on the general ecology of the cases as presented
in Chapter 7, using the SES framework as a guide
Gain knowledge on craft
Depending on constraints (time, money, access) and
opportunities (network, availability of data), identify
specific cases (at least two)
Be able to start case
investigation
In-depth interviews with a handful of actors, some ran-
domly chosen and some important actors (local cham-
pion, i.e. someone who would be indicated by several
actors as someone whose opinion matter) - possibly in
a single case
Capture qualitative spe-
cific data and get new
insights
Review hypotheses, make new assumptions if neces-
sary and create a questionnaire allowing for the precise
testing of these new hypotheses
Refine or shift approach
of question
In-depth interviews with actors of a second case in the
same manner
Get rid of elements spe-
cific to first case
Create a more precise questionnaire (or two compara-
ble ones) allowing for the testing of these sharpened
assumptions and submit it to actors of both cases
Collect quantitative
data
the researcher, investigating cases is however a lengthy process. How should
researchers organize their study? I would recommend to follow the steps listed
in Table 12.1.
This process is an adaptation of the one that I followed for the present
work that takes into account errors that I made during the thesis, leading to
waste of time or interviews less productive than they could have been.
12.1.2 SES framework
The SES framework proposes an important set of variables to take into account
when analyzing a system in which a human and a natural environment are
coupled (Table B.1, p.260). To first get acquainted with the cases, I used
reports and scientific literature to try and complete as much of the variables
as possible, summarized in Table 8.3, p.137. This exercise proved useful, helped
me identify knowledge gaps, especially with the main question of information
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sharing, a specific type of interaction, in mind.
Completing the framework was useful and frustrating at the same time.
Traditional studies on natural commons focus on systems that are relatively
closed, in which the identification of boundaries are clear. Two studies helped
qualifying this statement. Brewer (2012) discusses the question of defining
clear boundaries, suggesting that keeping them open allows for more adaptive
management. Nagendra and Ostrom (2014) study urban lakes in Bangalore,
open and complex environment, with important inflows, and a loose commu-
nity of actors. In the present work, completing the SES framework while fo-
cusing on oyster farming required constant choices to decide whether elements
should be kept in or out of the analysis. I discussed in details consequences of
boundary choice in Chapter 7, summing up the main impacts of this choice in
Table 7.3, p.112: internalize all flows at the expense of increasing the number
of actors, or limiting the number of actors at the cost of making most flows
external? This is the price to pay while studying systems as open as the ones
oyster growers act in.
An element that I developed in Section 3.3 and that structured the thesis,
is that threats are usually approached differently such as in Anderies et al.
(2004)’s robustness framework.
One of the triggering point of the study of the commons is the so-called
tragedy. This tragedy occurs because of free-riding, pursuit of personal interest
and eventual depletion of the common pasture. The main point in studying
systems as the ones studied through the lens of SES is that they are subject to
threats, originating from actors’ behavior or the environmental dynamics. De-
scribing a SES situation without explicitly pointing out threats to researchers
and actors is an major flow in the framework. I proposed in Table 3.6, p.40, a
set of variables that would help identifying important threats while studying
a SES.
Despite these limitations, the SES framework was a useful and helpful guide
to structure the study of such complex systems. The assumed complexity of
the considered systems prevents an analysis in terms of focusing on an element
under constraint of the other, rather taking into account interactions between
elements.
The SES framework proved to be more than a guide for study. As men-
tioned in the previous section, the framework is a useful tool to enable broad
comparison of cases on a vast number of variables. Splitting the variables into
a set of common variables (such as in Table 7.1, p.106) and of potentially dif-
ferent variables allowed to refine the comparison and to identify variables that
can make a difference for the question under scrutiny.
12.1.3 Agent-based modeling
Developing the model The agent-based model that I developed was the
most challenging part of the thesis. After having interviewed farmers, and
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after seeing the Oyster Information Portal that gathers information about
mortality and growth, I decided to develop a model to see whether collective
information sharing on a virus threat could help actors learn and understand
better environmental dynamics and subsequently make appropriate decisions.
The choice of developing the model is linked to the intrinsic difficulty of fol-
lowing information sharing, in real settings, as much in terms of participation
in a system as interpretation of obtained information. It is also linked to the
time frame: the virus acts only once a year, and studies in epidemiology are
not reproducible (Bonté, 2011).
As cited in Chapter 6, according to Minsky (1968, p.1), “to an observer B,
an object A∗ is a model of an object A to the extent that B can use A∗ to
answer questions that interest him about A.” In the present case, I am the
observer (and the reader is) and the agent-based model is a model of oyster
farmers facing a virus situation that was designed to help answering questions
about the impact of information sharing: can information help agents to adapt
to this private threat?
Setting up the different information sharing modalities was natural: no
sharing, sharing through a network and through a technological system, with
possible combinations. On the other hand, deciding over types of information
to share and cognitive interpretation of received information has been a diffi-
cult phase. The possible scope of interpretation was limited and the range of
possible choices decided by actors is small: they have to choose a mix between
three species and quantities. In real cases, farmers do not have many other
possibilities: they can choose to diversify their activity (by growing other shell-
fish species, by fishing, or opening a restaurant); or try natural oysters which
apparently, according to a farmer who strictly grows natural oysters, are not
affected by the virus (in the model, natural oysters are affected).
The way the model is coded does not allow for personal complex inter-
pretation of information: agents receive information (figures), aggregate them
using probabilities and follow a set of pre-established rules that allow them
to make a decision regarding the next season. Other more or less complex
solutions for information sharing and aggregation could have been considered,
as in Pyka et al. (2007) who model the use of information with a capabil-
ity/ability/expertise triplet that evolves with research and experimentation.
The virus context did not favor such a complex way of modeling information
since options are limited for agents: they can only change oyster types and
quantities. On the contrary, simpler representations seemed most logical, es-
pecially when considering real-life applications such as the Oyster Information
Portal developed by Nash and Rubio-Zuazo (2012) and lessons learned that
simple quantitative information seemed the most useful to oyster farmers.
The other variables that I tested (decision type, population size and consti-
tution) came with conceptual model development and resulted in an important
number of scenarios which made it tricky to explore in-depth. Global compari-
son of results required either aggregation that gums out variations, or creation
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Figure 12.1: Main loop of the model (reproduced).
of exotic representations.
Possible extensions The model code is designed in a modular way that
makes evolutions as easy as possible. For instance, information shared is
treated separately from decision-making. Several extensions are possible and
can be considered. As a reference, I reproduced Figure 11.4 that I follow to
suggest further exploration. Each verb associated with an arrow or noun with
a box in the figure is the result of an algorithm or a representation choice that
can always be questioned and changed.
Initialization During the initialization, farmers all have the same bud-
get, batch size and beliefs. Other initialization parameters are possible. Those
easy to implement variations could lead the system to other directions than
those observed with the parameters presented in the document.
Virus dynamics As it is, other and more complicated virus dynamics
may be explored. Numerous virus models are listed in Gilligan (2002) that
are useful for inspiration. A major change would be to choose to explore the
last type of threat that has not been considered in this thesis: the common
threat. The virus can easily be modeled as a common threat rather than
a private one. However, switching this modification would shift the main
question from private learning thanks to a collection of collective experiments
to self-regulating capability of agents. Mortality would be a function of the
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total number of oysters in the estuary, rather than independent draws of the
virus at the scale of single batches or tables.
Information (sharing) What could be the result of a erroneous model
A∗ that cannot represent accurately the environmental dynamics? In the
model, the collected and shared information allows to describe and under-
stand the virus dynamics as long as enough information is given to the sys-
tem. The virus dynamics may be linked to variables that are not collected
and thus the information shared could be misconceived, or only partly reflect
the virus modus operandi. In the model, with m corresponding to the mor-
tality function, we have m = m(qty, type). Both qty and type are shared
among farmers. Local variations could be added and not taken into account,
m = m(qty, type, location), with only qty and type being shared.
Decision making I opted for a simple modeling choice where actors fol-
low simple rules. I defined three types of agents who have various goals and
follow different procedures. According to their own experiences and their net-
work, they receive heterogeneous values for mortality and use the same model
of the virus dynamics to make their decisions for the next season. Heterogene-
ity is thus linked to information received and type of agents. For a given type
of agent and a given stimuli (here information received), there is a single de-
terministic decision d at time step n: dn = d(agentType, information, dn−1).
However, the observed outcomes led to averaged behaviors that made it diffi-
cult to distinguish among them and identify and track interesting trajectories.
Instead of creating such agents, one could imagine agents with various re-
sponse threshold, e.g. a threshold above which they change their production
type. The threshold embodies various interpretations of the same information
that allows to inlcude reasoning elements that cannot be taken into account
in the model (a type of white noise). I expect from this strategy to increase
heterogeneity among agents and favor a wider diversity of outcomes.
On the use of ABMs Creating an agent-based model enabled another
type of evaluation of information sharing role for actors than with the use
of the ENCORE framework. This method enables a quantitative tracking
of evolutions of facets difficult to identify, or simply observe, in real settings
thanks to the creation of a model that one can tweak and master: evolution
of beliefs, knowledge, practices and environment.
These facets allow to qualify consequences of information sharing in this
model and of other elements in other models. Replication of experiences and
controlled variations of scenarios is a strong benefit of agent-based models
and simulations. Changes in the situation are difficult to track since events
are non reproducible (such as viruses attacking oysters) and are delayed in
time (the virus attacks only once a year) and changes are subtle to observe
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in actors minds and practices (since changes may be due to other causes than
the one under focus). This situation advocates strongly for agent-based model
development and simulation.
However, exploring a model is a time-consuming task. In this model, only
6 variables have been kept (Table 11.3, p.183) which, once combined, led to
1300 scenarios. This number of scenarios is already the result of drastic down-
sizing in terms of variables or values. This fact leads to necessary compromises
between a thorough exploration of all the simulations using an aggregation with
the risk of gumming out interesting differences or a finer one but rapidly dif-
ficult to handle. The evolutions suggested above even increase the number of
scenarios and make exploration even more complex. It is possible to counter
this effect by giving fixed values to variables that do not lead to noticeable
effects in the analysis, such as the “decision-making” variable in the model.
The exploration strategy that I followed in the thesis is a useful one when
a model includes a large number of variables. I suggest the following steps:
1. After defining a set of simple indicators, draw aggregated graphs along
various dimensions to get first insights on which global effects can appear
by using representations along time.
2. Use these graphs to create global indicators which were not considered
initially, such as “change convergence”. These indicators should capture
a scenrio with a single number, not a time series.
3. Identify a subset of scenarios that seem interesting or leading to varying
outcomes and explore them again in more details using the indicators
used for the first two steps.
12.2 On threats in SESs
12.2.1 Goods
The typology of goods presented in Chapter 2 (Table 2.1, p.13) introduces two
dimensions, substractability and excludability. These dimensions allow for a
definition of four types of goods or resources: public, private and club goods,
as well as common-pool resources.
By creating this typology, a set of specific and effective questions was linked
to each good type. First, since common-pool resources are highly substractable
and difficult to exclude, issues such as depletion and free-riding emerge. Os-
trom (1990) found necessary rules linked to specificity of issues for common-
pool resources management (Table 2.4, p.17). Second, public goods are dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to exclude and not substractable. The main issues
associated with this type of goods are its provision and free-riding. How to
ensure that enough means (money, time) are allocated to the provision of the
good? Third, club goods, highly excludable and not substractable, are also
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subject to the question of provision. In this case, the possibility of exclusion
makes it easier to prevent free-riding. Private goods are out of the scope of
such a theory, except when they are tied together through another type of
good.
Using this typology to frame a question and a situation is an effective
manner of considering problems that may emerge, and provides directions to
look for so as to solve or tackle such problems.
12.2.2 Threats
Threats so far The typology of goods opens explicit roads for investigation,
but it does not provide a way to fit threats that are commonly faced by actors
and communities while belonging to the NRM realm: floods, pests, epidemics,
pollution, exhaustion, free-riding among others. It could be possible to frame
a flood as a public good provision problem as Carlson et al. (2015) do, the
provision consisting in privately implementing diverse measures to limit col-
lective (and thus private) damages. Even though the threat can fit within
the previous typology, it feels awkward to consider a flood as a public good,
at least semantically. This flood should be considered a threat, a threat for
a set of actors, wreaking havoc on a number of characteristics of goods and
resources of various types (private homes, public facilities ...).
The threat typology that I exposed in Chapter 3 proposes an operational
formalization of threats with the 〈A, C, I, D, E〉 tuple: a set of actors A is
concerned for characteristics of assets C, characterized by infrastructure I,
human decisions D and environmental dynamics E. Threats can be organized
along two dimensions.
First, the internality dimension determines whether the threat affects other
actors than the (potentially self-constituted) set of actors A. Determining
this property helps concerned actors to choose whether they should try to
reach outside their own community. A threat recognized as non-internal threat
should prompt actors of A to define a strategy that reaches external actors, as
did oyster farmers in the Australian case, for instance, by sharing information.
Second, the excludability dimension is defined on the solution side: can a
solution adopted by a single actor be effective or should it be collective. In some
cases, collective action is compulsory. The tragedy of the commons emerges
from this fact. In some other cases, actors may decide which to consider the
threat as excludable or not. In Thau Lagoon, oyster farmers need to depurate
oysters before selling them. All farmers decided to build depuration basins
in their own sheds while collective basins could have been built. Actors have
played an important part in choosing how to deal with a threat. The choice
they make is a projection of how they consider a threat.
Determining these two dimensions combined with the case studies allowed
to identify three main types of threats: public, common and private. There is
still an empty space in the typology for little internal and highly excludable
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threats that does not specifically appeared in the case studies but which may
emerge from other types of cases, where actors are less intrinsically linked by
a common resource such as water in the case of oyster farming.
I developed this typology to be operational. A group of actors can use this
classification to define strategies to tackle threats. Australian oyster farmers
developed their EMSs with this idea in mind. By showing clearly how exter-
nal actors impacted their activity and the environment using an information
sharing artifact, these actors managed to impact upstream actors and local
councils practices. As shown in Chapters 10 and 11, where I investigate in-
formation sharing systems as infrastructure to deal with examples of public
and private threats, giving a type to a threat leads to a specific approach
(Section 12.3). The internality dimension was inspired by the case study and
I added the excludable one that bears consequences for information sharing
stakes.
A common vision of threats is an essential part of devising solutions that
are accepted by all (Adams et al., 2003), as much as shared mental models of
SESs (Castillo Brieva, 2013). I defined the typology with the goal of creating
a meaningful classification of threats for actors such as the internal / external
one developed in EMSs. The time frame of a thesis did not allow me to test
this. In order to gain legitimacy and be reinforced or modified, the concept
should now be experimented with actors.
The future of threats For the moment, due to the angle adopted in the
thesis, I characterized information sharing stakes linked to each type of threat
(see Section 12.3) and explored the two least investigated of them. The con-
cept of threats emerged during the research from the study of a specific type of
interaction, information sharing, out of a set of possible interactions, such as
self-organizing and evaluative activities, listed in the SES framework. Consid-
ering other types of interactions could be a way to make the threat typology
more robust and potentially see general patterns and strategies available to
actors emerge, such as those that appeared from the classification of goods in
Ostrom et al. (1994).
Mental models A question that emerges from such a framing of a NRM
situation is that of the mental models of actors. What does foster more col-
laboration: uniting behind a collective threat or a collective framing of shared
resources? The case studies considered in this thesis, especially the French one,
show that oyster farmers see each other as competitors in good times and unite
when they collectively face a threat, at least in the case of the public threat.
This observation provides a first insight, but is not sufficient to conclude on
the question.
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Dynamics A second element that requires investigation is the dynamic
side of threats, especially in the case of excludable threats. The theory could
go further by trying to understand what could be the externalities caused by
some actors adopting individual solutions. A solution that is adopted by a
single individual may mitigate a threat for the person while increasing the
threat for other actors. A collective solution may better address the threat
for a larger group of actors. The importance of collective projects to frame
threats and discuss strategies together is a possible important prove important
in these situations. Does classifying threats according to the typology make
actors changing the considered solutions?
Evaluation Threats are characterized as T =〈A, C, I, D, E〉. They po-
tentially limit the capability of actors in A to take advantage of assets due
to a deterioration of characteristics C of the asset. Endowing threats with a
structure could increase the operational potential of the concept while leading
to promising theoretical questions in collective decision aiding. For instance,
one could model the deterioration using a capability function cA that depends
on actors and enrich threats by giving them a structure that includes conse-
quences and possible defenses D. For instance, defenses may be actions on
I or D; or on information on E and may thus be thought using the formal-
ism. Information sharing artifacts are examples of such a defense: creating a
piece of infrastructure I that could influence decisions D. Such a model offers
a possible way to evaluate threats and considered solutions. Developing the
concept in this direction requires cautious generalization of concepts drawn
from the capability approach developed in Sen et al. (1999) which is focused
on individuals and not on groups.
Conclusion The elements on threats provided and developed in this thesis
create the core of a formalism that could be effectively used by actors and
which has to be tested further. I proposed the threat typology as a way
complementary to the goods and resources typology to address core questions
in NRM. This concept provides a new possible focal almost orthogonal to goods
and resources: all types of asset characteristics may have to face all types of
threats (Table 3.5, p.37). Elements regarding threats are absent from the SES
framework, while they are central for NRM. Threats, under the form proposed
in Table 3.6, p.40, should be added to the SES framework.
12.3 On information sharing artifacts for NRM
Throughout the thesis, I considered information sharing artifacts as pieces of
infrastructure destined at tackling various threats. First, I critically recall the
hypotheses of information sharing stakes associated with the different types of
threats under the light of the case studies and the model. Then, I go through
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what I consider to be the advantages and limits of these artifacts that I can
justify thanks to the present research, proposing complementary manners to
explore further these claims.
12.3.1 Information sharing artifacts to face threats
Characterizing threats opened the door to a clear delimitation of information
to seek for, in terms of environmental dynamics, infrastructure and decision-
making. Using these variables allows actors to precisely define what is known
and what is not, identifying what it is, and researching for what is not.
The case studies, based on a group of actors acting in an environment
where inflows are independent from actors and of core importance to them,
allowed me to identify three types of threats. Those threats point out various
strategic directions for information sharing artifacts.
Public threats - Influencing Oyster farmers (A) are located downstream
of catchment areas. They are heavily dependent on good water quality and
have to face regular microbiological peaks (E), leading to bans on sells, due to
upstream activities, practices (D) or facilities (I). For oyster farmers, this is
a case of public threat. I claimed that in this situation, information sharing
artifact implementation, a new piece of infrastructure I, is mostly used to gain
clout over future developments and as members of communities.
In the Australian case, building EMSs proved a way to effectively gain
influence and change decisions D of upstream actors, by working as a coher-
ent group of actors, hand in hand with local authorities. The industry is
increasingly seen as responsible for water quality management, slowly becom-
ing stewards over this resource. By listing a long set of internal threats, that,
on a close look, include only few that could improve water quality, they have
managed to show how responsibly they act. In this case, oyster farmers man-
aged to gain influence over upstream actors, convincing them as well as the
global community of the role of all in water quality.
In the French case, the main artifact that I studied, OMEGA Thau, has
been initiated by public authorities. To French oyster farmers, the microbio-
logical threat is also a public threat. Communication with upstream actors is
done through local oyster farming lobbies and public authorities. The infor-
mation sharing artifact is here a technical tool, little known by oyster farmers,
that assists local authorities in predicting short term flows as well as long
term changes due to developments. As a side effect, oyster farmers have a
more precise information regarding microbiological flows and possible bans on
sells. According to most actors that I interviewed, the supplementary infor-
mation that they could get from the system did not appeal them, appearing
as slightly better than weather forecast. If we take the point of view of oyster
farmers, the system does not produce information that makes a difference. In
the long run however, due to strong regulatory constraints on water quality
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(e.g. WFD, 2012), the precise model that has been obtained in the information
sharing artifact should serve oyster farmers.
The cases propose two visions of how information sharing artifacts may be
used to manage a public threat. On the one hand, artifacts and their imple-
mentation allows actors to gain power and influence, increasingly becoming
stewards of the resource they need. On the other hand, artifacts are tools that
finely monitor flows and subsequently inform actors, without farmers even
being aware of the existence of the artifact.
Private threats - Learning Being attacked by a virus (E), oysters farmers
(A) face an internal threat. In the thesis, I considered the threat as a pri-
vate one. The main question linked to private threats is how to escape the
threat, or simply limit its effects, by choosing an adapted solution, i.e. mak-
ing a right decision D? If there is perfect knowledge, then the best solution
should be chosen by all. However, perfect knowledge does not exist, and a
bounded rationality is a preferable assumption, especially since there would
be no point in implementing information sharing artifacts. I investigated how
the way information is shared could influence how actors learned the virus
dynamics through an agent-based model. The model leads to contrasted con-
clusions. Different facets of the model can be evaluated to compare scenarios
in a quantitative manner, especially the influence of information sharing means
availability, through personal experience, networks and/or a centralized infor-
mation sharing system. In this context, the more information is shared, the
more agents share a set of beliefs (in the model, on oyster mortality rates)
but there is no connexion with proximity of knowledge to the truth (i.e. real
virus dynamics) that actors do not manage to achieve. Production is slightly
influenced by information sharing, but heterogeneity of agents seems to be the
most important factor to determine the production.
Common threats - Monitoring I did not specifically examine the last
type of threat, the common one, on the case studies. The common threat is
the usual threat that Common-pool resources (CPRs) face. I claimed that
facing this type of threat requires an information sharing to monitor users
decisions, ensuring conditional cooperation. The examples that I found in the
literature confirm this hypothesis. Monitoring the resource may be a solution
for actors, but it can lead to faster depletion as demonstrated in Haynie et al.
(2009). A study focusing on information sharing for this type of threat has yet
to be conducted and may be started by studying further the rich literature on
this type of threat.
Conclusion Defining different types of threats allowed a precise delimitation
of information sharing artifacts requirements and goals addressed to specific
types. Within the limited time frame of a thesis, I had the opportunity to
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investigate different types of artifacts linked to two types of threats. The
study of other artifacts in similar contexts, for instance oyster farming in the
United States, where environmental processes are advanced, or in other areas
of France could complement the present study. To be able to draw more
general conclusions, it could be useful to investigate other types of SESs where
actors have developed information sharing artifacts and see whether the goal
in creating them fits with the stakes considered here. The framework that was
developed during the course of the thesis now provides testable hypotheses.
12.3.2 General findings on information sharing artifacts
Apart from those stakes, information sharing artifacts generate effects that go
beyond their content. An artifact creation may lead to a common perception
on issues and an external representation around which actors may refer to.
Artifacts come with limits that may prevent them from being used, or even to
be useful.
Advantages One of the important effects that Australian oyster farmers
kept evoking is the evolution of the mental model of the SES they act in,
as shown using the ENCORE framework that allows qualitative tracking of
changes (Chapter 10). Creating EMSs led oyster farmers to all gather in reg-
ular meetings organized by an external facilitator, during which they had the
opportunity to discuss their vision of their activity, their practices, the sur-
rounding environment, and threats they have to deal with. During the process,
actors who did not know each other came to discover others. The oyster farm-
ing community as a whole became more cohesive and stronger thanks to the
participatory process that led to the artifacts creation.
I intended to investigate deeper the idea that the creation process is fun-
damental for the success or failure of an artifact by looking at the French case,
through a survey. The survey failed to be launched to a wide audience of
oyster farmers. The few people who answered complained about a lack of gen-
eral information on the existence of artifacts, except those who were directly
involved in creating the artifacts. The survey does not allow me to conclude
further, but these initial elements seem to confirm the hypothesis. The link
between creation, appropriation and future use has to be explored further. El-
ster (2010) provides a framework in the context of collective decision processes
relating actors (those who are effectively in the process) and subjects (those
who will be affected by the decision) that can be used as a base for exploration.
Creation is important, what about the use? When the artifact is supposed
to reach external actors, it can be considered as a boundary object, accessible
to all, with different meanings and uses. A global document such as an EMS
enables communication between different types of actors, even without the
presence of the other. A more technical tool such as OMEGA Thau is not
conceived as an interface between several worlds, even though it can be used
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for this purpose: promoters may understand better consequences on water
quality of their projects, oyster farmers are informed more precisely, public
authorities follow flows better. Once again, the ENCORE framework allows
to keep track of those possible evolutions in various parts of the community
thanks to an evaluation on six qualitative dimensions.
Limits As evoked in the previous paragraph, the mere existence of an arti-
fact, even with a well-defined goal, even with a goal that would serve actors,
is not enough to ensure that it is known, accepted, trusted or used. In France,
few actors were aware of the existence of OMEGA Thau, and even less of the
existence of the French version of an EMS, written by an intern who inter-
viewed a handful of public servants and oyster farmers. Few were aware of
the existence of a beautifully made guide summing up techniques, rules and
regulations destined to oyster farmers (Gervasoni et al., 2011).
Even a well-thought process such as the one described for EMS imple-
mentation does not systematically lead to shared mental models that enable
going beyond profound divergent beliefs. In Wapengo Lake, even though an
EMS was developed in 2010, some growers applied for triploid Pacific Oyster
Crassostrea Gigas (PO) cultivation approval, while (diploid) PO is considered
a pest in NSW. This created a rift amongst farmers, and communication is
currently non-existent.
When well-designed, information sharing artifacts increase knowledge and
reflexivity of actors on their environment. However, they cannot foresee every-
thing. The example of farmers in the Hawkesbury River who implemented an
EMS and improved the local situation, participating in reaching pristine wa-
ter quality, working hand in hand with local authorities and the surrounding
community, and who were struck by the herpes virus that wiped them out for
the second time in less than 10 years illustrates this idea.
If we think of actors implementing information sharing artifacts to influence
others’ practices, then support of public authorities seems necessary. In the
Australian case study, even though I did not have the opportunity to visit
farmers located in the North Coast, success of EMS implementation was more
nuanced than in the South. In the North Coast, local public agencies lacked
fundings to support farmers. On the other hand, farmers were less proactive
in developing their EMSs.
12.3.3 Information sharing artifacts for NRM
In the case studies, the main resource to be managed is water. Water quality is
of importance to oyster farmers, fishermen as well as for the whole community.
Oyster farmers have the highest requirement regarding water quality for their
activity. Public servants have legal quality levels to meet, defined by rules and
regulations.
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In the thesis, I have studied different approaches of information artifacts
use to manage a natural resource. The first one based on the coupling of
simple documents, one issued by public authorities, Oyster Industry Sustain-
able Aquaculture Strategy (OISAS, 2006, 2014), and one developed by oyster
farmers, EMSs. In this low-tech approach, external representation asserted
and lobbied for the role of oyster farmers as stewards of the resource, being
though of as sentinels of the environment, with an increasing acceptance by
the rest of the community. The main goal is to make mental models evolve
around the idea of collective responsibility on water management.
Information sharing artifacts are not enough by themselves to modify ac-
tors’ representations and practices. Collective sense of stewardship through
the use of artifacts can be achieved through an involving process, and not
only with their mere existence. As a French oyster farmer puts it: “first, we
need to talk to each other.” Creating an artifact may be a good pretext for
such a dialogue. In this manner, it can probably be asserted that the infor-
mation produced is a difference that can make a difference: the information
sought for comes from grassroots demand and is therefore considered useful,
for themselves or for external actors.
In the French case, public authorities have implemented a costly and long
to develop technology-laden artifact that enables a fine and high level vision of
the catchment, especially water flows. Being considered central and sensitive
actors, oyster farmers are overrepresented in local decision instances and dia-
logue sessions and are considered beneficiaries of information generated by the
artifact. However, they did not originate the project and the artifact hardly
fosters an evolution of mental representations and a sense of collective respon-
sibility. This example provides a case of information sharing artifact that leads
to differences for public authorities and little difference for oyster farmers.
The information sharing artifact in the model is an example that does not
lead to much difference for actors on performances when other means of infor-
mation sharing exist, as the social networks in the model. These differences
are even strongly affected by existing social networks. Worse, the artifact leads
to convergence of beliefs of agents on the environmental dynamics (actually
a more cohesive collective mental model) tracked by the system but not to
beliefs closer to the true virus dynamics. Effects of information in this case
may be so limited that in the end actors might have to change completely their
growing techniques, an option unavailable in the model.
Those three examples lead to divergent conclusions on the difference cre-
ated by information sharing artifacts: efficient, neutral, ambiguous. The re-
sults obtained support the diversity of results observed in the literature and
are a step towards a refinement of the relation between information sharing
and NRM. Implementing information artifacts as infrastructure to face threats
should be considered with care since they are long and costly (even though
these elements have not been studied here) to develop with uncertain results.
The existence of other means to share information (Table 4.4, p.55) should
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also be taken into account since they may provide differences that would gum
out the potential difference brought by the artifact.
Chapter 13
Conclusion
- Dove va l’umanità?
- Boh!
Uccellacci e uccellini
Pier Paolo Pasolini
13.1 Findings
Context and method In this thesis, I have investigated the link between
collective NRM and information sharing, through the study of specific arti-
facts in the context of oyster farming and, more generally, coastal water man-
agement. The research led me to question the positive correlation generally
associated between artifacts existence and improvements in collective resource
management and to find ways to evaluate this correlation.
To conduct the study, I have explored two main cases, the Thau Lagoon,
France and several estuaries in NSW, Australia. Actors in those places face
comparable conditions for their production and devise and use, in various ways,
more or less technologically advanced information artifacts. In addition to the
study of real cases, I developed an exploratory agent-based model based on
those cases.
Evaluating the role of information sharing for natural resources manage-
ment first prompted to decompose the notion of information sharing artifacts
through content (what), medium (how) and goal (why). The main information
artifacts that I found in the cases were oriented towards coping with threats
(a goal) using various media (from simple text documents to technologically
advanced systems) and contents (from arguments to models). I evaluated in-
formation sharing artifacts consequences using two methods: a quantitative
one with the use of an agent-based model that enabled the tracking of various
dimensions; and a qualitative one through the ENCORE framework that al-
lowed to go beyond content. These two methods are ways to understand the
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(potential) difference created by artifacts for actors that could be impacted by
new information availability.
Main results In this paragraph, I recall the take-home messages of this
thesis.
On methods An empirical approach based on a case study investigation
proved a valuable method to explore the main questions of the thesis regarding
consequences of information sharing artifacts for NRM. The SES framework
that guided and structured the exploration of cases created a path for investi-
gation that enabled to quickly grasp those cases globally and precisely at the
same time, without forgetting important elements of those complex systems.
Since the question of the thesis is open and complex, exploring a single case
would have led to misleading conclusions due to local particularities. Thus,
even considering the time-frame of a thesis, a two-case study investigation is
a minimum to be able to get rid of local specificities and adopt a wider and
more nuanced view on the question.
The SES framework is useful to describe the cases but does not provide a
method for understanding focal systems dynamics. The use of the ENCORE
framework and an agent-based model provided ways to more efficiently mea-
sure, as much qualitatively as quantitatively, and study evolutions linked to
information sharing artifacts implementation.
On threats Framing oyster farmers questions under the lens tradition-
ally used of goods and resources coupled with associated dilemmas (free-riding,
provision) did not prove efficient in this case. The main artifacts that I studied
are aimed at tackling or understanding microbiological flows in the surround-
ing catchment so as to guarantee water quality. Water quality is a public
good that cannot be provided for. The study of information sharing artifacts
content led to understand the importance of threats around which collective
action is organized.
The 〈A, C, I, D, E〉 model of threats allows actors to identify the main ele-
ments that characterize threats: infrastructure, human decisions and environ-
mental dynamics. The two dimensions of internality and excludability enable
to define strategies for actors to cope with it, as much in terms of information
sharing (the focus of this document) as others. Framing the oyster farming
situation in this context was easier and more natural. The concept of threat
is likely to be applied to a large set of SES situations.
Threats are a complementary way to the goods and resources vision to de-
scribe a SES. They allow to understand related stakes and need to be explicitly
kept in mind while studying such a system. Actors facing public threats need
to devise ways to reach the cause or find manners to make decisions that in-
fluence infrastructure or others’ decisions. Actors facing private threat need
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to understand the said threat to deal with it. Finally, actors dealing with a
common threat have to forge institutions to force all to adopt practices that
would ensure sustainability use of the resource. In this regard, threats are a
catalyst for collective action.
On information sharing The study of various information sharing ar-
tifacts, whether real or theoretical, and the evaluation of consequences for
actors using ENCORE or an agent-based model is a step towards an extension
of knowledge of the relation between information sharing and NRM. I list some
lessons that can be drawn from this study. As a reminder, since the approach
is descriptive and not normative, it is not possible to derive theorems from it:
• Information sharing may lead to important differences: the Australian
case provided an example of actors who fostered collective action by
creating a low-tech artifact that legitimized them as stewards of the
resource they depend on and smoothed relations with all surrounding
actors. This case is a case of positive correlation between information
sharing, sustainable NRM and collective action.
• Information sharing may lead to little changes: the French case provided
an example of artifact that is mostly technical and makes little difference
to actors on a day-to-day basis. Indeed, information given by the model
does not make more precise predictions than those that weather forecasts
allow to deduce, at least according to oyster farmers.
• More technology does not necessarily lead to more impact: evaluation
of Australian and French artifacts using the ENCORE framework led to
demonstrate a wider impact of simple documents on water management,
on mental models and on relations than the more technology advanced
one.
• The existence of information artifacts is not enough: the creation process
needs to be carefully thought for the artifact to be known, or used. This
point is strongly linked to the previous one. Implication of actors in the
process is fundamental since participation is what creates most changes.
• Information sharing artifacts may be used to face threats: actors can
use information to reach upstream actors whose activities impact them;
they can also use artifacts to favor collective learning, even though, in
the model, this approach did not prove successful.
The present research does not allow me to conclude on absolute necessary
properties required for information sharing artifact to lead to more sustainable
management of resources, or better handling of threats actors deal with, since
it is based on similar case studies. However, they allow to precise the frontier
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between information artifacts that have an impact and those that do have a
limited one. I strongly recommend the use of the ENCORE framework for
qualitative assessment, or of an agent-based model for a more quantitative one
of differences made by information artifacts, since they may be long and costly
to produce for uncertain results.
13.2 Future research
The notion of threats needs to be investigated further if the notion is to be asso-
ciated with strategies, as for the different types of goods and resources. I have
investigated and characterized information sharing stakes linked to threats
but information sharing is but a possible interaction between actors of a SES.
Three directions seem to me the most interesting to expand knowledge on this
notion: explore new SES types; structure and evaluate threats and explore
other types of interactions.
Firstly, there is a need for the study of common threats which were not
investigated in this thesis due to unadapted SESs. Furthermore, other cases
may reveal the importance and relevance of the non-internal and excludable
threat that did not appear in the present case studies.
Secondly, this thesis is a first step in the theoretical study of threats. En-
dowing threats with a proper evaluation method of consequences and possible
defense mechanisms, such as the one using capability theory sketched in the
previous chapter, would be a step towards a stronger and possibly more effec-
tive theory.
Finally, information sharing artifacts implementation is but a possible in-
teraction between actors of a SES. The study of other types of interactions is
a way to study the threats typology’s robustness. For instance, are specific
types of threats tackled by similar monitoring activities in various SESs?
13.3 Epilogue
Managing natural resources is a difficult task, as shown by the diversity of
questions asked, studies conducted and ways devised by local communities
to deal with this fundamental element intrinsically linked to the future of
mankind. This task is difficult due to the range of uncertainties, of individual
decision making, of beliefs, of usages made out of these resources. We now
have to face an uncertain future of an era sometimes called the anthropocene,
where the influence of man is predominant, leading to climate change and
trespassing of planetary boundaries. The intertwining of environmental, social
and economic spheres are to take into account with now an increasing focus
made on the environment.
Numerous examples have shown that local communities are able to create
institutions that enable sustainable management of social-ecological systems,
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i.e. systems mostly defined by the interaction between actors, resources and
rules defining a space of possibilities. The emergence of information tech-
nologies and the turn taken by society towards the use of information for an
immense variety of purposes obliges us to think of the possible implications of
information sharing at local levels for NRM.
While creating the information sharing artifacts for his community, Bob
has discovered that the artifacts that will influence most actors’ practices and
mental models and eventually the resource are not necessarily those which are
technologically advanced. During the implementation process, he realized that
the existence of a collective project was already a sign of possible convergence in
problem formulation and solution seeking; that is was an opportunity to make
allies of local authorities and work with other categories of actors.
However, he also realized that there is no simple link between the existence
of information sharing artifacts and efficient resource management. Knowl-
edge does not necessarily lead to avoiding threats. Improvements in environ-
ment situation can only be reached thanks to long term adoption of sustainable
practices that may be difficult to attain, all the more so if other unaware actors
are implied.
In this context, communication and alliances between different spheres of
actors interacting around a SES is essential. Oyster farmers call themselves,
and are called by others, sentinels of the environment. Indeed, they are those
who need the best water quality. The inclusion of all in an environment all feel
responsible for can be fostered by the creation of information sharing artifacts,
or other types of information sharing processes. Farmers testimonies of these
processes show how influential these are, more than the mere information that
can be found in a specific artifact. Information sharing processes do not neces-
sary need to be built around artifacts, but can be imagined using all types of
processes favoring the emergence of social connections and ecological values.
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ODD protocol detailed
This appendix contains a detailed version of Table 6.1, p.92 that contains a
list of questions associated with each structural element. Those questions have
driven the model development.
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Table A.1: The ODD+D protocol (Müller et al., 2013)
Main block Structural element Guiding question
Overview Purpose What is the purpose of the study?
For whom the model is designed?
Entities, state What kind of entities are in the model?
variables and scales By what attributes (i.e. state variables and parameters) are these entities charac-
terised?
What are the exogenous factors / drivers of the model?
What are the temporal and spatial resolutions and extents of the model?
Process overview and
scheduling
What entity does what and in what order?
Design concepts Theoretical and empirical
background
Which general concepts, theories or hypotheses are underlying the model’s design at
the system level or at the level(s) of the submodel(s) (apart from the decision model)?
What is the link to complexity and the purpose of the model?
On what assumptions is/are the agents’ decision model(s) based?
Why is/are certain decision model(s) chosen?
If the model/submodel (e.g. the decision model) is based on empirical data, where
do the data come from?
At which level of aggregation were the data available?
Individual decision-
making
What are the subjects and objects of the decision-making? On which level of aggre-
gation is decision-making modeled? Are multiple levels of decision making included?
What is the basic rationality behind agent decision-making in the model? Do agents
pursue an explicit objective or have other success criteria?
How do agents make their decisions?
Do the agents adapt their behavior to changing endogenous and exogenous state
variables? And if yes, how?
Do social norms or cultural values play a role in the decision-making process?
Do spatial aspects play a role in the decision process?
Continued on next page ...
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Main block Structural element Guiding question
Design concepts Do temporal aspects play a role in the decision process?
To which extent and how is uncertainty included in the agents’ decision rules?
Learning Is individual learning included in the decision process? How do individuals change
their decision rules over time as a consequence of their experience?
Is collective learning implemented in the model?
Individual sensing What endogenous and exogenous state variables are individuals assumed to sense and
consider in their decisions? Is the sensing process erroneous?
What state variables of which other individuals can an individual perceive? Is the
sensing process erroneous?
What is the spatial scale of sensing?
Are the mechanisms by which agents obtain information modeled explicitly, or are
individuals simply assumed to know these variables?
Are the costs for cognition and the costs for gathering information explicitly included
in the model?
Individual prediction Which data do the agents use to predict future conditions?
What internal models are agents assumed to use to estimate future conditions or
consequences of their decisions?
Might agents be erroneous in the prediction process, and how is it implemented?
Interaction Are interactions among agents and entities assumed as direct or indirect?
On what do the interactions depend?
If the interactions involve communication, how are such communications represented?
If a coordination network exists, how does it affect the agent behavior? Is the structure
of the network imposed or emergent?
Collectives Do the individuals form or belong to aggregations that affect and are affected by the
individuals? Are these aggregations imposed by the modeler or do they emerge during
the simulation?
How are collectives represented?
Continued on next page ...
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Main block Structural element Guiding question
Design concepts Heterogeneity Are the agents heterogeneous? If yes, which state variables and/or processes differ
between the agents?
Are the agents heterogeneous in their decision-making? If yes, which decision models
or decision objects differ between the agents?
Stochasticity What processes (including initialization) are modeled by assuming they are random
or partly random?
Observation What data are collected from the Agent-Based Modeling (ABM) for testing, under-
standing and analyzing it, and how and when are they collected?
What key results, outputs or characteristics of the model are emerging from the
individuals? (Emergence)
Details Implementation details How has the model been implemented?
Is the model accessible, and if so, where?
Initialization What is the initial state of the model world, i.e. at time t = 0 of a simulation run?
Is the initialization always the same, or is it allowed to vary among simulations?
Are the initial values chosen arbitrarily or based on data?
Input data Does the model use input from external sources such as data files or other models to
represent processes that change over time?
Submodels What, in detail, are the submodels that represent the processes listed in “Process
overview and scheduling”?
What are the model parameters, their dimensions and reference values?
How were the submodels designed or chosen, and how were they parameterized and
then tested?
Appendix B
SES second-tier variables
This appendix contains all second-tier variables of the Social-Ecological System
(SES) framework as presented in McGinnis and Ostrom (2014).
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260 APPENDIX B. SES SECOND-TIER VARIABLES
First-tier variable Second-tier variables
Social, economic, and political settings (S) S1 - Economic development
S2 - Demographic trends
S3 - Political stability
S4 - Other governance systems
S5 - Markets
S6 - Media organization
S7 - Technology
Resource system (RS) RS1 - Sector (e.g. water, forest, pasture, fish)
RS2 - Clarity of system boundaries
RS3 - Size of resource system
RS4 - Human-constructed facilities
RS5 - Productivity of system
RS6 - Equilibrium properties
RS7 - Predictability of system dynamics
RS8 - Storage characteristics
RS9 - Location
Governance systems (GS*) GS1* - Policy area
GS2* - Geographic scale of governance system
GS3* - Population
GS4* - Regime type
GS5* - Rule-making organizations
GS6* - Rules-in-use
GS7* - Property-rights systems
GS8* - Repertoire of norms and strategy
GS9* - Network structure
GS10* - Historical continuity
Resource units (RU) RU1 - Resource unit mobility
RU2 - Growth or replacement rate
RU3 - Interaction among RU
RU4 - Economic value
RU5 - Number of units
RU6 - Distinctive characteristics
RU7 - Spatial and temporal distribution
Actors (A) A1 - Number of relevant actors
A2 - Socioeconomic attributes
A3 - History or past experiences
A4 - Location
A5 - Leadership / Entrepreneurship
A6 - Norms (trust/reciprocity) / Social capital
A7 - Knowledge of SES / Mental models
A8 - Importance of resource (dependence)
A9 - Technologies available
Action situations: I1 - Harvesting
Interactions(I) → Outcomes (O) I2 - Information sharing
I3 - Deliberation processes
I4 - Conflicts
I5 - Investment activities
I6 - Lobbying activities
I7 - Self-organizing activities
I8 - Networking activities
I9 - Monitoring activities
I10 - Evaluative activities
O1 - Social performance measures (efficiency, eq-
uity, accountability, sustainability)
O2 - Ecological performance measures (overhar-
vested, resilience, biodiversity, sustainability)
O3 - Externalities to other SESs
Related ecosystems (ECO) ECO1 - Climate patterns
ECO2 - Pollution patterns
ECO3 - Flows into and out of focal SES
Table B.1: First and second tier variables of a SES (McGinnis and Ostrom, 2014).
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Environmental information sharing: a means to support the
legitimization of oyster farmers’ stewardship over water quality
management in NSW, Australia?
Nicolas Paget, Katherine Anne Daniell, Ana Rubio Zuazo and Olivier Barreteau
Abstract
Oyster farmers depend on good water quality. Activities upstream from estuaries result in externalities that impact water quality.
Over the last 10 years, oyster farmers have been developing estuary-wide environmental management systems (EMSs) to tackle
internal (i.e. industry-related) and external (i.e. catchment) issues in New South Wales, Australia. Drawing on interview-based
research and document analyses, this paper shows that the process of creating an EMS for the oyster industry, as well as the cre-
ation of the EMS itself, resulted in legitimizing the industry’s stewardship over the natural resource it depends on (water). For
the oyster industry, this result was due to a change in the scale on which EMSs have been developed: instead of viewing issues
at the individual business level, the systems expanded their viewpoint to the entire catchment, and included every oyster business
in the estuary, as well as all other activities in the upper catchment. By providing a means of communicating internal efforts and
with the support of local government bodies, EMSs provided a mechanism with which inﬂuence over upstream actors and activ-
ities could be exerted. We demonstrate this by using the ‘social-ecological systems’ and ‘ENCORE’ frameworks, emphasizing
the transitions that allowed for this change of scale to take place.
Keywords: Information sharing; natural resources management; social-ecological systems; oyster farming; environmental management systems.
1. Introduction
1.1. Estuarine health and water quality
Estuaries are conﬂuences. They contain water originating
both from catchment runoff and from the sea. For coastal
estuaries, rainfall results in pollution inﬂows from the
catchment via run-off into the waterways. These inﬂows
can contain a combination of chemical pollution from towns
and roads, pesticides, fertilizers and animal manure from
farms (diffuse pollution), and sewage overﬂows from towns
or individual houses (point source pollution), as well as
increased turbidity resulting from erosion and soil run-off.
Salinity balance is also affected by the quantity of freshwater
entering estuaries from tributaries or water treatment plant
outfalls that is available to mix with sea water. Hence, water
quality can be affected in many ways as a result of the intro-
duction and balance of these elements in estuaries.
Estuarine health is therefore a good indicator of environ-
mentally friendly activities in the catchment. Estuaries are
mostly open environments that, except for speciﬁc locations
like restricted areas of marine protected parks, can be used
for professional or recreational ﬁshing or for general lei-
sure, such as boating or swimming. Estuaries can be chan-
nels through which trade boats pass. Estuaries, and more
generally catchments, are thus social-ecological systems
(Folke et al., 2005; Ostrom et al., 2007) in which actors or
appropriators act, having different goals and concerns.
Estuarine health can be monitored and managed through
a wide variety of water quality indicators (Fairweather,
1999). According to the Department of Environment and
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(NSWDEC, 2005), these indicators are developed based on
ﬁve estuarine-related components: aquatic ecosystem
health; primary (swimming) and secondary (boating, ﬁsh-
ing) contact recreation; visual amenities; and aquatic com-
mercial food production. A range of key variables can be
found in the document (NSWDEC, 2005). For human
activities, an indicator that is shared for all objectives is
fecal coliforms (E. coli) levels. For aquatic ecosystem
health, the main indicators are algae blooms (in particular
toxic blooms) and the presence of high levels of nutrients
in the water. In this paper, we will focus mostly on water
quality related to human activities. In particular, we focus
on levels of E. coli (cfu/100mL) in the water. Depending
on the activity, sampling and thresholds are different.
Table 1 presents the requirements for the most demanding
activity: oyster farming (see following sections).
Water quality can be considered a public good (Ostrom
et al., 1994; Hess and Ostrom, 2003) since it is non-
rivalrous and non-excludable. Every user or appropriator
uses water as is. However, poor water quality has effects at
different levels for various users, and good water quality is
the desirable state. In light of the key role of estuarine
water quality for some economic activities, we wonder
how local estuarine actors can gain legitimacy as stewards
of a resource that is of core importance to them. We take
oyster production as an emblematic estuarine use with a
high sensitivity to water quality.
1.2. Information sharing to legitimize stewardship over
water quality management
Information has been shown to be a component of an
action situation within the institution analysis and develop-
ment framework (Ostrom, 2009b). Research on global
common goods has pointed out the fact that information
can be considered to be a common good, emphasizing the
difference between information, artifacts and facilities
(Hess and Ostrom, 2003). Other research on information in
the context of commons management has shown its impor-
tance, for instance through studies of the effects of infor-
mation availability and granularity for conditional
cooperation (Villena and Zecchetto, 2010; Janssen, 2013;
Bell et al., 2015). Information can be shared one-to-one
(Bodin and Crona, 2009) or with groups of people during
meetings or through information sharing artifacts (Allen
and Kilvington, 2005; Pahl-Wostl, 2005). Information
availability increases reﬂexivity, which has been proven to
Table 1. Sampling requirements for oyster farming in NSW
Seafood business
section Product to be tested Variable to be quantiﬁed Limit Frequency of testing
Oyster grower Cultivated oysters (in oyster
lease)
Escherichia coli <2.3 E. coli/g (direct harvest) After an event i.e., rainfall,
sewer pollution, peak
holidays (direct harvest
areas)
<10 E. coli/g (restricted
harvest)
Every month (restricted
harvest)
Oyster grower Water from oyster harvest
area (in lease)
Faecal coliforms 14 cfu/100 ml (direct
harvest)
As per above
70 cfu/100 ml (restricted
harvest)
Oyster grower Phytoplankton (from waters
close to harvest areas)
Harmful algal species As per phytoplankton action
Limit included in the
Biotoxin Manual
Fortnight or during algal
bloom present
Oyster grower Cultivated oysters (in oyster
lease)
Paralytic, diarrhetic and
amnesic shellﬁsh
poisoning toxins (PSP,
DSP and ASP)
Presence of biotoxins Every fortnight if
phytoplankton testing
results positive
NSW food authority
and oyster grower
Cultivated oysters (in oyster
lease)
Heavy metals (arsenic,
cadmium, lead, mercury,
selenium, copper and zinc)
As per Australian National
Food Authority Standards,
e.g., Pb < 10 μg/g dry
mass
Every 5 years
Seafood processor-
offering ready-to-
eat oysters
Opened oysters Escherichia coli Not exceeding 2.3/g Every 20 batches
Packed oysters Escherichia coli Not exceeding 2.3/g Every 20 batches
Cooked/smoked oysters Listeria monocytogenes Not detected in 1g Every 10 batches
All oyster processors Non-reticulated water used in
connection with the
production and processing
of oysters
Escherichia coli Not detected in 100ml Not treated – every month
Treated –every 6 months
All estuaries have the same threshold, even though the frequency of testing may vary, especially depending on local weather conditions.
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be critical for social-ecological systems (Young et al.,
2006). Local and global environmental information sys-
tems have been developed in the context of raising envi-
ronmental awareness (Haklay, 1999), and are known to
help companies cope with internal and external pressures
(El-Gayar and Fritz, 2006). To the best of our knowledge,
their inﬂuence on collective environmental management,
the focus of this paper, has never been studied. Is environ-
mental information sharing a way to empower actors while
ensuring the sustainability of a resource that is valuable to
different users? Can information sharing fuel institutionali-
zation processes?
In this paper, we investigate these questions by studying
the case of oyster farmers in NSW, Australia. This popula-
tion of actors that use estuaries as a resource is frequently
impacted as the result of a number of upstream catchment
activities. Estuarine health is needed for optimal oyster
production. If an estuary is healthy, then oyster mortality
levels are kept to a minimum and oyster growth and com-
mercial harvest remain optimal most of the time, resulting
in higher proﬁtability. Recently, new management plans
have been collectively written by oyster farmers in several
estuaries where oysters are grown. We seek to explore how
oyster farmers managed to gain legitimacy over water qual-
ity management and have become stewards of the resource
they depend on.
Section 2 of the paper provides background information
on the NSW case study, including the history of oyster farmer
engagement in estuarine water quality management. Section 3
then presents the research methodology and frameworks used
for analyzing the impact of environmental management sys-
tems (EMS) creation and use on the legitimization process of
oyster farmers as water quality stewards. Section 4 follows
with the results of this analysis; they are discussed in
Section 5. Section 6 provides our conclusions.
2. Context
2.1. Oyster farming in NSW: a general overview
Commercial oyster farming is one of the oldest aquaculture
activities in NSW, and started in the 1870s (OISAS, 2014).
Oysters grow naturally in the shorelines of every estuary in
NSW. Oysters are also grown commercially in 32 estuaries.
In NSW, 43 estuaries are larger than 5 km2,1 and 26 of
these contain oyster farming activities. Oysters are a key-
stone seafood product on the east coast of Australia, and
generate a strong demand in the seafood market. Although
production has been declining since mid-1980 due to major
issues like diseases and water pollution, it is the most
important commercial seafood industry in NSW
(Schrobback et al., 2014), with a production of 2,979
metric tons in 2011/12, or 32% of the state’s total commer-
cial ﬁsheries production, valued at $33 million, or
$35.000/ha, and directly employing 1,600 people, with
318 license holders (ABARE, 2014). Most businesses are
family-owned medium size businesses (less than ﬁve peo-
ple working), and a few are large companies. The NSW
oyster production accounts for 38% of Australia’s total oys-
ter industry production value (ABARE, 2014).
Oysters are ﬁlter-feeder animals that have the capacity
of ﬁltering between 0.5 and 1 ml of water during their life-
times (White, 2001). Oysters ﬁlter to extract phytoplankton
and organic matter from the water column, thereby provid-
ing ecosystem services in estuaries as they play key roles
in the uptake and recycling of nutrients, and coupling
pelagic and benthic processes, all of which are related to
water quality (Fulford et al., 2010). As a result of the ﬁltra-
tion activities, oysters store water in their guts for a few
days before releasing it, ﬁltered. Some of the particles pres-
ent in the water column can be dangerous to human health
and hence, oysters become unsuitable for human consump-
tion. In most cases, these particles appear as a result of
upstream anthropogenic activities. Consequently, the oyster
industry suffers at the hands of others, i.e., polluting a pub-
lic resource that is of core importance for oyster farmers.
Oysters, like any ﬁlter-feeder, have been considered world-
wide as good indicators of estuary health (Phillips, 1977;
Phillips and Yim, 1981; Scott and Lawrence, 1982; Rosas
et al., 1983).
In NSW, three types of oysters are cultivated: the native
Sydney Rock Oyster (SRO – 4,786,802 dozen in 2013/
2014), Saccostrea glomerata, the Paciﬁc Oyster (PO –
255,213 dozen), Crassostrea gigas, and marginally the Flat
Oyster, Ostrea angasi (NSWDPI, 2014). Paciﬁc Oysters
are approved in seven estuaries, and in six are found under
the form of sterile triploids since this species is considered
a noxious ﬁsh (OISAS, 2014). Oysters can be naturally
caught ($1,401,343 worth); others are grown in hatcheries
($421,728). Some oyster farmers grow oysters from spat to
customer in a single location. Others are specialized in a
speciﬁc age, and buy oysters from hatcheries or move
oysters around according to which environment is best for
the oyster at each speciﬁc moment of its life, so as to
increase growth rates.
2.2. Water quality needs for the NSWoyster industry
Along the South Coast of NSW, the harvesting of oysters
is forbidden when levels of E. coli reach 14 cfu/100 ml,
swimming is forbidden when levels reach 150 cfu/100 ml
and ﬁshing is forbidden when levels are 1000 cfu/100 ml
(NSWDEC, 2005). Even though these levels may vary
depending on local conditions, they show that oyster farm-
ers are the most sensitive users of estuary water. A mini-
mum deterioration of water quality leads to pass the
threshold for oyster harvesting. Oyster farmers’ ﬁrst inter-
est is thus to maintain good water quality. It consequently1http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/estuaries/list.htm
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seems coherent to rely partly on oyster farmers’ interest
and local knowledge to assist in water quality management.
They already participate and co-ﬁnance an intensive water
quality monitoring programme managed by local authori-
ties called the shellﬁsh quality assurance programme. The
cost for monitoring is shared equally by oyster farmers and
the food authority through a shellﬁsh quality assurance
Programme (ASQAP, 2009). The programme involves
intensive water and meat sampling and testing, with a par-
ticular importance placed on microbiological and algal/
phytoplankton testing. It ensures optimal food safety, deal-
ing with consequences of poor water quality. See Table 1
for details of these requirements. The collective cost for
oyster farmers in the Lower Hawkesbury (5 harvest areas,
2 phytoplankton sites, 15 water sites, 12 oyster sampling
sites) is around AU $40,000 per year.
If these levels are reached, production estuaries are
closed following procedures, negotiated between the NSW
Food Authority and oyster farmers. These procedures differ
slightly in different localities. After a period of time deter-
mined by the procedure, the estuary, or parts of the estuary
if a zoning system is implemented, is reopened for harvest-
ing. Table 2 shows different causes for closure in the
Shoalhaven estuary.
Oyster farmers mainly undertake the sampling, and the
testing is conducted in NATA-certiﬁed laboratories.
According to protocol, closures are imposed by the NSW
Food Authority. Part of the measures is linked to automatic
closures after rainfall, since rain triggers an increase in
E. coli levels. Protocol is updated annually based on results
from the programme, including knowledge evolution. For
example, in the Wonboyn estuary, the closing trigger
dropped from 25 ml of rain in 48 hours to 25 ml of rain in
24 hours (interview with oyster farmer, November, 2014).
The NSW Food Authority also manages the reopening of
harvest zones when E. coli levels drop back to acceptable
levels. Each estuary has a growers association in which
water monitoring is discussed along with other topics, a
levy voted on and representatives elected every year.
Depending on the level of E. coli found year round in an
estuary, harvest areas are classiﬁed at several levels. These
levels are adjusted every year. The levels are categorized in
order from best to worst water quality (Food Standards
Code and the Food Regulation, 2010). In approved harvest
areas, growers are allowed to harvest and sell oysters
directly from the harvest area except in adverse conditions
(e.g. heavy rain) – not exceeding 14 cfu/100 ml of E. coli.
In restricted harvest areas, growers are allowed to sell
oysters after oysters are depurated in UV-treated water for
36 hours – not exceeding 70 cfu/100 ml of E. coli.
Approved harvest areas have optimal estuary conditions
for oyster production, as growers do not need to take depu-
ration time into consideration prior to market.
Water quality is heavily impacted by catchment activities
and is monitored mainly for the sake of consumer safety,
and indirectly for oyster ‘image.’ Public health concerns
and potential deaths can cause signiﬁcant harm to the oys-
ter image in the public eye, as was the case during the
tragic Wallis Lake event in 1977, in which a number of
people were infected with Hepatitis A as a result of con-
suming contaminated raw oysters (Conaty et al., 2000).
This event led to the creation of the Shellﬁsh Committee in
the NSW Food Authority (interview with Shellﬁsh Pro-
gramme manager, November, 2014).
Recently, several changes have taken place in the oyster
industry that have led to a number of legal documents
highlighting the industry’s roles in the waterways, as well
as the roles of catchment stakeholders to ensure long-term
sustainability of the NSW oyster industry. Figure 1 repre-
sents the oyster farmers’ representations of the system in
which they were acting prior to these changes.
2.3. Recent processes
2.3.1. Emergence of a series of key oyster industry
institutions
Institutions are being developed in an ad hoc manner with
neither deﬁned structures nor distinguishable goals. These
institutions are nested, and tackle issues at different levels:
estuary, several estuaries, coastal region, and state. At the
estuary level, there are associations of producers, such as
the Broken Bay Oysters Association (all oyster farmers
from the Hawkesbury estuary). At this level, these institu-
tions address local issues. In some cases, the institution
does not do much. On a larger scale, the Sapphire Coast
Wilderness Oysters (SCWO), an association created in
2011 and comprised of 19 oyster farmers from four nearby
Table 2. Closures in days for 2006–2012 in the Shoalhaven estuary
Closure reason (days) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Grand total
Rainfall 29 78 29 13 98 48 49 344
Sewage discharge 47 13 60
Rainfall and sewage discharge 23 23
Precautionary closure 10 1 11
Toxic harmful algal bloom 10 10
Salinity below trigger level 7 7
Microbiological exceedance in water and/or shellﬁsh 8 7 4 19
Grand total 39 135 37 20 99 82 62 474
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estuaries within the local government Bega Valley Region,
is a voice for oyster farmers in the estuaries of the Sapphire
Coast. This level is consistent with areas of local govern-
ment, since the estuaries participating in the SCWO are
those located within the Bega Valley Shire Council. At an
even larger scale, the Australia’s Oyster Coast (AOC), an
association created in 2012 and comprised of 39 oyster
farmers, covers the entire South Coast. These associations
are working toward new oyster branding and marketing
strategies, addressing local issues, affecting estuaries and
members, and crafting rules or strategies for members,
basing their argumentation on environmental responsibility.
The Sapphire Coast Wilderness Oysters is represented in
councils and workshops.
At the state level, the NSW Farmers’ Association, the
general farmers lobby in NSW, has an oyster committee
represented by nine oyster farmers who look after the inter-
ests of oyster farmers on a state-wide level, i.e., all along
the NSW coast. This association is required for the farming
industry to speak with one voice. Government agencies
know who to contact if they need to discuss issues with the
industry. As a result of their expertise, oyster farmers can
assist with the writing of better policies, obtain legal
advice, and formulate plans (interview with oyster farmer
member of the oyster committee, December, 2014).
The NSW Farmers’ Association is a great supporter
of EMS development, and was consulted during the devel-
opment of the Oyster Industry Sustainable Aquaculture
Strategy (OISAS) (communication in workshop,
November, 2014).
Most of these institutions are recent. What enabled their
creation and development? In the following subsection, we
show that environmental information sharing document
creation was a key point in this process.
2.3.2. New information sharing documents
Two types of documents have emerged in the last 10 years.
The ﬁrst is a document written by the Department of Pri-
mary Industries (DPI) of NSW in 2006 and updated in
2014: the aforementioned OISAS. The second is a set of
documents that have been written for the oyster industry at
the estuary level: the aforementioned EMS.
The Oyster Industry Sustainable Aquaculture (OISAS)
has been written and updated by the DPI, with support
from the NSW oyster aquaculture industry. It “arose from
concerns (...) as to the existing and potential impact on the
oyster aquaculture industry associated with the rapid devel-
opment of the NSW coastline” (OISAS, 2014). It states
that “the maintenance of existing water quality, tidal range
and ﬂow will be achieved primarily through establishing
links between the requirements for the sustainable cultiva-
tion of healthy oysters and catchment land and water use
planning” (OISAS, 2014). The document also declares that
for any development application, which could have an
impact on water quality, oyster farmers must be consulted,
and it lists elements that could help protect harvesting
areas (OISAS, 2014). After nine years of existence, this
document is now part of normal procedures for local coun-
cils during urban or industrial development application
processes. Knowledge of OISAS varies from oyster farmer
to oyster farmer, some “not even knowing of its existence”
and others capable of “citing parts of the document” (inter-
view with the author, November, 2014).
The second class of documents, the EMSs, is described
as “a voluntary, industry driven, environmental initiative”
(EMS Wagonga, 2012). They have been developed under
the direction of an environmental non-governmental organ-
ization called OceanWatch Australia and local natural
resource management agencies like the South Coast Catch-
ment Management Authority. These documents are all pub-
licly available on-line. The ﬁrst one of these was developed
for the oyster industry in the Broken Bay area in 2005.
This was the Hawkesbury estuary that in 2004 had been
wiped out by QX disease, killing nearly 100% of the local
oysters (Butt and Raftos, 2007). Out of 32 estuaries produ-
cing oysters in NSW at the time this article was written,
17 have developed an EMS. The number of estuaries will-
ing to develop an EMS is growing constantly (interview
with EMS facilitator, November, 2014). A notable excep-
tion is Wallis Lake, the biggest oyster producer in NSW
(OISAS, 2014), as growers in this estuary have business
plans set using old infrastructure that is not the most
environmentally-friendly technology.
All EMSs have the same layout and are adapted to each
estuary to address local issues. The EMS documents con-
tain a scope, an overview of the estuary, a list of best prac-
tices used in the estuary, a summary of the impacts from
the industry’s practices and external impacts affecting the
industry. The document also has a risk assessment that
scores the severity of the impacts, both internal and
Figure 1. Oyster farmers’ representations of the system prior to EMS
implementation.
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external, toward optimal estuarine environmental condi-
tions. Following the risk assessment, actions to be under-
taken by the industry are proposed to mitigate each risk,
including indicators to monitor the evolution of these risks
and actions. The risks are evaluated at the estuary level and
not on a business scale, creating solidarity among actors.
Estuary-wide environmental management systems were
developed through a series of meetings with all local
growers, in which all local problems were raised and
assessed.
Internal problems are those that could be tackled within
the oyster industry. Projects are mostly funded by oyster
farmers, partially helped by government grants that trig-
gered the evolution process. Examples of typical projects
are: moving to recyclable plastic cultivation infrastructure
instead of tar-coated infrastructure, cleaning up derelict
cultivation structures, and investing in more efﬁcient
engines.
External risks are those occurring outside the oyster
farms such as: leachate of on-site sewage treatment sys-
tems or destruction of riparian habitats as a result of cattle
intrusion to these areas. The EMS documents allow infor-
mation sharing about the actions undertaken by oyster
farmers and make their requirements legitimate to ensure
proﬁtability within their industry. Estuary-wide environ-
mental management systems further generate feedback to
upstream actors through information sharing.
On the south coast of NSW, two EMS ofﬁcers have been
nominated to be in charge of monitoring EMS implementa-
tion processes and representing oyster farmers in different
councils and authority bodies. These ofﬁcers help maintain
the momentum of the EMS project, advocate for oyster
farmers’ interests and are contacted when development
applications are submitted.
Thanks to these documents, the institutions that were
created are becoming legitimate in the eyes of the councils
and government authorities with whom they communicate.
3. Methods
3.1. Research approach
To study the effect that information sharing documents
have on actors’ abilities to manage their resources and fos-
ter institution creation, we adopted a case-based approach.
To gather data and evidence, we interviewed 13 oyster
farmers across NSW estuaries (Figure 2), and used a par-
ticipant observation position in meetings.
The chosen case is a positive example of how some
actors managed to impact and steward the quality of water,
a public good on which they heavily depend, through the
creation of new institutions made possible thanks to an
environmental information sharing process. As described
in Section 2, oysters are commercially grown in 32 estuaries
in NSW, with 17 of them having developed estuary-wide
EMSs, a process started in 2005 and continuing today. To
understand the effects of the EMS development process,
we conducted a series of interviews with industry members
and key oyster stakeholder representatives, attended oyster
farmers’ meetings and drew upon the deep knowledge of
one of the authors of this paper, who has been working
closely with the Australian oyster farming industry for
more than 10 years. We analyzed the evolution of situa-
tions using the social-ecological systems (SES) (Ostrom,
2009a; McGinnis and Ostrom, 2014) and ENCORE
(Ferrand, 2004; Daniell, 2012) (see Section 3.3) frame-
works. The SES framework is used to take a large, speci-
ﬁed collection of system components into account, as well
as understanding their role in the system’s governance.
ENCORE is used to assess impacts resulting from the
introduction of the EMS, not only on its intended effects
on resources, but also on other dimensions related to the
various components of the SES, including social ones.
3.2. Data collection
In November 2014, two of the authors interviewed 13 oys-
ter farmers across six estuaries (79 licenses in these estu-
aries) out the 17 equipped with EMSs, ﬁve of which were
located in the South Coast, and the last of which was
located in the North Coast. The 13 oyster farmers inter-
viewed included three growers in Wagonga Inlet, three in
Merimbula Lake, two in Broken Bay (North Coast), and
one each in Shoalhaven River, Pambula Lake, Wapengo
Lagoon, and Nelson and Wonboyn Rivers. Some of the
growers interviewed are proactive growers, keen on playing
a leadership role in the industry. Among those, some are
very involved in environment protection matters, such as
the Bega Valley EMS ofﬁcer or the one who implemented
an EMS at the individual farm level. These growers played
a signiﬁcant role in the adoption of EMSs involving all
farmers in each estuary. Other growers were randomly
chosen.
The interviews were semi-structured, and supported by a
set of pre-deﬁned questions. The questions chosen were
then adapted to the situation and discourse of the oyster
farmer. Interviews usually lasted for around one hour, and
all were recorded and transcribed. The questionnaire is
available as an appendix of this paper, and was globally
organized around three main topics. The ﬁrst part was
intended to gather data about local practices, as well as the
oyster farmer’s personal history. The second part investi-
gated issues faced by farmers, both personally and at the
estuary level. Lastly, the interview focused on collective
action, with a particular emphasis on information and
information sharing artifacts, especially EMSs, and the
changes they fostered.
In addition to the above, we interviewed three actors
involved in the industry: the EMS facilitator, the Shellﬁsh
programme manager of the NSW Food Authority and the
author of the OISAS document, member of the NSW
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Figure 2. Main oyster producing estuaries in NSW. Visited estuaries are in boxes.
Source: Adapted from OISAS (2014).
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Department of Primary Industries. Questions were adapted
to the respondent. The interviews were similarly recorded
and transcribed. These interviews were ﬁrst based on
understanding the role of the institutions for which they
worked, as well as their personal involvement, and second
on the role of information sharing in the industry.
We also attended a workshop called “The role of natural
resources management in the NSW oyster industry,” held
in Sydney in November 2014, which brought together six
oyster farmers, seven public servants and a few other parti-
cipants, such as a member of the NSW Farmers’ Associa-
tion. They discussed the roles of each party openly,
confronting positive and negative experiences, and what
should be done next. The idea behind this arena was that
“by sharing knowledge and information, and improving
communication across stakeholders, [it] will help foster
stronger partnerships and projects that deliver better out-
comes for industry and the environment.”
The ideas of this paper were presented to the people
who were interviewed for validation and completion feed-
back. The 6 out of 13 who responded agreed on the analy-
sis developed, either accepting it as a whole or adding
clariﬁcations and precisions that we have subsequently
included in our analysis and discussion.
3.3. Analysis frameworks
3.3.1. Social-ecological systems (SES)
We use a systemic perspective with the SES framework
(Ostrom, 2009a; McGinnis and Ostrom, 2014; see
Figure 3). It allows a thorough description of a system in
which some actors interact with a (or several) renewable
natural resource(s). In a SES, several entities that can be
described separately are linked together to form a complex
system. The main categories are the resource system (RS),
the resource units (RU), the actors (A) and the government
system (GS*). A selection of relevant variables to our case
has been made, and can be found in Table 4.
Resource systems can be seen as two nested systems,
the smaller one being the estuary scale and the bigger one
being the catchment scale. We will investigate the change
in perspective that these documents create. Resource units
are oysters, but they can include ﬁsh. At the estuary level,
actors are oyster farmers, ﬁshers, and boat users. At the
catchment level, actors are farmers, homeowners, and the
general community. The governance system is evolving,
and it principally consists of catchment management autho-
rities and local government agencies (i.e., councils) at the
waterway-catchment level, the Food Authority and Depart-
ment of Primary Industry at the state level, and new asso-
ciations/institutions on the industry side.
3.3.2. ENCORE
ENCORE is an observation and evaluation model for
participatory management processes (Ferrand, 2004;
Daniell, 2012). It is an acronym of the following terms:
External – improvement in the water management situa-
tion; Normative – norms, values and preferences of water
users; Cognitive – representations and beliefs of users;
Operational – practices and actions of users; Relational –
social relationships among users; Equity – perception of
social justice.
The deﬁnitions have been adapted from Daniell (2012)
to ﬁt the situation studied in this paper. It is a useful frame-
work to list possible evolutions linked to a process invol-
ving a number of different actors.
Figure 3. The social-ecological framework (McGinnis and Ostrom, 2014).
© 2016 The Authors. Natural Resources Forum © 2016 United Nations
8 Nicolas Paget et al. / Natural Resources Forum •• (2016) ••–••
3.3.3. Framework completion
The frameworks were completed using the information
gathered during the ﬁeld investigation led by one of the
authors and reviewed by another author, who has been an
important actor in the NSW oyster farming industry for the
past 10 years.
4. Results
This section ﬁrst focuses on the originality of the EMS
documents in the context of the case study: the EMSs are
designed at the estuary level and not at the farm level.
Then the analysis draws upon the SES and ENCORE fra-
meworks to show that environmental information sharing
can be a way to legitimize actors as stewards of their
resources, as well as to foster institution creation.
4.1. Estuary-wide EMSs, an innovative approach to
oyster farming
First, let us focus on fundamental changes that occurred on
rules (GS6*) with a document that affected a great number
of variables in the SES. Usually, EMSs are the “part of the
global management system which includes the organiza-
tional structure, the planning activities, the responsibilities,
the practices, the procedures, the processes and the
resources necessary for development, implementation,
achievement, evaluation and sustentation of the environ-
ment policy” (Cotoc et al., 2013: 1317). They help to “pro-
tect valuable environmental assets, manage local areas on
the most suitable way and develop relationships between
people and the natural environment” (Mangra et al.,
2014: 1). They are organization-oriented: “an EMS has the
primary purpose of preventing negative effects on the envi-
ronment and improving a ﬁrm’s environmental practices”
Massoud et al., 2011: 6). EMSs could be taken to meet a
certiﬁcation standard or could be left as codes of practice.
Two standards for certiﬁcation exist: the ISO 14001 inter-
national standard and the CE regulation 1221/2009n envi-
ronment and audit management (Cotoc et al., 2013).
Literature shows that EMS implementation has positive
outcomes for clients, costs (sparing unnecessary waste)
and image (Massoud et al., 2011; Psomas et al., 2011;
Ronnenberg et al., 2011; Cotoc et al., 2013), that several
strategies can be followed (Nishitani, 2010) and that small
businesses have many more difﬁculties in EMS implemen-
tation, despite achieving positive outcomes (Hillary, 2004;
Collins et al., 2007; Zorpas, 2010).
There is an important difference in the way EMSs have
been conceived in the case study. The innovation lies in the
creation of estuary-wide EMSs for the oyster industry.
These EMSs involve a great majority of the businesses in
an estuary, since most impacts and risks from and to the
industry are equally shared by every business within a
waterway. To our knowledge, apart from those written for
oyster farming, only a few EMSs have been designed for
some ﬁsheries at a general level in Australia, and these are
not publicly available. The EMSs follow most ISO
14001:2004 standards, even though they are ‘not fully
compliant’ (EMS Wagonga, 2012). It is seen as a code of
practice that can be upgraded to ISO certiﬁcation with min-
imum work. This will happen in the near future once the
industry is ready to be audited. EMSs set global objectives
for the industry as a whole, covering internal issues that
maximize industry practices to minimum environmental
impact and external issues that, try to mitigate risks result-
ing from catchment users and processes. A few oyster
farmers created EMSs for their own individual businesses,
but they offered limited beneﬁts (interview with one of
such oyster farmers, November, 2014). Since the main
objective for the oyster industry is water quality improve-
ment, it can only be reached through collective action. The
developed internal indicators are aggregations. For
instance, in the category ‘Ecological effects’, the indicator
‘Number of derelict leases rehabilitated’ ensures monitor-
ing of the sub-objective “work with NSW DPI and other
organizations to identify and rehabilitate derelict leases”
(EMS Wagonga, 2012).
Estuary-wide environmental management systems can
thus serve as collective action documents, or documents
that make every member of a category of actors in an SES
responsible for management, going beyond simple, albeit
laudable, business-oriented EMSs. They can be part of sus-
tainable management of a shared resource. This makes
even more sense, considering the recognized difﬁculty in
EMS implementation for small businesses (Zorpas, 2010).
4.2. Evolution of oyster farmers’ roles – legitimation
and feedback through an information and environment-
centered boundary object
4.2.1. Legitimation
Internal change in rules led to better internal and external
information sharing (I2) through a legitimization of oyster
farmers who provide stewardship over the water quality
process. As emphasized in Section 1, to ensure good water
quality, oyster farmers have to cope with other actors’
actions, and have to deal with upstream catchment users
and processes (i.e. external risks). There were also misun-
derstandings throughout the community regarding oyster
farmers’ impacts on the estuary. The development of EMSs
allowed communities to learn about typical industry prac-
tices, as well as industry’s roles as stewards of good water
quality. They are information-laden documents. Using the
ENCORE framework, Table 3 shows their impacts on dif-
ferent populations. All the listed changes did not occur in
all estuaries where EMSs were developed (see Section 5.1.
on limitations). An EMS is a long and comprehensive doc-
ument, containing information that can be irrelevant to a
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broad audience. It is updated on a regular basis, in general
every ﬁve years, and thus does not contain situation evolu-
tions between those dates. Two other documents can be
considered as parts of the EMS, even though they are not
the EMS per se.
The ﬁrst of these two other documents is an annual
review, publicly available, stating the evolution of the situa-
tion and the actions undertaken since the last review (I10).
It was created using a collective summary of the actions
undertaken by all oyster farmers. The second one is a small
leaﬂet of general and concise information, informative
enough for the general public, highlighting what has been
achieved in recent years. Having all these different roles of
information sharing, management helping and procedure
facilitating, EMSs can be considered as boundary objects,
or “objects that are both adaptable to different viewpoints
and robust enough to maintain identity across them” (Star
and Griesemer, 1989: 387). They are information systems
that allow communication among different categories of
actors at the required level.
According to Gietzelt et al., 2014, p.2: “When South
East LLS ﬁrst engaged with the oyster industry in 2003, (oys-
ter farmers) were frustrated with their lack of inﬂuence over
processes and practices threatening their industry. When
issues (...) caused the temporary closure of oyster harvesting,
their response was generally reactionary, and they did not
have a loud and collective voice when expressing their con-
cerns to government and the community.”
Table 3. Possible evolution of actors according to ENCORE dimensions (see Section 3.3. for deﬁnitions)
Dimension Potential impact of EMS and OISAS implementation on different actors
External Oyster farmers Cleaning up of derelict and polluting
infrastructure, investment in sustainable
infrastructure
Govt. and councils Can use oyster farmers’ knowledge and presence
to assist when monitoring
Farmers Fencing off cattle to limit access to the estuarine
foreshore, regrowth of riparian vegetation
House owners Better on-site sewage system
Community Safety during swimming and recreational ﬁshing
Normative Oyster farmers OF should provide stewardship over water, others
should be made aware of their impacts
Govt. and councils OF should provide help as stewards of the
waterways
Farmers Need to play a role in keeping good water quality
House owners Should be made aware that they can have an
impact on water quality
Community Should be made aware that they can have an
impact on water quality
Cognitive Oyster farmers Government is not an enemy
Govt. and councils Oysters are good indicators of estuarine health
Farmers Farming activities can impact water quality
House owners Micro behaviors can affect the whole system
Community Aware that OF are not harmful (if not beneﬁcial)
to the environment, oyster farming is
associated with clean environments, suitable
for tourism, and generating income for the
local economy
Operational Oyster farmers Reducing high internal risks by implementing
risk mitigation procedures
Govt. and councils Oyster farmers are integrated in decision
processes
Farmers Maintain cattle out of the water, behind fences
House owners Improve or maintain sewage treatment
Relational Oyster farmers Legitimate members of the community, can talk
to others with pride
Govt. and councils OF are knowledgeable partners
Farmers OF are partners in environment quality
House owners Accept better OF requests for improvements
Community Common interest in tourism
Equity Oyster farmers Feel that they have input
Govt. and councils Better acceptance of decisions
Farmers Agree to invest knowing OFs make efforts
House owners Agree to invest knowing OFs make efforts
Community Legitimate use of crown resource
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Following this, OISAS explains to what extent local
councils and the oyster industry worked hand in hand to
develop EMSs and address issues raised, to the point of
creating an Oyster Partnership Programme in 2006, which
partly subsidizes an EMS implementation ofﬁcer position
and promotes oyster performance monitoring programmes
(RS7, I9, O2), among other actions (Gietzelt et al., 2014).
Furthermore, as explained in OISAS, 2014, upon submis-
sion of a development application to a Council, conse-
quences on water quality are to be considered and oyster
farmer representatives consulted in case of possible impact
(I10, O2). This communication provides a discussion
among key stakeholders (interview with oyster farmer,
November, 2014).
4.2.2. Evaluation of consequences on the SES
The identiﬁcation of boundaries and content of the SES by
its actors has dramatically changed with the creation of
these documents (see Section 3.3). Estuary-wide environ-
mental management systems are new resources available to
oyster farmers to act on an object of core importance to
them: water quality and the estuary in general. As shown
before, they are used in many different ways: during devel-
opment application processes; for raising awareness; to
allow farmers to voice their views; and for interacting with
councils. Oyster industry sustainable aquaculture is another
government-owned resource that can be used in similar
cases to ensure optimal water quality. The SES framework
analysis shows in Table 4 that these new resources have
had an effect on a considerable number of variables of the
SES. One of the most important is that it allowed the size
of the system (RS2) for the oyster farmers to be redeﬁned.
Instead of being focused and constraining actions to the
estuary limit, the system now includes the whole catchment
and the processes that could indirectly affect oyster farm-
ing practices. This had an impact on pollution patterns
(ECO2) and ﬂows into and out of focal SES (ECO3): pol-
lution events are now internal, and thus can more easily be
addressed, and ﬂows in and out are reduced because the
system is deﬁned at the catchment level, which prevents
water from entering from other systems, except the sea.
This could happen thanks to the deﬁnition of new rules at
all levels: constitutional, collective and operational (GS*).
Estuary-wide environmental management systems are all
the more efﬁcient as they are emerging following most of
the core principles of common-pool resource management
(Ostrom, 1990), helped by a cooperative attitude of govern-
ment bodies. These rules have affected information shar-
ing, self-organizing, monitoring, networking and evaluative
Table 4. Evaluation of consequences of the implementation of the environmental information sharing system – only the relevant variables have
been selected from McGinnis and Ostrom (2014)
Variable (see Figure 3) Initial features Transition Features after implementation
RS3 - Size of resource system Estuary External issues internalized Catchment
RS7 - Predictability of system
dynamics
Difﬁcult to predict Indicators multiplied More precise: growth and mortality
GS2 – Non government
organization
Almost none Emerged through meetings SCWO, AOC
GS3 – Network structure Porous Meetings Very dense, at least at the estuary level
A6a – Trust/Reciprocity Little Meetings Improved, for environment at least
A7 – Knowledge of SES/Mental
models
Upstream actors
responsible
Holistic view Part of a catchment
A9 – Technology available Any Long-term thinking while elaborating Sustainable, non-polluting (internally)
I2 – Information sharing Little Forced through meetings on consensual
subjects
Among actors, with others
I3 – Deliberation process Meetings for water
quality
Canalized through meetings Regular meetings at several levels
I5 – Investment activities Water and meat
monitoring
Identiﬁed through meetings New technologies (individually), clean-up
I6 – Lobbying activities Dispersed Made easier with hard documents More centralized
I8 – Networking activities Dispersed Hard documents exist, EMS ofﬁcer More systematic (incl. in government
processes)
I9 – Monitoring activities Water and meat Government implicated Extensive, partnership with government for
stewardship, growth and mortality
I10 – Evaluative activities Little Range of indicators deﬁned Extensive
O1 – Social measures Little Deep thinking about sustainability Sustainability is core
O2 – Ecological performance
measures
Little Deep thinking about sustainability Precisely deﬁned
ECO2 – Pollution patters Many, upstream,
dispersed
Scale change Now internal and more reachable
ECO3 – Flows into and out of
focal SES
Flow from catchment Scale change Now internal and more reachable
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activities. They even deﬁned social and ecological perfor-
mance measures that will allow efﬁcient monitoring of out-
comes. Figure 4 shows the evolution of oyster farmers’
representation of the system (A7).
5. Discussion
This case study focuses on NSW oyster farmers who have
developed environmental management systems to increase
their ability to mitigate risks by increasing dialog with
upstream and public actors. This approach has positively
impacted the industry. There is more cohesion among
actors, a change in SES view, and a reinforcement of legiti-
macy over use and management of the resources they both
use and share. The process seems to be an effective solu-
tion for enhancing or strengthening links among industry
members and catchment actors.
5.1. Limitations
Some limitations exist, and these were pinpointed during
interviews. First, launching the environmental information
sharing process in itself can be tough, in that it is adversely
affected by internal conﬂicts and beliefs of actors, preventing
further institutionalization. Then, despite having achieved the
process and building of institutions, some areas have been
wiped out due to environmental factors, thus demonstrating
that this process does not guarantee complete sustainability
and resilience within the industry. Finally, the support of pub-
lic institutions plays a critical role, either favoring or not
favoring a change in actors’ roles.
The ﬁrst difﬁculty lies in process initialization. In
Australia, the ﬁrst oyster farming EMS was developed in
Tasmania, in 2005. The EMS’s beneﬁts were advocated by
a proactive oyster farmer. According to the EMS facilitator,
these processes could only emerge through another oyster
farmer’s advocacy. Even at the local scale within each
estuary, a local champion needs to be identiﬁed, so that he
or she drives the process of creating an EMS for the whole
industry. This champion’s opinion can lead to the success
or the failure of the EMS implementation (interview with
EMS facilitator, November, 2014). The success in develop-
ing and implementing EMSs in other estuaries and the
availability to access government grants to implement
EMSs’ actions is now a motivation for other estuaries to
develop their own EMS. The process is much easier when
council or catchment management authority personnel are
involved (interviews with oyster farmers, November,
2014), as it means that these regulatory bodies have similar
goals to those of industry members.
Adoption and understanding of EMS advantages is pro-
gressive. It is an opt-in document. According to the EMS
facilitator, it is becoming the norm in estuary management:
not having an EMS could leave oyster farmers behind, in
particular missing out on the option of having a voice in
catchment issues or obtaining grants that require the devel-
opment of EMSs. This issue could be resolved with time.
It was mentioned in Section 2.3.2 that the process of
implementing EMSs enhanced communication among oys-
ter farmers. This fostered institution creation and elevated
water management as a common issue. However, it did not
prevent other issues from arising. Beliefs of actors can pre-
vent appropriation of a subject that is of general interest. In
Wapengo Lake, even though an EMS was developed in
2010 (EMS Wapengo, 2010), some growers applied for
Paciﬁc Oyster (PO) cultivation approval. Since diploid PO
is considered a pest in NSW, it is forbidden to be culti-
vated in NSW estuaries except in Port Stephens (OISAS,
2014). If approved, the cultivation of triploid PO is
allowed; however, some actors believe that growing triploid
PO could be harmful to the estuary and SRO performance
as a result of exceeding the carrying capacity of the estu-
ary. Trials of PO cultivation led to the creation of rifts
among oyster farmers in that locality, to the point that com-
munication among farmers is currently non-existent.
Figure 4. Oyster farmers’ representation of the system after EMS implementation.
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An EMS document cannot cover everything. Monitoring
and developments must be periodically updated. Although
evaluation for industry-wide EMSs does not yet exist, iden-
tiﬁcation of issues affecting water quality or other environ-
mental topics and the implementation of strategies and
actions to tackle them, both internally and externally, is a
positive process, as shown in Section 4.1. EMSs do not pre-
vent all risks. A group of Lower Hawkesbury estuary farm-
ers, one of the largest groups of oyster producers in NSW,
was the ﬁrst oyster group to have implemented an EMS in
NSW. They created an association (Broken Bay Oysters) in
2005, and implemented and enacted the ﬁrst EMS that
same year. At the time, only two estuaries had developed
EMSs. They implemented most of the EMS actions and the
water quality was optimal for oyster farming (interview
with BBO president, October, 2014). After being wiped out
in 2004 by QX Disease, the industry recovered during the
2005–2011 period, swapping production from the SRO, a
native oyster species, to the PO (EMSBBO, 2011). In
January 2013, this estuary got hit again by the Paciﬁc Oys-
ter Mortality Syndrome, a virus that killed nearly 100% of
Paciﬁc oysters in the Hawkesbury. By 2014, only three oys-
ter farmers remained in the estuary. Water quality results
are very good, and almost all internal risks were addressed
at that time, as described in the EMS (EMSBBO, 2011).
However, despite growers being key pioneers in the EMS
process and implementation, major unexpected events out-
weighed the beneﬁts of implementing EMSs.
The Lower Hawkesbury River catchment was the ﬁrst
to implement an estuary-wide EMS in 2005. This effort
was very much supported by the local council, the
Hornsby Shire Council. This effort was translated ﬁnan-
cially through support for the cleaning of derelict and
tarred infrastructure. It is also visible through investments
made in water monitoring: six telemetry-based monitoring
stations in the river, in addition to an extensive water qual-
ity monitoring programme that is regularly undertaken by
council and the oyster farmers. Pollution levels and early
warning alerts are shared between both bodies. The mutual
help that oyster farmers and the council can give each
other has been ofﬁcially recognized through a memoran-
dum of understanding, signed in 2011 between the Broken
Bay Oyster Association and the Hornsby Shire Council.
The South Coast Local Land Services (LLS) in Nowra,
Batemans Bay and Bega work closely with oyster farmers,
supporting their efforts and recognizing their roles in estu-
ary management. The South Coast LLS states that: “EMS
is not only the tool that identiﬁes best practice manage-
ment within the industry, but is also a foundation for
growers and South East LLS to actively engage other
industries, stakeholders, government agencies, landholders
and local communities on catchment issues that impact on
oyster production and estuary health” (Gietzelt et al.,
2014: 1).
In the North, there were some issues that prevented a
similar level of improvement as along the South Coast.
First, catchment management agencies were less proactive
because of a lack of resources. Second, key environmental
issues, such as acid sulfate soils (ASS), existed. These
affect the oyster industry as well as other industries, such
as recreational ﬁshers and land-based farmers. These issues
are both hard to manage and have signiﬁcant impacts on
the industry and waterways. In some cases, ASS are
located on private land, leading to difﬁculties in ﬁnding a
public means of mitigating the issues, or the work requires
extensive ﬁnancing and operations. Slowly, however, some
estuaries are succeeding in employing competent research
groups. Third, growers were less proactive in EMS devel-
opment, making it harder for councils and other groups to
support the process. This conﬁrms the demonstration of
this publication: if an industry has an EMS, then there is a
professional commitment by the industry to do the right
thing, and other stakeholders might subsequently consider
assisting in ‘external’ catchment issues.
5.2. Information sharing: a prelude to
institutionalization
As downstream actors located at the very end of physical
ﬂows of catchment areas in estuaries, oyster farmers have to
deal with externalities resulting from other actors. They are in
competition with other actors for the use of their most impor-
tant resource, the estuary (under the form of Crown Land in
NSW) and its corresponding water quality. The EMS imple-
mentation process enabled them to create a feedback loop,
which consists of information ﬂow as shown in Figure 5.
The study shows that while implementing such documents
is not a smooth process since it can be impeded by strong
beliefs or lack of initial support by actors or the public sec-
tor, or even be limited in effect by unforeseen risks, it does
create important positive effects. First, local cohesion and
communication are enhanced. These effects have been wit-
nessed in the case developed in this paper, and could proba-
bly be achieved through different kinds of projects involving
local actors, since these projects could foster regular meet-
ings, and thus discussions, among themselves. The advan-
tage of this project over other types of projects could be the
needed thinking and formalization of water and the estuary
as shared resources, as well as joint responsibilities. Second,
working on projects like these, being exposed to opinions of
others allows participants to build a greater understanding of
their own environments, as demonstrated by the change in
views of the SES. One could think of further strengthening
Upstream
Physical flow
Downstream
Informational flow
Figure 5. Physical vs. informational ﬂows.
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impacts by implicating upstream actors, or other users of the
estuary, in a bigger project. This kind of idea has been
applied by the Hornsby Shire Council when developing their
estuary management plan (HSC et al., 2008; Daniell, 2012).
To our knowledge, this case is a unique case of actors
developing EMSs, especially in a voluntary way. To our
knowledge, it does not exist elsewhere in Australia in any
industry. It could be interesting to try to apply this process
with other types of actors that are located at the end of a
chain, such as beekeepers. Like oysters, bees are important
for the environment, oysters by ﬁltering water, bees by pol-
linating crops, and are indicators of healthy and sustainable
practices, having to undergo upstream actors’ externalities
as well.
The mere existence of these documents is not a solution
in itself. However, it is a good step toward legitimation of
core actors over a shared resource. Demonstrating personal
and institutional environmental responsibility through well-
built, transparent and accessible information sharing docu-
ments can be an efﬁcient way of improving work with
other actors.
6. Conclusion
The goal of the study was to explore possible conse-
quences of environmental information sharing over the
stewardship of a shared resource that is of core importance
to some actors. These actors, in this case oyster farmers,
managed to implement documents that led to more cohe-
sion amongst themselves, as well as to more negotiating
power with other actors and local public authorities.
Despite some limits, environmental monitoring,
information production and sharing can have multiple
positive effects on water quality, estuary management,
maintenance of resource system productivity, and local
actors. Different users or managers of the estuary can unite
to ensure good water quality. In this case, changing the
scale of the problem is part of the solution. And in the case
of NSW oyster farmers, this process came from two differ-
ent sides.
First, the government ofﬁcially acknowledged the role
that oyster farmers needed to play in using best practices to
ensure minimum impact on the estuarine environment,
recognizing them as environmental stewards, since oysters
are extremely sensitive to water quality. Second, in many
estuaries, EMS documents emerged. These documents,
crafted by oyster farmers, stated they have a responsibility
in maintaining good water quality and identifying their
own internal responsibilities and external risks, which are
mainly upstream responsibilities of other actors. These
documents proved to everyone (councils, governments,
community) that oyster growers were responsible, and thus
legitimated their role in estuary/catchment management.
Thus, they were able to effectively act at the level of the
whole catchment instead of being limited to the estuary,
and hence to address other actors’ actions that were affect-
ing them. This enabled the creation of practical feedback
on the right level.
Perceptions, values and actions of different actors, as
well as their views of each other, are therefore shifting.
Oyster farmers took advantage of increasing environmental
awareness in communities, and positioned themselves as
guardians of the environment, being able to act to protect a
public resource that is a condition for their industry. The
industry is getting stronger, as attested by institution crea-
tion, despite signiﬁcant setbacks caused by disease in some
estuaries.
The EMS creation process will not always be success-
ful. It needs to be internal, and can be hampered by
unconvinced local actors, or slowed down due to formaliz-
ing internal issues or beliefs in a public document. New
issues can arise as well, such as unforeseen new risks,
resistance on the part of upstream actors, government pas-
sivity or support for other activities. These documents are
a step toward sustainability of a trade, as well as a positive
way to manage a natural resource by building trust in the
possibility of collective action and improvement of prac-
tices of all, both within and outside of a trade. This paper
adds to the global discussion on environmental manage-
ment information systems by extending the domain in
which they can be useful from single companies or farms
to emergent collective action aimed at collective resource
management.
Publicly shared information, whether in an extensive
form such as an EMS or a more compact one such as a
leaﬂet about the environment and actions demystiﬁes, justi-
ﬁes, clariﬁes and legitimizes actors in a local environment.
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Résumé 
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Abstract 
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Nous explorons e lien entre partage 
d'information (PI) et gestion collective de 
ressources naturelles (GRN). La reflexivité est 
souvent considérée comme un moyen d'aide à la 
gestion et de mobiliisation collective autour d'un 
objet commun. Cette reflexivité peut être atteinte 
grâce à la mise en place et à l'usage de 
systèmes de PI. Pour déterminer la relation entre 
PI et GRN, nous nous sommes interessé au cas 
de l'ostréiculture. Les ostréiculteurs sont 
particulièrement sensibles à la qualité de l'eau et 
sont actuellement touchés par un virulent virus. 
Localement, ces acteurs ont développé et 
utilisent divers artéfacts de PI. Ces artifacts sont 
en fait destinés à faire face à des menaces qui 
pourraient les toucher. L'identification de ce point 
fondamental a mené à développer le concept de 
menaces en utilisant la typologie traditionnelle 
de biens et ressources. Les menaces sont 
définies par le modèle <A,C,I,D,E>: un groupe 
d'acteurs (A) est inquiet pour certaines 
caractéristiques (C) de biens ou de ressources 
qu'ils utilisent influencées par l'infrastructure 
locale (I), les décisions d'acteurs (D) et les 
dynamiques environnementales (E). Elles sont 
organisées le long de deux axes: l'internalité, et 
l'exclusivité. Formuler la situation des 
ostréiculteurs en utilisant ce concept permet une 
caractérisation des enjeux pour les artéfacts de 
PI pour la lutte contre les différents types de 
menaces.  
Pour explorer ces enjeux, nous avons adopté 
une approche descriptive en se focalisant sur 
des artéfacts réels et en évaluant qualitativement 
leur(s) impact(s) grâce au cadre ENCORE. 
Ensuite, nous avons développé un modèle à 
base d'agents pour évaluer différentes facettes 
des conséquences sur les SES. Les différents 
artéfacts étudiés montrent qu'ils peuvent avoir 
des buts, media et contenus variés peuvent 
améliorer la réflexivité, ou mener à peu, voire 
aucun changement. Ces améliorations sont 
intimement liées au processus de création de 
l'artéfact.
This thesis aims at exploring the link between 
information sharing (IS) and collective natural 
resources management (NRM). Reflexivity is 
often referred to as a possible solution and one 
of the main ways to mobilize actors around 
collective objects. This reflexivity may be 
achieved through the implementation and use of 
IS artifacts. So as to qualify the relation linking 
IS and NRM, I focused on the case of oyster 
farmers (OF). OFs are sensitive to water quality 
and are currently severely harmed by a virulent 
virus. Locally, actors developed and used 
various types of IS artifacts. Artifacts are 
destined to tackle threats that OFs face. 
Realizing this focal point of interest led to 
develop the concept of threats using the 
traditional goods and resources typology as a 
base for comparison. Threats are defined as the 
<A; C; I; D; E> model: a group of actors A is 
concerned for some characteristics C of goods 
or resources they use which is influenced by 
local infrastructure I, human decisions D and 
environmental dynamics E. They are organized 
along two main axes: internality, that 
determines how open or closed the threat is, 
and excludability that focuses on how much 
actors may individually find ways to tackle the 
threat. Framing OF situation using this concept 
allows for a characterization of stakes for IS 
artifacts when they are destined to help actors 
cope with different types of threats, as actors of 
the cases do. To explore these stakes, I 
adopted a descriptive approach and first delved 
into actual artifacts, evaluating qualitatively their 
impact with the ENCORE framework. Then, I 
developed an exploratory ABM,to evaluate 
various facets of SESs. The various artifacts 
studied in the thesis show that their nature 
encompasses a wide variety of in goals, 
contents or media, may lead to improvements in 
reflexivity or to little to no changes. These 
improvements are strongly linked to the artifact 
creation process .
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